In all, 353,780 electronic voting machines were used by the electorate able to vote in that election
The 2000 municipal elections marked the 1st 100% computerized elections in Brazil. The success of that electoral process definitively ended paper ballot voting in the country.
In all, 353,780 voting machines (including the 1996, 1998 and 2000 models) were used by the 109,780,071 eligible voters in that election.
Physically, the 2000 voting machine was similar to the previous model, but with structural modifications. The keyboard was changed to the mechanical standard, which is resistant and presents no danger of the system confusing the keys pressed by the voter, since each one of them has its own connections for sending the signal. This type of keyboard is still used today.
Accessibility
EU2000 also considered the concern of the Electoral Justice with accessibility. Audio was included for people with visual impairments and a headphone jack. In addition to the numbers in Braille on the keys, which were already present in previous models of the ballot box, blind voters began to hear the position and number of the chosen candidate before confirming the vote.
Electronic voting machine used in 2000
contingency ballot boxes
During the preparation of the urns that would be sent to the sections, in the public loading and sealing ceremony, some devices were separated for the purpose of replacement, the so-called contingency urns.
In case it was necessary to change the equipment, the voting diskette and the memory (flash card) were transferred from the defective ballot box to the contingency ballot box, migrating already registered votes.
The new urn was then sealed and became the section urn. In this way, the auditors could certify the integrity of the information and ensure the continuity of electronic voting in the event of any equipment breakdowns.
EU2002: printed vote test
In the 2002 general elections, as per the change instituted by the Law No. 10,408/2002, which sought to ensure greater security for the election, modules for external printing of votes were purchased.
The use of the equipment would be mandatory as of the 2004 municipal elections, but the Electoral Court anticipated its use for testing. According to the norm, the voter should check the vote visually, without having manual contact with the printed version. After confirmation, the vote would be deposited in a sealed ballot box.
![](https://static.poder360.com.br/2023/01/urna-eletronica-2002.jpeg)
Electronic ballot box from 2002
Vote printing did not contribute to security
According to 2002 election report, in addition to the high costs, the experience has demonstrated several problems and proved that the printing of the vote does not add anything in terms of security or transparency. On the contrary, the issue contributed to the breach of constitutional secrecy of the vote in some polling stations since, to resolve problems with paper jamming in the printer, human intervention was necessary.
There was also an increase in queues, the percentage of defective ballot boxes and the need to vote by ballot.
In a meeting of the College of Presidents and the College of Corregedores of the Electoral Justice, held in Florianópolis (SC), on November 28 and 29, 2002, one month after the 2nd round of the election, the participants concluded that it was imperative to eliminate the printed vote in the voting process.
In its place, it was agreed that the electronic vote record (electronic ballot) would be introduced, which mirrors the composition of the voter’s vote, without identifying him, and can be retrieved and printed for an eventual audit request. The following year, sanctioned the Law No. 10,740, which revoked the devices that determined the printing of the vote and instituted the RDV (Digital Vote Record) – still used today. Therefore, it is worth remembering that it is wrong to say that the printed vote is still law.
Former minister Carlos Velloso, who chaired the TSE twice, from 1994 to 1996 and during a period in 2005, occupied the position of substitute at the time of the printed vote. He says that the experience did not work out, mainly due to the inconveniences in using the external printer module, and points out that the electronic ballot boxes can be audited.
“Electronic voting machines are auditable before, during and after elections. It is even possible for parallel counting to be carried out, because the ballot papers, which contain the counting of the ballot box, carried out immediately after the vote, are posted on the door of the polling station and on the internet”he says.
Audit: parallel voting
In 2002, the Electoral Court began parallel voting, also instituted by the Law No. 10,408/2002. According to the device, this audit should only be implemented in the 2004 municipal elections.
To ensure greater transparency and security in the voting process, the parallel voting system consisted of auditing electronic voting machines chosen by lot one day before the elections. This process took place in a controlled and separate environment in the Regional Electoral Courts during the election.
In the system, votes are recorded on paper ballots by a commission. These votes are then typed into a computer and also into the electronic ballot box for all contested positions in the elections. The entire procedure is carried out in the presence of political party inspectors, electoral authorities and appointed civil servants, in a session filmed by two cameras.
To check the data, the ballots contain the number and time of registration in the computer and, at the end, the votes totaled in the electronic ballot box are confronted with those calculated in the computer.
The parallel voting audit was carried out in all TREs, in the 2 shifts, and the results proved the correct functioning of the voting system, ensuring the security of the vote. With the success of the system, parallel voting was definitively incorporated into the electoral process, guaranteeing the security and transparency of the vote. Today, it is known as integrity test.
Oversight
As provided for in paragraph 2 of article 66 of the Law No. 9,504/1997 (Elections Law) and still following Law nº 10.408/2002, the Electoral Justice added to the electronic voting process, in 2002, the ceremony of sealing the systems, the official sampling inspection in the ceremonies of loading the ballot box systems and the correspondence table of ballot boxes loaded for elections.
The sealing ceremony is a public event in which the electoral systems are presented to the oversight bodies, in the form of source and executable programs and, after presentation and conference, they are signed and sealed.
The digital signature ensures that the urn’s software has not been intentionally modified or lost its factory characteristics due to a recording or reading failure. That is, if the digital signature is valid, it means that the file has not been modified.
The procedure also ensures the authenticity of the program, confirming that it has an official origin and was generated by the TSE. The sealing of the systems is carried out by recording the signed programs on non-recordable media and later packaging them in a physically signed envelope and kept in the TSE’s safe room.
Before the 2002 elections, at the initiative of the TSE, Unicamp (State University of Campinas) carried out an analysis comprising the production and operation processes of hardware and software voting, counting, data transmission and vote totaling.
The report indicated “robust, secure and reliable electronic voting system”. The system also complied with all the fundamental requirements and demands of the Brazilian electoral process, respecting the expression of the vote and guaranteeing secrecy, certifying that the vote given is the verified vote, according to the analysis.
The presentation to political parties and companies contracted by them of all the computer programs used in the elections was also carried out.
The associations got to know the application and security systems, the libraries and cryptographic modules, the digital signature of all programs, with the public key and the respective sealing on the Internet. Following TSE Resolution No. 21,221/2002, they could also request an audit of additional ballot boxes up to 30 days after the election. The procedure was carried out in the states of Paraíba and Paraná and confirmed the completeness of all audited ballot boxes.
discard
The useful life of electronic voting machines is about 10 years. Disposal is done in an ecologically correct way, by contracting a company by bidding. Both EU2000 and EU2002 are no longer used in the electoral process.
With information from the Electoral Court
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