Despite the government’s division in Washington, there is ample room for bipartisan action in US foreign policy. Fighting China and supporting Ukraine against Russia top the list, but the main opportunity for Republicans and Democrats to work together may lie in Venezuela, where next year’s presidential election offers the best chance in a long time for a democratic opening. .
US policy in the Americas has often been characterized by bipartisanship. In recent decades, Democrats have backed the diplomatic efforts of the US administration. George HW Bush who helped end the civil wars in Central America; the North American and US-Mexico-Canada trade agreements each passed with a strong bipartisan vote in Congress; Plan Colombia, which reduced drug trafficking and weakened an armed insurgency, has been applied through five US presidencies; and both parties have supported development programs to address the root causes of migration from Central America.
In Venezuela, too, Republicans and Democrats have generally found common cause, reacting together in alarm when presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro they dismantled democratic institutions, engaged in drug trafficking, sided with rogue regimes, and created an economic calamity that has driven more than 7 million Venezuelans out of the country. In 2015, President Obama issued an executive order on the “unusual and extraordinary threat to national security” posed by Venezuela, and his administration laid the groundwork for sanctions imposed on Venezuelan officials by the Trump administration.
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Democrats largely supported Trump’s tactic of recognizing National Assembly leader Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela and extend sanctions to the Venezuelan economy.
Today, most members of Congress agree to use the sanctions as a way to pressure and induce the Maduro regime to engage in genuine negotiations with the political opposition and improve conditions for the 2024 elections. There is broad support for denying Maduro the international legitimacy he craves and the funding his government needs unless he holds legitimate elections.
Participate or sanction
To the extent that there have been differences over US policy towards Venezuela, these have largely reflected tactical differences of opinion within the Venezuelan opposition, namely whether to participate in elections under unfair conditions and how to gauge sanctions. to put pressure on the regime. However, today there is almost unanimity among the opposition on the political path to follow: hold primaries in October to choose a standard-bearer for next year’s presidential elections and negotiate better electoral conditions with the regime.
Naturally, there is widespread skepticism that the regime will hold elections that could threaten its hold on power. But there is also now a widespread consensus that sanctions alone will not topple the regime, that street protests have largely run out of steam, and that fissures in the military are not enough to bring about political change.
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In addition, the democratic opposition has reaped notable successes in recent elections, such as in 2021, when opposition-aligned parties won the majority of votes across the country in local elections.
The opposition is putting differences aside ahead of the presidential elections. Both parties must support their decision to contest the elections and support policies and programs that maximize the probability that the elections will produce a democratic opening. That means sending a united message to the opposition that, despite any doubts about the likelihood of success, the United States supports the decision to use the electoral process to promote democracy in Venezuela.
For the Maduro regime, Congress should make it clear that the United States will gradually lift sanctions in response to positive steps, such as the release of political prisoners., the announcement of a date for the presidential elections and the lifting of the bans on the right of some opposition figures to stand in the elections. At the same time, both sides should stress that the sanctions lifted can be re-imposed if the government fails to engage in serious negotiations with the opposition or adopt regressive measures, such as passing a bill that would put independent NGOs in legal jeopardy.
Congress must take into account several key points. First, the election of left-wing governments in Colombia and Brazil does not necessarily undermine the democratic cause in Venezuela, and may even strengthen it given the influence that the new presidents could have over the Maduro regime. Colombian President, Gustavo Petro has already taken a step in this direction by holding a summit in Bogotá with the Venezuelan opposition.
Second, members of Congress may be well positioned to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Maduro regime. Although the Boston Group, an informal meeting of US and Venezuelan lawmakers, has dissolved as a bilateral forum, former US participants maintain contact with Venezuelan counterparts. The 2018 release of Joshua Holt, an American unjustly imprisoned in Venezuela, came about thanks to quiet diplomacy by Republicans on Capitol Hill.
Third, tangible support for the Venezuelan people must continue. Congress has strongly supported the humanitarian assistance the US has provided to date, making it the largest donor to Venezuelans at home and abroad. Congress must back efforts to implement the humanitarian agreement reached by the regime and the opposition to allocate billions of dollars in frozen assets to UN social programs in Venezuela.
Finally, Congress should also agree to continued support for defenders of democracy in Venezuela. Washington can provide logistical support to the opposition to stage a successful primary, resources to keep independent media outlets alive and combat misinformation, and assistance to civil society groups to monitor and educate voters about the electoral process. The Maduro regime would surely denounce this aid as interference, but Washington should let local activists weigh the benefits and risks of receiving foreign support.
The most difficult issue for US officials to resolve will be the guarantees for regime officials should the opposition win the presidential election. Maduro and other senior officials have committed crimes against humanity, as documented by UN investigators, and Maduro and other senior officials have been accused in the US of drug trafficking and corruption.
Ultimately, however, Washington should accept that the Venezuelans do justice.
The opposition figures who would negotiate any form of modified justice are the victims themselves, and civil society leaders will speak out about it. The United States should be willing to accept the agreements reached between the Venezuelans.
Contemplating such matters may seem like a pipe dream. The alternatives, however, are to duplicate failed approaches or accept an autocratic state. Millions of Venezuelans will be on the front lines of this fight. They deserve the united support of the United States.
A new realistic era for the opposition
It is not surprising that in the current context, interest in Venezuela’s push for democracy has taken a backseat to the country’s migration crisis, one of the largest in the world. Only in the United States.
But even with waning interest in Venezuelan democracy, the current scenario presents a unique opportunity to bolster its chances for a comeback, that is, if the international community, not just countries, but also multilateral organizations, civil society, and the private sector are working to re-engage.
Because right now? For the first time in years, the international community and the Venezuelan opposition agree on the way forward: participation in the next constitutionally mandated presidential elections most likely in 2024.
For years, the strategy between the Venezuelan opposition and the international community focused on supporting Juan Guaidó as interim president as part of an attempt to break the power structure of the Maduro regime. But over time, that strategy seemed to run its course, leaving behind a lack of consensus on how to move forward.
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Today there is a consensus of all opposition leaders to participate in the elections under Maduro, even those who historically were the most reluctant, such as María Corina Machado and the Popular Will party of Leopoldo López. Now they agree not only to participate, if conditions improve, but also on the need to hold primaries.
MARK FEIERSTEIN
AND JOHN CRUZ (**)
AMERICAS QUARTERLY
He is a Senior Advisor at Dentons Global Advisors-Albright Stonebridge Group and the US Institute of Peace.
(**) A 35-year US government veteran, he is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Both served in the Barack Obama and Donald Trump administrations, respectively, as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council.
Guillermo Zubillaga
Americas Quarterly
Senior Director of Public Policy Programs at AS/COA, where he heads the Venezuela Working Group.
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