In 2014, a national security analyst claimed that the Ukrainian army was “falling apart” and that the country’s navy was in “a sorry state”. Ukrainian General Victor Muzhenko, a former commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, went so far as to say that the military was “literally in ruins”.
However, eight years later, after the Russian invasion that began on February 24, 2022, the performance of Ukraine’s armed forces was surprisingly strong against Russian forces, which are larger and better equipped.
The strong resistance of the Ukrainians is the result of four significant factors.
The first it was the Ukrainian government’s committed effort in 2016 to reform the military. The second it was the millions of dollars in aid and military equipment from the West.
the third factor were the important changes in Ukrainian military thinking, which now allows junior leaders to make decisions on the battlefield. Until recently, these leaders had to ask permission to change orders given by commanders, even if there were rapid changes in field conditions.
The last significant factor, and arguably most importantly, occurred among the Ukrainian people: a national culture of military volunteerism emerged. As a result, a government agency was created to organize and train civilians in defense against military attacks.
From 2016 to 2018, I helped Ukraine to reform the country’s defense. During that time, I also conducted field research in Georgia to study the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. Based on this research, I found that the Russian tactics used to invade Ukraine were not at all surprising.
What really surprised was the performance of the Ukrainian army.
In 2014, the Ukrainian government began a comprehensive review of national security and military defense. A number of issues were identified that directly resulted in poor combat performance.
The shortcomings ranged from the inability to withstand cyberattacks to the poor provision of medical care. Corruption was rampant, troops were unpaid, and basic supplies were always lacking. General logistics and command were also inefficient.
To remedy these shortcomings, the then president Petro Poroshenkoin 2016, directed reforms in five categories: command and control, planning, operations, medicine and logistics, and professional development of the force.
It was an ambitious plan that set a completion target of just four years. A truly Herculean effort at a time when the Ukrainians were waging a war against Russian separatists in Donbass.
What motivated the Ukrainian authorities and accelerated these reforms was the deep fear that Russia might initiate an invasion. While all reforms have yet to be implemented, significant improvements have taken place over the past six years.
Evidence of this was seen in the response to the Russian invasion.
To support Ukrainian military reforms, the US increased financial aid to Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.
In 2014, the Obama administration provided $291 million in resources, and by the end of 2021, the United States had donated a total of $2.7 billion in training and equipment.
As part of that assistance, the United States helped train Ukrainian soldiers at the Yavoriv military base. The base quickly became a top-notch training facility, where around five battalions have been training annually since 2015.
In 2016, Poroshenko asked senior defense advisers from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Lithuania and Germany to advise Ukraine on modernizing the armed forces with the aim of achieving NATO standards, rules and procedures by 2020.
One of these NATO rules was a requirement for civilian control of the armed forces; at the time, Ukraine’s defense minister was also an active-duty general. Another important standard was ensuring that Ukraine could integrate its logistical support with other NATO units.
Western support also included various weapons and equipment, including military vehicles, drones, sniper rifles, radars that locate the source of enemy fire, and thermal sights that are used to identify targets in the dark.
Obtaining better anti-tank missiles was of great interest to the Ukrainians. When Russia sent T-90 tanks across the border to support separatists in 2014, Ukraine’s existing weapons failed to penetrate the vehicles’ armor.
In 2017, the United States supplied the first set of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine.
Once the invasion became imminent, Western nations sent additional weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, including missiles from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the United Kingdom.
In 2014, Ukraine’s military culture precluded risk-taking by junior leaders – the lieutenants and captains who conducted the fighting in the field. They were banned from making decisions and required to ask permission before acting, thus ruling out the possibility of what are called “disciplined initiatives”.
Given the speed and lethality of modern warfare, disciplined initiatives can be the difference between success and failure.
While fighting Russian-backed separatists and Russian forces in Donbass in 2014, Ukrainians quickly learned that lower-level leaders such as platoon leaders and company commanders could not wait for the approval of a higher headquarters for every move. The battle was just too fast.
A new culture emerged. Ukrainians are now struggling with an updated version of the ends justify the means: results are more important than processes.
This cultural shift, combined with eight years of combat in the Donbas, created a generation of combat-ready officers.
Volunteers from across Ukraine gathered in Donbass in 2014 to fight Russian-backed separatists. There were so many registered that new battalions had to be created.
But there was little time to train. Volunteers were thrown into these makeshift battalions, in camouflage uniforms incompatible with war, and sent to the front lines with a veritable mix of weapons.
However, Ukraine has bought time with these civilians. They helped maintain the line of defense and prevent further Russian penetration into Ukraine.
The country passed a law that took effect on January 1, 2022 to remedy problems in organizing the volunteer effort. The law established a Territorial Defense Force as an autonomous branch within the military. Some of these positions are for professional soldiers; others are reservists.
The force will include 10,000 peacetime career positions and will organize 120,000 reservists into 20 brigades.
The Russian invasion began before this structure could be fully established. But it reorganizes itself as the war goes on.
Despite these reforms and Ukraine’s resistance to date, Russia’s war machine still dwarfs Ukraine’s.
A successful defense of Ukraine against Russia is a daunting challenge. This will require determination, something the Ukrainians have demonstrated repeatedly over the past eight years and in the early days of the current war.
Based on my time there, I can say that Ukrainians are proud, patriotic and prepared to do whatever it takes to defend the nation.
*Liam Collins is a retired colonel in the U.S. Army, where he served for 27 years as a Special Forces officer, founding director of the Modern War Institute at the Military Academy at West Point, a BS in Mechanical Engineering (Aerospace) from the United States Military Academy, a Masters in Public Affairs and PhD from the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.
©2022 The Conversation. Published with permission. original in english.
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