The AfD’s electoral victory in Thuringia on Sunday, the first by a far-right party in a German state election since World War II, seems to signal a country whose self-confidence is at an all-time low. To keep fringe parties in check and remain a reliable partner for international allies, the country desperately needs to rediscover its economic and political mojo.
If that doesn’t happen, a troubled Germany could become a problem for Europe and the world. Although populist groups from the left and right won more than 60 percent of the vote in Thuringia and about half the vote in Saxony, other parties have ruled out joining regional governments with the AfD, meaning it is unlikely to be able to implement its policies. But if current polls are accurate, the AfD will not do well in next year’s federal elections. Instead, the conservative Christian Democrats are expected to win about 30 percent of the vote in 2025 and thus the right to lead the next federal government.
An early election before that date is unlikely, because all three members of the coalition have seen their supporters turn away. That’s reassuring, but only to a point: A political firewall against the AfD would reinforce voters’ sense of marginalization and neglect. Meanwhile, the opposition conservatives are now led by Friedrich Merz, whose views on immigration are even more hawkish than Merkel’s. (Merz has at least ruled out cooperation with the AfD, and has been a vocal supporter of support for Ukraine.) For now, Germans are finding trouble everywhere, making them more vulnerable to the AfD and Buendis Sahra Wagenknecht, a new left-wing group that opposes immigration and wants to end sanctions against Russia.
On the other hand, the country’s economy has been in recession for two years, while inflation has only just begun to decline. Violent crime has increased (mostly by migrants, allegedly), and the normally pacifist Germany is being forced to support Ukraine against Russia. Instead of providing reassurance, Germany’s bickering coalition government has reinforced the impression that the country is off track. Reconciling the anti-borrowing tendencies of the Free Democratic Party, the social-welfare commitments of the Social Democrats, and the decarbonization zeal of the Greens is often a doomed task. Frustration is especially strong in the former communist east, where loyalty to the main parties has not been firmly established, average wealth has fallen, and the population is aging rapidly as many young people have migrated to the more prosperous west. Germany spent a decade letting in refugees from Syria and Afghanistan, but now a large part of the population thinks that this humanitarianism has gone too far. The killing of three Germans last month by a Syrian asylum seeker has soured the national mood, with moderates now more restrictive on immigration. Chancellor Olaf Scholz, meanwhile, has offered steadfast support for Ukraine, but concerns about the cost of financing its defense and supporting Ukrainian refugees are starting to resonate among voters. Germany will this year meet its NATO target of spending at least 2 percent of economic output on the military for the first time in decades. Some of the Germans’ concerns are justified, stemming from an unhealthy dependence on the outside during Merkel’s long tenure. Cheap Russian gas and voracious Chinese demand for German cars and capital goods have given the country a false sense of security. The low national debt is partly the result of a failure to fix its crumbling infrastructure. German companies have spent too much time tinkering with traditional combustion engines rather than building the industries of the future. A shrinking working-age population is also expected to hamper the country’s growth potential.
Other concerns are exaggerated or self-imposed: After all, Germany has done a good job of coping with the loss of Russian gas. While some energy-intensive companies have closed, the lights have mostly stayed on. A 49-point economic plan unveiled by the coalition in July also included some good ideas for boosting investment, cutting bureaucracy and boosting jobs, including financial incentives for working overtime and retiring later.
But reining in Germany’s debt remains an obstacle to adequately financing the country’s needs and makes internal conflicts in the ruling coalition over limited financial resources inevitable.
Unfortunately, parliamentary consensus on this issue seems elusive because changing the constitution requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority, and the opposition conservatives have no incentive to help. Germany’s European allies have benefited enormously from its willingness to accommodate refugees and its financial support for Ukraine—it is the second-largest aid provider after the United States. Germany is also a major export destination for most EU member states. But if the economy fails to grow, the battles over how to distribute the economic pie are sure to intensify, helping hardliners on both the left and the right. A stronger, more confident Germany is in everyone’s interest.
*Writer specializing in European affairs.
Published by special arrangement with The Washington Post Licensing and Syndication Service.
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