As Venezuela’s presidential elections scheduled for 2024 approach, international attention is focused primarily on how to ensure minimum conditions in the elections.
Senior US officials have publicly expressed their willingness to lift some sanctions in exchange for significant concessions from the government of Nicolás Maduro, and There is clearly an ongoing communication channel between US and Venezuelan authorities (In fact, a few days ago both governments agreed to restart the “direct deportation” of illegal Venezuelans to their country, and some sources claim that there are already “contacts” to resume negotiations between the Maduro government and the opposition).
However, this discussion often overlooks one crucial aspect: the plan for the day after. No transition of power can be carried out successfully without a clear path forward for the day after the election.
The feeling of normalization of the situation in the country – explained by multiple factors such as a virtually dollarized economy, the growing international recognition of the Maduro government and the decreasing visibility of human rights violations and the serious humanitarian situation in global medias– has created conditions so that interacting with those in power is the predominant strategy.
It is important to highlight that It is atypical for a country to have an inflation of 400%. practice targeted repression, require millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance, and generate one of the largest migration and refugee crises the world has witnessed in decades. Now, this interaction is not necessarily bad. It is essential to dialogue with all parties involved.
The question is how to ensure that this conversation paves the way from the current authoritarian government to something closer to a democratic opening and, ultimately, to the eventual restoration of this devastated nation’s institutions. It should not be a tactic to buy time and perpetuate those in power.
Efforts to facilitate elections that are as free and fair as possible are essential and must be based on the roadmap established by the European Union following its 2021 election observation mission.
This roadmap highlights key measures such as allowing disqualified candidates to run for public office, strengthening the separation of powers and judicial independence, and abolishing the Comptroller General’s authority to administratively and arbitrarily disqualify political opponents. It is imperative to ensure participation in the opposition primaries scheduled for October 22. Why would those who are clinging to power allow it? They will not do it out of good will. History shows that Venezuelan authorities do not make concessions for free and the current situation is no exception.
A pressing question demands an urgent answer: how to incentivize those in power to give up their privileges and accept a democratic transition?
This goes beyond a theoretical discussion about the model of democratic political and social coexistence in the future, which, without a doubt, is very important. It is about creating the necessary conditions for this opening to occur.
a golden bridge
In other words, how do we provide a “golden bridge” for (some members of the) Maduro government? Although the lifting of sanctions and international recognition of the elections They can be valuable tools, by themselves they will not magically solve the crisis in Venezuela.
Accountability can play a crucial role. For years, those in power in Venezuela have committed two types of crimes: serious human rights violations and acts related to corruption, money laundering, organized crime and drug trafficking.
Human rights violations in Venezuela, including brutal crackdowns in 2014 and 2017, have led to the first investigation by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) into crimes against humanity in Latin America. It includes accusations of deprivation of liberty, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as politically motivated persecution.
Independent experts from the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela have revealed the complicity of the judiciary and recently reported on the ongoing selective repression. These international mechanisms offer the main avenue for victims to obtain justice. The ICC prosecutor has also agreed to collaborate with Venezuelan authorities in reforming the judicial system while his office continues the investigation.
Anti-corruption activists have documented more than 200 investigations in 29 countries that implicate senior officials in the diversion of millions of dollars for their own benefit, that of their allies or their families.
Most cases occur in the United States, but also in Argentina, Spain, Colombia and Brazil. Key sectors affected by corruption cases include the oil industry, the health system, security and the judiciary.
International law establishes clear guidelines for investigating and prosecuting serious human rights violations. Amnesties or pardons cannot be applied to the most heinous crimes. The jurisdiction of military courts, which often lack the necessary independence, is not acceptable. Limitation periods do not apply in these cases.
Restore democracy
These red lines cannot be crossed. There are some gray areas, including issues related to chain of command accountability, the seriousness of the crimes, or the types of sanctions that will be imposed. Although it is possible to learn from how other countries resolved these dilemmas, A solution designed for Venezuela is required that takes into account its unique circumstances, the perspectives of victims and their families, and the obligations of international law.
There are two reasons why considering other types of crimes committed in Venezuela could be more productive. First, given the clarity of international law regarding crimes against humanity, there can never be complete impunity for some people and cases. For example, an ICC investigation or a complaint based on universal jurisdiction for torture will always pursue those most responsible.
Second, many people in power in Venezuela, or with ties to power, have been involved in corruption, mismanagement, organized crime or drug trafficking, but may not necessarily face trials for crimes against humanity.
Some may prefer to be remembered for leading Venezuela back to democracy rather than being part of a repressive regime. To engage them in opening up to a democratic transition, incentives are needed, and ongoing criminal investigations into corruption and related crimes can provide them.
It would not be the first time that individuals who face a real threat of being prosecuted by authorities with the political will to advance these cases They are persuaded to cooperate when given significant incentives in exchange for their survival. A reduced sentence or the ability to keep some of the illegally obtained funds are possible outcomes, a golden bridge.
It will be essential to identify who is willing to be part of this conversation, what benefits can be offered within the framework of the rule of law and, equally important, understand what the expectations of those in power are and how compliance with these agreements can be ensured to ensure a long-term democratic political and social coexistence. To have success, This proposal must take into account the political dynamics in Venezuelaincluding internal divisions within the ruling party, the need for unity within the opposition and public opinion.
Despite the urgency of addressing these questions today, it is crucial to remember that Venezuela’s current situation did not happen overnight.
The debacle of its democracy has been a gradual process and restoring it will require a slow, uncomfortable and possibly complicated effort. To achieve this, we must think beyond electoral conditions.
TAMARA TARACIUK BRONER
AMERICAS QUARTERLY
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