Tensions have risen in recent weeks, with Russia pushing tens of thousands of troops to the border with Ukraine, which expected Russia’s invasion in January.
Western reports say that Moscow is planning a military attack on Ukraine, prompting US President Joe Biden to threaten the Russians with unprecedented sanctions.
On the other hand, the Kremlin denies plans to invade Ukraine and asserts that the army’s movements do not threaten anyone. Russian President Vladimir Putin likens the fighting in the Donbass region between Ukrainian forces and separatist fighters loyal to Moscow to “genocide”.
Which may open the door, in the eyes of some, to a Russian military intervention in Ukraine.
The US National Interest website, which specializes in military and strategic affairs, says that while the facts on the ground seem bleak, hope has not yet been lost.
He adds that Russia is escalating a lot on the border with Ukraine, but that does not necessarily mean going to war.
It is true that the balance of power tilts in Russia’s favour, and that it possesses nuclear weapons, unlike Ukraine, which is prohibited under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Weapons of Mass Destruction, but Kiev has worked to develop and modernize its army over the past years.
After the Crimean war, Ukraine worked to equip a large and sophisticated army, equipped with modern local and Western weapons, and it is expected that in the event of a Russian attack it would receive Western armament and intelligence information.
Therefore, a quick Russian victory does not seem as possible in the case of Ukraine as it was in the 2008 Georgia war.
It is not clear how public opinion in Russia and the West will react to this war, although past experiences show that the attitudes of the masses cannot be taken into account as factors constraining Putin. After the Russian army invaded lands in Georgia in 2008 and annexed the Crimea in 2014, it did not arouse public opinion. In Russia against Putin, but increased his popularity.
At the international level, the West punished Russia with light sanctions in 2014, against the background of the annexation of the Crimea, but its limited effects encouraged the Kremlin to escalate further.
European sanctions, for example, only came after about 200 European citizens were killed in the bombing of a Malaysian plane, which the West accused Moscow of being behind its downing.
The National Interest website says that the main factors that determine Russian behavior in past experiences and will determine Russian behavior in the future are the costs of military escalation and the reaction of the public in the country. For example, many Russians saw that the costs of the 2008 and 2014 wars are within a reasonable range.
By this logic, Putin’s behavior in the two wars was logical.
According to the American website, it is possible to avoid the next war, based on the conclusions of the past two wars, and this comes down to 3 points:
First, Ukraine should avoid situations that the Kremlin might interpret as weakness and provide a “quasi-legitimate justification” for war with the Russian people or the world.
Second: Ukraine must send a clear and unambiguous message to Moscow that its people are united and ready to fight, and unlike the Georgia war, the idea of rushing to demand a ceasefire must be abandoned.
Third: The West needs to talk openly and through secret channels with Russia that it will impose more than symbolic sanctions, and the European Union, in particular, will have to make a decision on this, and not wait for the mass murder of EU citizens to impose sanctions.
It is not easy, as it will be up to European officials to do their utmost to secure this unity, which is interrupted by many differences.
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