Columns Temperance and cold blood are still effective foreign policy weapons – Moscow must not be allowed to scare or jump on Finland

Ukraine the crisis surrounding it raises the question of whether a great war could strike Europe anyway.

The protection zone demanded by the head of the crisis, President Vladimir Putin, is reminiscent of history. Immediately came to mind the fall of 1938, when the Western powers of Britain and France sacrificed their minority to Adolf Hitler in the hope that it would suffice. It was not enough: in August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union unexpectedly concluded an agreement in which a secret part of the entire territory between these powers was divided into interests. A week later, Germany began World War II.

The worst echoes in the interests of the Baltic countries, which were annexed to the Soviet Union as a result of the pact. The fear is justified in that Putin’s list takes the form of a division of interests. But as for the situation itself, with this information it is difficult to see that one would be as close to the Great War as in August 1939. During nuclear weapons, the threshold is higher.

More relevant the benchmark could be the behavior of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the Cold War.

In October 1957, the Soviet Union took Sputnik into space. There were no satellites in the West yet. Intercontinental nuclear missiles became possible, and Khrushchev did not intimidate: “Soon we will produce missiles like sausage.” (You’d just see that sausage, Soviet-inch.)

The status of a divided Berlin led to repeated crises in which Khrushchev tried, by threatening – but always to no avail – to put pressure on the West to his liking. War broke out – once there were armor on the streets of Berlin – and side branches were developed. We had both night frosts and a note crisis related to Berlin.

Nikita Sergeyevich hardly immediately remembers the sensitive James Dean, who died young, but the actions of the Kremlin gambler have been compared A young rebel to the famous scene of two stolen cars driving at full speed towards the edge of a gorge. Which driver jumps from the ride first?

For Khrushchev, this culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. That fright contributed to his ousting.

Putin the bulge has the same substance. Increasing pressure, mediating the threat of war, wrapping a package around the core of the crisis to trade and bargain.

But the exit strategy is missing, and besides, the first war crash plan. “There’s s’engage, you don’t wood, there are you,” Napoleon said. Let’s take action, then see you.

Now the crisis in Kazakhstan shows the fragility of the allied pattern. The supposedly plunges into chaos and demands action, more than just ex-autocracy quotes from the walls.

This the crisis of the class is the place for an accurate game for a small and “zone” state.

When the note arrived in Finland in 1961, the leadership of the Defense Forces began preparing for negotiations with the Soviet Union. After all, the neighbor required consultations under the yya agreement. And on that side, the position of the military could be improved.

The president stopped the intention. The last word about Urho Kekkonen’s role at that time has hardly been said yet, but this solution can be considered correct. Military negotiations would have entangled in an unpredictable process. They were better avoided if possible.

Also now it is essential to maintain restraint and cold blood. The nerve has to be kept. It was that sentence that President Sauli Niinistö put forward when explaining his New Year’s speech, which was the most critical public statement of the Finnish head of state about the eastern neighbor since the war.

It is not worth giving the impression to Moscow that Finland could be suddenly frightened, let alone jumped. There should be a revival of the information that the Soviet leadership came to learn in the least. If Finland is threatened and driven somewhere, the mood will start to move in the opposite direction.

The author is Professor Emeritus of Political History at the University of Helsinki.