Russia’s retreat in Kherson to the east bank of the Dnieper may be a necessity for military reasons, according to Docent of Military Sciences Ilmari Käihkö.
Russian it has been speculated that the troops will retreat to the eastern bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson area.
Thus argued for example, a representative of the Russian occupation administration operating in the Kherson region Kirill Stremousov on Thursday.
However, Ukrainian authorities and Western military experts have been wary of signs that Russian troops are leaving the Dnieper West Bank in the Kherson region.
Ukraine fears that the announcement of the withdrawal of the occupying forces would be a Russian trap. Russia’s top management, on the other hand, has remained silent about the situation.
Read more: Claim: Russian troops withdrawing from Kherson – if realized, would mark a turning point in the war
American think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) estimates in his reportthat Russian forces continue to withdraw to some extent from the northwestern Kherson region, but it remains unclear whether Russia intends to fight from the city of Kherson.
ISW has noted that Russian forces are continuing to prepare backup positions on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River while continuing to establish defensive positions northwest of the city of Kherson and moving more mobilized troops there.
On Friday from early evening the deputy governor of Kherson’s puppet regime Kirill Stremousov announced, according to the news agency Reuters, that a curfew has been declared in the city of Kherson. The ban is valid 24 hours a day, and it has not been announced when it will end.
According to Stremousov, the curfew was imposed because an attack by Ukrainian forces on the city is “probable”.
Alexander Institute Visiting researcher Ilmari Käihkö notes that it is difficult to draw valid conclusions about Russia’s withdrawal, as the information available from the front is currently very contradictory.
The inconsistency of the information also makes it difficult to assess whether Russia is trying to trap the Ukrainian forces with an apparent withdrawal.
“At the same time, there is information that Russia is withdrawing and, on the other hand, that it would bring more troops to the region. Data can also be interpreted in many different ways,” says Käihkö.
However, Käihkö sees that an urban war would be a very effective trap for the defending party, in this case Russia. He adds that if Russia is really suffering outside the city, it would make sense to focus the warfare on population centers.
“[Ansan] the goal could be to attract Ukraine to the urban area of Kherson, because urban warfare is usually more profitable for the defender than for the attacker.”
Cuckold himself considers it likely that Russia will withdraw from Kherson to the east bank of the Dnieper. He believes that Russia’s presence in Kherson has been too draining for its armed forces for a long time and considers it possible that Russian military commanders have already thought that withdrawing from the city would be reasonable.
“It is not at all surprising if Russia withdraws its troops from there. Already in the summer, Ukraine has been able to influence the bridges crossing the river and Russian logistics. It has succeeded day by day in making the situation of the Russian troops more and more difficult on the west side of the Dnieper.”
Käihkö summarizes his views as follows: Russia’s withdrawal may be a necessity for military reasons. He says that according to information from open sources, there would be 40,000 Russian soldiers and a significant amount of equipment in the area.
“It doesn’t make sense militarily that a significant part of the soldiers there fall, surrender or remain prisoners. In addition, a significant amount of equipment for the Ukrainians would be left behind. In terms of the future of the war, holding on to Kherson may be a worse option for Russia than an organized retreat to the east side of the river,” Käihkö says.
The idea of withdrawing is also supported by the fact that it is possible to influence the Ukrainian forces with artillery fire from the eastern bank of the Dnieper.
“It is definitely one option that when the Ukrainians arrive at a sufficient distance to the city, then artillery fire is used. However, the Dnerp River is not so wide that an artillery shell cannot cross it.”
Käihkö sees a contradiction in the fact that, according to Russia’s view, Herson is part of the federation, because it “joined” the region to itself with a “referendum”.
“It wouldn’t look good if the artillery fire was aimed at ‘my town’,” says Käihkö.
Provided Ukraine really succeeds in liberating Kherson, which it lost at the beginning of the war, it would have a significant strategic and symbolic meaning.
According to Käihkö’s view, the liberation of Kherson would be significant above all because Ukraine should be able to prove once again the effectiveness of Western countries’ arms and other support, i.e. that it will be able to liberate the areas it has lost in the long term.
“It would be an important message to foreign countries and also inside Ukraine – it would keep up the will to fight. Proof of success is also required in Ukraine.”
“They depend on the support of Western countries and they must show that the war is going in the right direction.”
The strategic importance of Kherson is emphasized by the possibilities of influencing the Crimean peninsula by military means. Kherson is also strategically significant because of the water of the Dnieper River, which is diverted to the peninsula by means of a canal leaving the city.
“[Hersonista] can more easily influence the direction of Crimea, because a large part of Russia’s forces in southern Ukraine are taken care of through it. With the liberation of Kherson, Crimea would also be within range of the Himars missile system.”
What What would Ukraine do after the liberation of Kherson?
Käihkö believes that Ukraine’s goal, i.e. the liberation of its territories, will be considerably more challenging in the future due to the terrain. He estimates that Ukraine’s next direction of attack may be somewhere other than the Kherson region.
“The problem for Ukraine is that even if they take over the city, it will be difficult to continue the offensive because of the crossing of the Dnieper River and the destroyed bridges that cross it. The next direction of attack could be, for example, in the direction of Zaporizhia.”
Challenges are also created by the “partial deployment” imposed by Russia, which has allegedly led to the call-up of up to 300,000 conscripts. According to Käihkö, about a third of the Russian conscripts called up for service have already arrived at the front, according to Russian sources.
“It has already caused Ukraine’s progress to slow down to some extent. If a huge number of soldiers come to the front in the spring, it will affect the Ukrainians’ opportunities,” says Käihkö.
In addition to the launch, the coming winter will reduce Ukraine’s chances to advance on the front.
“It is to be expected that when the autumn rains start and winter comes, the progressing movement will slow down. Ukraine currently has the initiative in the war and they are expected to demonstrate. Before the arrival of the mobilized forces and the attack, as much as possible should be done,” says Käihkö.
Terraindespite the “partial motion launch” and the challenges brought by winter, Käihkö believes that the struggle for Kherson will turn into a victory for Ukraine.
“Victory has been assumed because the situation for the Russians there is the most difficult of all the fronts in Ukraine.”
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