The attempts of the Generalitat Valenciana chaired by Carlos Mazón to try to transfer to the Government the responsibility for the catastrophic management of the DANA that was perpetrated by the Consell del PP on October 29 are becoming more discredited as new details become known.
Mazón’s executive has gone from targeting, first of all, the State Meteorological Agency (Aemet), which warned at all times and days in advance of what was coming, to now focusing on the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHJ) , which on the 29th alone sent 194 notices to the Generalitat’s Emergencies, 62 of them while Mazón was having lunch with a Valencian journalist. Of course, the former minister and current vice president of the European Commission, Teresa Ribera, or the president of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, have not escaped the Valencian president’s attempts to divert attention either.
However, as it appears of the document to which elDiario.es has had accessthe Valencian Government took charge of the emergency, as established by the Civil Protection law, five days before the arrival of DANA. Specifically, it was the Security and Emergency Agency of the Generalitat that activated the Special Flood Plan on October 24 at 11:45 a.m., from which time, among other things, it can convene the Integrated Operational Coordination Center ( Cecopi) that did not meet until the 29th at 5:00 p.m. For example, the Botanical Government called it 48 hours before the DANA that punished the Vega Baja of Alicante in 2019. There were two deaths in Orihuela and one in San Fulgencio. The Flood Plan remained active at all times in the following days, including October 29. In fact, it remains that way today, since situation 2 is still in force.
That day, October 24, the Emergency Coordination Center (CCE) activated weather alerts with a yellow level in the interior of Castellón and València due to rain and storms; as a consequence of the warnings from Aemet which, a day later, issued the first official information note, warning of very strong showers and storms for Tuesday the 29th.
Although the CCE activated the Special Flood Plan on October 24, many aspects of prevention were not met. According to this plan, all instructions directed to the organizations that comprise it must emanate from the emergency management – which corresponds to the Generalitat Valenciana – in emergencies declared “situation 0, 1 and 2”. However, those declared to be of national interest (situation emergencies 3) correspond to the General Administration of the State. In the case of DANA, it has never gone beyond situation 2, so the Generalitat itself was in charge of adopting the appropriate prevention measures, many of which, such as the suspension of classes in risk areas, were not implemented. taken from the autonomous administration. In some municipalities, the case of Utiel, for example, it was the mayors themselves who decreed this measure on their own initiative.
According to the Civil Protection Law and the Flood Plan itself, the management of the emergency falls to the head of the department responsible for civil protection and emergencies. At that time it was the former Minister of Justice, Salomé Pradas.
In pre-emergencies and emergencies declared situation 0 and 1, in order to improve management operability, the head of the ministry responsible for civil protection and emergencies, delegates the direction of the Plan to the person who manages the plan. the Valencian Agency for Security and Emergency Response (Avsre). That responsibility was then carried out by the now dismissed former regional secretary, Emilio Argüeso.
According to the regulations, it is the responsibility of the director of the Flood Plan to “declare the pre-emergency situation, emergency and its completion as established in this Plan; declare the order for the constitution of Cecopi and decide, where appropriate, an alternative location for it; determine the actions to be carried out by the Cecop / CCE Generalitat; determine, depending on the type and severity of the emergency, the population protection measures that must be adopted; determine the human and material resources that must be assigned to each of the possible locations of the emergency in the Valencian Community, establishing the priorities for action that it deems appropriate; determine the information that must be provided to the population and the media in relation to the emergency situation; establish priorities for the restoration of essential public services; inform the Civil Protection Commission of the Valencian Community of those emergencies that involve the activation of this plan in an emergency situation 2; ensure the operation of the Plan through its implementation and maintenance of its operation; “The direction of the plan will be carried out in coordination with the General Administration of the State and the Local Administration.”
Many of these measures came late. When the Cecopi met at 5:00 p.m., the Magro River had already overflowed and there were people missing and rescued by the UME. The Poyo ravine was at its limit in Chiva and overflowed minutes later in this town, starting the ravine downstream. Many of the mayors denounced that the Generalitat Emergencies were not warned of the danger, in some cases because the telephone list was not updated. Mazón arrived at Cecopi after 7:30 p.m. and the alert message to citizens’ cell phones was not sent until 8:12 p.m. The tragic balance is 223 deaths, thousands of lives ruined and material losses in the millions.
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