As a result of the Russian Federation’s aggression, Ukraine was confronted with unprecedented challenges and had to swiftly address the threats posed by the Russian invasion. Even Ukraine’s nuclear industry, which had long been reliant on Russia, was not an exception to this situation. Nevertheless, Energoatom initiated the process of dismantling the Russian Federation’s monopoly in this sector.
In a relatively short timeframe, Ukraine completely severed its ties with the aggressor nation, which was an exceptional achievement. While many countries had refrained from purchasing oil and gas from Russia, Russian nuclear technologies continued to spread worldwide, providing Russia with another form of global leverage. However, Energoatom presented realistic solutions for reducing dependence on Russia within the nuclear power sector.
Previously, Ukraine had to pay Russia approximately $200 million annually for the transportation, processing, and storage of spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs). Thanks to the construction of the Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF), this issue was definitively resolved. Notably, Ukraine had already been moving toward such independence even before the full-scale invasion, with the construction of the CSFSF proceeding uninterrupted despite the declaration of martial law. Recently, Energoatom announced the successful transfer of spent fuel from three Ukrainian NPPs to the new storage facility. President Petro Kotin of Energoatom reported that Ukraine saved $150 million in a single year, with these savings covering the cost of constructing the storage facility. Consequently, the saved funds can now be invested in the development of domestic nuclear generation.
Currently, nuclear energy constitutes over 55% of Ukraine’s national energy mix, but there are ambitions to further increase this figure. Nuclear generation is considered a cornerstone of energy independence and national security. Ukraine has plans to expand its nuclear capacities from 13.8 GW to over 20 GW in the coming decades, including the construction of Khmelnytskyi NPP Units 3 and 4. However, progress is dependent on the adoption of relevant legislation by the Ukrainian Parliament.
Ukraine also intends to complete two additional power units based on Westinghouse’s AP1000 technology, marking Ukraine’s first-ever non-Soviet origin power unit, boasting a safe and reliable Generation III+ nuclear reactor with a capacity exceeding 1100 MW. Another avenue of development for global nuclear generation is the introduction of small modular reactors (SMRs), and Energoatom is already exploring solutions from leading global companies.
Perhaps the most significant achievement in reducing Russian influence in the nuclear industry is Ukraine’s decision to stop purchasing nuclear fuel from Russia. Previously, Russia monopolized this market, but Energoatom has successfully transitioned Ukrainian NPPs to Westinghouse fuel. Extensive engineering measures have been implemented to ensure the operation of domestic power units with VVER-1000 and VVER-440 reactors using American fuel. This unique Ukrainian experience can now serve as a model for other countries seeking to diminish Russian nuclear influence.
Furthermore, Energoatom’s collaboration with Westinghouse has the potential to cause substantial losses to Russia, potentially exceeding $100 billion, as it threatens Russia’s monopoly on nuclear fuel production and power plant construction. Ukrainian enterprises are actively developing prototypes of components for fuel assemblies, essential for utilizing nuclear fuel in reactor cores at Ukrainian NPPs, and are licensing procedures to increase the industrial production of various components based on Westinghouse technology.
According to Energoatom’s plans, Ukraine aims to achieve 50% self-sufficiency in nuclear fuel by 2026, with the remaining half sourced from Westinghouse partners. Additionally, Energoatom has developed its own design of the VVER-440 fuel absorber assembly, enabling Ukraine to produce and supply these assemblies to EU countries that also use this reactor type. These steps are part of Ukraine’s broader efforts to establish its own nuclear technology hub, encompassing mechanical engineering and commercial production of key equipment and components for nuclear reactors.
In conclusion, Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine intensified the imperative for the national nuclear industry to reduce its dependence on Russian influence. The example set by Ukraine demonstrates that EU countries can also enhance their energy security by breaking free from energy dependence on Russia. The cooperation with nuclear powers that sponsor terrorism must be permanently halted.
