Ahen Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, on the very first day he fired a volley of threats at a fictitious interlocutor – someone whom he did not name but whom he apparently trusted to stop him. If that happens, there will be “consequences that you have never experienced in your entire history,” Putin told his unnamed counterpart.
In the West, this has been taken as a nuclear threat. The reactions are complex. The main one is NATO’s refusal to intervene militarily in Ukraine. Nobody wants to risk nuclear war. But this also includes a remarkable statement by Clément Beaune, who is responsible for Europe at the cabinet table of French President Emmanuel Macron. Recently he offered France’s partners in Europe to discuss nuclear defence. Now he has renewed his offer in conversation with the FAS. This is important because since Brexit, France has been the EU’s only nuclear power, and so far Paris has never really been willing to let other countries know too deeply about its nuclear strategy. Its nuclear weapons have always served primarily to protect its own territory.
To appreciate the importance of this French initiative, one must first look at Russian military doctrine. In this, conventional wars of aggression and nuclear threats are as closely linked as hand and glove. A rapid ground attack against a neighboring country, perhaps against a poorly protected NATO outskirts, would be step one in Russia’s concept. If the alliance then wanted to bring in reinforcements (with some delay, because America’s soldiers would first have to get across the Atlantic), step two would follow: the threat of nuclear strikes against Europe – against infrastructure hubs such as Bremerhaven, where American reinforcements could land, or against cities . With this threat, NATO could be deterred from snatching his loot from Putin.
threat and counter-threat
In this form of blackmail, Russia would primarily bring its short- and medium-range nuclear weapons into play. They have the advantage of not being able to reach the United States. Their use is therefore not overly risky for Russia, because it does not automatically entail the risk of an American nuclear retaliation.
Experts like the German three-star general a. D. Heinrich Brauss thought through this scenario of a Russian conventional nuclear attack years ago, especially in relation to Ukraine and the Baltic States. In the case of the Ukraine, the Russian attack actually took place according to the foreseen pattern of tank wedge and nuclear threat, even if the execution on the ground is now more difficult for Russia than expected. Russia has not yet attacked the Baltic States.
From a Western perspective, Russia can only be deterred from such blackmail if it becomes clear that NATO would respond to nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons. Russia’s generals need to know they risk a retaliation. A strategy for this was developed in NATO as early as the Cold War: The United States is stationing so many soldiers “up front” in the threatened front areas that any attacker will understand: Washington will not allow these women and men to be overrun. If necessary, it will protect them by threatening an attacker with limited nuclear strikes. This is how America defended Germany in the 20th century.
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