The sudden regret of some leaders of Democratic Socialism regarding their support for Approve in the 2022 plebiscite where Rejection triumphed has gone hand in hand with a persistent complaint, according to which the new constitutional process underway would suffer from the same defects, vices or problems of the failed Convention. However, whatever parameter we choose to analyze one phenomenon or another, there are no arguments that allow us to support said complaint; not at least formulated like that, without the nuances and precisions of the case.
The shape
The most obvious differences reside in the forms, that is, in the rules of the game and the tone of the debate that characterized both processes. If the majorities of the Convention were determined to stridently try to remake or refound the political, social and economic structure of the country, based on the worst possible reading of the so-called blank page (absence of a default rule), this year the experts and advisors respected the 12 institutional bases or borders; borders that were agreed upon from left to right in the National Congress and that are consistent with the Chilean constitutional trajectory, beyond the innovations involved.
A similar contrast is evident if we compare respect for the elementary modalities of civic dialogue, which has predominated throughout the sober process underway, versus its systematic violation—through funas and other performances—which were abundant last year. On this plane, the distance is undeniable.
The bottom
An equally or more significant difference is evident when looking at the hostility of the Convention with respect to the fundamental institutions of constitutional democracy. It was not by chance that that body ended its work sessions with a group of conventional members proudly shouting, “the people, united, advance without parties.”
That was the natural corollary of a project that, among other problems, sought to eliminate the bicentennial Chilean Senate; that granted high doses of power to a lower house that perpetuated the appearance of the Convention; that put at risk the independence of the Judiciary and the Election Qualifying Court, which became dependent on the questioned Council of Justice; and that made future constitutional reform extremely difficult (everything “substantial” required a quorum of 2/3, or 4/7 plus a plebiscite). All this, moreover, under a government identified with Approve, which would implement its proposal if it triumphs. Something not far from omnipotent power.
It is worth remembering that it was this type of defects that led various voices from across the political spectrum to warn about the dangers of an eventual capture of power if Approval were imposed, a dynamic typical of the new authoritarianisms of the 21st century. Well, nothing similar can be said about the proposal that will be put to a plebiscite in December.
Indeed, it may coincide more or less with the changes to the political system and the anti-fragmentation measures contained in it – many lawyers and political scientists consider them to be progress – but the truth is that, regardless of this debate, such changes respect fully the separation of powers and the other pillars of a democratic republic. The text rejected on September 4, 2022 did not have that quality.
A single sector text?
Of course, it would have been desirable to have a broader consensus in view of the upcoming plebiscite. And, regardless of the electoral result, it will be a matter of discussion to clarify what responsibility the Republican Party has here (shouldn’t we give in and talk more from the beginning?), the left (was it reasonable to bet on all or nothing in the negotiations ?), and the Council in general (a 100% elected body that the ruling party demanded as a condition of the new process, and that would inevitably put some stamp on the experts’ preliminary draft).
However, also in this dimension it is necessary to rigorously formulate comparison and criticism. After all, the available data reveal that half (50.1%) of the Council’s votes had over 90% support from its members, while in the Convention only 8.4% of the votes exceeded that backup level. The contrast is eloquent.
And if it is added – rightly – that the figures are not conclusive in this type of matters, and that therefore a qualitative examination is needed, in the same way it must be recognized that the new constitutional proposal includes not only relevant agendas for the majorities of the Council , but also a series of flags or demands that have historically been raised by the center-left or independent groups.
They range from strengthening decentralization and temporary and flexible exit parity for parliamentary elections, to the constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, care, climate change and respect for animals (among several other issues). Could something analogous be said about the Convention and its majorities?
The insistence on stating that “the same problems” have now been incurred only ratifies the more or less profound loss of a political world that still does not understand the seriousness of what happened in the Convention, nor does it fully assume its responsibilities in this regard. Beyond the legitimate criticisms that the new constitutional proposal admits, in the current process “the same mistakes” were not made. Is not the same.
#constitutional #proposal