How wide does the mind blow? Or, to put it another way, where are the limits of our consciousness? Or, even more contemporary: who are we human animals actually to presume that only we have consciousness? We already know about non-human animals, but would ‘non-living nature’ also have a form of consciousness, atoms or who knows even the entire universe?
Roughly speaking, the core of the eccentric philosophical theory known as “panpsychism” is the belief that consciousness is not a phenomenon that arose late (or “high”) in evolution, but is a fundamental property of all reality. It is not so much about ‘thinking’ (which we can do) or about ‘being aware of your physical environment’ (which all kinds of organisms have), but about what is then called ‘phenomenal’ consciousness, having subjective experiences, if the true the ‘quality’ of experiences. If that ability is basic, it would be a hard break with materialism, in which matter is basic and consciousness arises from it or can be reduced to it.
Variants of such panpsychism have ancient roots in philosophy, traces of which are sometimes seen in, for instance, the monism of Spinoza, who saw all reality as one divine substance. It opposes theories that reduce everything psychic to material processes (the most radical conclusion being that ‘mind’ does not exist, but is an illusion). But also against the dualism that sees matter and spirit as two substances, such as that of René Descartes (1596-1650). The French thinker split reality and what we can know into matter (res extensa) and mind (res cogitans). A dualism that has often been challenged in philosophy and has been discredited by many popular writers on consciousness as “Western” thinking that is responsible for the binary doom that has befallen the planet.
A fundamental property
As a remedy, panpsychism promises a beautiful new vision of reality as one “system” of which consciousness is a fundamental property. Reference is made not only to Spinoza, but also to Leibniz (who believed that reality consists of thinking ‘monads’) or to Schopenhauer (who saw everything as the expression of one metaphysical ‘Will’). The closest in the twentieth century came to the “neutral monism” of William James and after him Bertrand Russell. According to that theory, mind and matter consist of properties that are themselves “neutral” but that can manifest in two different ways.
Since then, such richly abstract ideas have been pushed into the background by the success of neuroscience and the dominance of naturalism in philosophy. That is the belief that science offers the best explanations we have, and philosophy should follow suit. But times are changing, and recently the once exotic panpsychism has experienced a modest, and of course controversial, revival. In the margins of philosophy, it has even acquired something of a hip cult status. The most famous panpsychic proponent is Philip Goff, philosopher at Durham University, who defends the theory in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017) and Galileo’s Error (2020).
Panpyschism ties in with ecological thinking that likes to see the earth or universe as an animate system
Goff rejects Galileo’s scientific worldview and Descartes’ dualism, both of which hold that you can describe reality mathematically, in a comprehensive objective science. No, says Goff, ‘qualitative’ experiences are fundamental, even down to the subatomic level in electrons and quarks. That sounds bizarre, but Goff is influential; three years ago even the fist-sized one appeared Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, chock-full of technical discussions about the plausibility and snags of his theory. Listeners to the NRCpodcast Future Affairsthe podcast that is always eagerly searching for paradigm shifts, regularly encountered the theory.
This revaluation of subjectivity as the basis of reality fits in with a cultural trend, a growing aversion to the Cartesian dualism that is said to have alienated the West and is now also destroying the planet. Panpyschism also ties in with ecological thinking that likes to see the earth or universe as an animate system. Including the penchant for indigenous or ‘eastern’ wisdom and the granting of rights to forests, mountains and rivers – after all, also sentient beings.
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Being a bat
But there was also a new impetus in analytic philosophy. Panpsychism received a strong impulse from the work of the world-famous Australian philosopher David Chalmers (1966). In 1996 he put the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ on the map for a wide audience in his book The Conscious Mind. That tough problem refers to the subjective character of experiences, which, according to Chalmers, cannot be captured with concepts from the cognitive sciences. He distinguishes this from the ‘easy problem’, giving explanations for cognitive tasks such as recognizing objects. What is missing is ‘the taste’ or ‘feel’ of subjective experiences. This has been argued before by the American philosopher Thomas Nagel, who wondered ‘what it is like to be a bat’ in an article that has become a classic. Even if we knew everything about a bat, that would be what it feels like to own one arestill elude us.
Chalmers finds panpsychism an enticing theory, but for now pulls from his analysis of it tough problem a dualistic conclusion, elaborating on Descartes. Spirit and matter may not be two substances, as the famous Frenchman believed, but they are fundamentally distinct properties: one cannot be reduced to the other. According to Chalmers, even zombies are logically possible: physical beings that behave just like us, but without inner experiences.
Extravagant nonsense
Chalmer’s work initiated new discussions in the philosophy of mind and also sparked new interest in panpsychism. Although he emerged as a dualist, Chalmers is just as averse to scientific materialism as Goff. He now considers it possible that a good panpsychic theory could be the ‘synthesis’ between that materialism and his own dualism. But for the time being he still sees that as conceivable at best, a “who knows”.
Because how plausible is it that reality ‘somewhere’ is made up of consciousness? And is panpsychism a serious theory?
In any case, panpsychists point to the advantage that their theory would have, namely that it offers a solution to what is called the “emergence problem” of materialism. That is the difficult question of how it is actually possible for consciousness to arise from ‘blind’ material processes. Panpsychists do not suffer from this problem, because according to them consciousness is the lowest building block. It doesn’t have to ‘arise’. Incidentally, classical dualists like Descartes do not have that problem either, who assume that two separate substances exist: spirit and matter (their pressing problem is rather: how is contact possible between the two?).
If everything is conscious, then why not also a corpse
Patricia Churchland Philosopher
Not everyone in the philosophy of mind is convinced that panpsychism can actually deliver on that promise. Least impressed, of course hardcore materialists, such as the American philosopher Patricia Churchland. She thinks panpsychism is extravagant nonsense. “If everything is conscious, why not also a corpse,” Churchland sneered on Twitter in April last year.
Other philosophers and consciousness scientists hold to naturalistic approaches to consciousness, in various (including non-materialistic) varieties. Some are along Chalmers’ lines: interested in themselves, but skeptical about the possibility of making panpsychism a convincing theory. Speculating or fantasizing off the cuff does not help. Thomas Nagel, the philosopher of the “bat sense,” in panpsychism smells “the slightly sickening smell of something assembled in a metaphysical laboratory.”
In Existential Physics (2022), her popular introduction to science and the ‘big questions of life’, physicist Sabine Hossenfelder also takes a hard line. Panpsychism may well be true, she believes. If you view consciousness as information processing, it is possible that complex systems elsewhere in the universe have a low degree of consciousness. But she also explains why panpsychism can’t be right, as far as we know now: consciousness is accompanied by changes in ‘inner’ state that have simply never been observed in subatomic particles.
Panpsychists have a retort to that. After all, it is not about ‘thinking’ as we do, but about a basic ‘phenomenal consciousness’, the ability to experience experiences ‘qualitatively’, sometimes encompassed under the concept of ‘qualia’. Subatomic particles could have ‘proto-phenomenal’ properties.
The most persistent problem
Or is that not an answer at all, but an excuse? For here looms a stubborn problem for panpsychists, which also includes numerous authors in it Routledge Handbook grit their teeth. That is the “combination problem,” the mirror image of the materialists’ “emergence problem.” How do these ‘proto-phenomenal’ particles manage to combine into a living organism that is conscious of its experiences as a whole? How does the unity of consciousness come about from the ‘experiences’ of all those already separate elements? Chalmers has no answer to that either.
Perhaps panpsychists want too much, think neurophilosophers Jolien Francke and Marc Slors. In Consciencetheir particle in the series Elementary Particles, the two argue that panpsychism is based on what they consider to be an outdated idea of consciousness as an inner realm of particular experiences. This view has been undermined by Wittgenstein and other philosophers who point to the social and “external” nature of human reality. There is no ‘ghost in the machine’ to build a bridge out. Our ‘phenomenal’ consciousness is allowed one tough problem maybe it’s not so puzzling that we have to attribute it to quarks or to entire galaxies.
And one more thing, say critics. Advocates of panpsychism sometimes speak of the different worldview their beliefs would produce, less alienated and destructive. But how exactly? Even if there is a lot to experience on a subatomic level and ‘everything’ is potentially consciousness, the question remains what it would matter on the surface, in experienced reality. Is panpsychism not only theoretically unlikely, but also practically irrelevant?
At least Goff isn’t giving up hope. Panpsychism remains hot. In July, the philosopher wrote a competition for essays on panpsychismalso related to religion. The winner will receive a publication in it Journal of Consciousness Studies and a thousand pounds. A bargain, for solving the riddle of consciousness.
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