Kevin Casas-Zamora, democracy expert: “The presence of organized crime is the greatest risk to democracy in Latin America”

Kevin Casas-Zamora (San José, Costa Rica, 56 years old) is the secretary general of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, an intergovernmental organization that supports democracy around the world. Leading an institution created three decades ago by 14 states, based in Stockholm, gives the lawyer and political scientist, who was vice president of his country between 2006 and 2007, a particular perspective on the state of democracy in Latin America. During a visit to Bogotá, he spoke with EL PAÍS about the post-electoral crisis in Venezuela, the deterioration of support for democracy in the region, and the Colombian situation.

Ask. What is the state of democracy in the region?

Answer. Like the rest of the world, democracy in Latin America is facing difficult times. There is a regression in some aspects of democratic construction that were advancing. The consolidation of the rule of law is failing due to the presence of organized crime and the proliferation of violence it produces. This is perhaps the most important risk facing democracy. It is not only that this presence distorts the functioning of the political system, to the extent that it tries to co-opt institutions, but that violence becomes a breeding ground for authoritarian attitudes, which propose the disregard of human rights in order to resolve the real anxieties of the population regarding personal security. This is very dangerous for democracy, as the example of El Salvador shows. The interaction between citizen security and democracy is a priority.

P. Do you see more setbacks?

R. Yes, in the two biggest advances in democratic construction in Latin America in a generation. First, the ability of countries to hold free, fair, transparent and secure elections. As in other parts of the world, elections today are subject to a toxic cocktail of threats. Some are digital, such as disinformation campaigns, cybersecurity attacks or the difficulty that electoral authorities have in controlling spending on digital campaigns. Others are political, due to the very high levels of polarization that we are experiencing and which produce elections with high levels of friction; attacks on the autonomy of robust electoral authorities, as we have seen in Mexico, Brazil, Peru or Guatemala; and the proliferation of electoral denialism, the Trump method of launching unfounded suspicions against credible electoral processes and results. And all this without talking about what we have just seen in Venezuela, which is the most serious case.

P. That is a progress that is deteriorating…

R. The other is civil-military relations. One of the things that Latin America had done well was to return the military to the barracks. Recently we see that in many countries they are being used for internal security tasks or they are being put to work building infrastructure, as in Mexico. In light of the political history of the region, these approaches are contraindicated. So, sadly, not only are we not resolving the major pending issues, but we are also regressing on other fronts.

P. With these setbacks, how much support does democracy still have in the region?

R. In recent years, there has been a significant erosion, according to all the surveys. The most recent Latinobarómetro survey, from 2023, shows a drop of 15 points in the last decade and a half, from 63% in 2010 to 48% in 2023. Interestingly, the number of people who are in favor of an authoritarian regime is not increasing, but the proportion of those who are indifferent to the fate of democracy is growing, those who say that it makes no difference to them whether we have a democratic or an authoritarian regime as long as it solves the problems. That is the biggest risk: that we end up accepting that a regime that maintains certain democratic paraphernalia but is emptying the content of democracy is fine. This is what has already been happening in many parts of the world, such as in El Salvador.

P. On social media, a phrase about relationships became a meme that reminds us of this: “I want a man who solves problems,”

R. That’s it. It’s a very complex discussion all over the world, where the levels of social uncertainty have increased brutally due to the effect of, for example, digital technologies or the changes that are coming to the labour market due to artificial intelligence. It’s a sensation that a friend calls “telluric”. When the levels of social uncertainty soar, there is a natural tendency for human beings to seek the protective embrace of a paternal figure. I say paternal deliberately. There are many precedents for this in history: Nazism arose on the basis of the immense dislocations generated by the Great Depression, Putin came to power after the chaos generated on multiple fronts by the Yeltsin government in Russia. This is happening today all over the world. Democratic systems have to worry about reducing the levels of uncertainty.

P. How to do it?

R. With welfare states and the social rule of law, by helping and providing a safety net, they reduce the levels of uncertainty to the extent that they grant predictability to social life.

P. In short, you are issuing a warning regarding the current situation of democracy in Latin America.

R. Absolutely. There are reasons to be concerned.

P. And do you see positive aspects?

R. Fortunately, yes. I see that the erosion of democracy has been reversed in some countries. It is important to say that this has happened through the electoral process in Brazil and Guatemala. There is a lesson here that has to do with Venezuela: one of the reasons why we must be extremely zealous in protecting electoral integrity is that elections are not only a foundational component of the democratic system, but they offer the best opportunity to reverse processes of weakening. This happens elsewhere, in India, Poland or Zambia. In the end, the line that marks when a system ceases to be democratic is whether there is the possibility of generating political change through the electoral route. That clearly has not been possible in Venezuela.

The context of this reflection is that the processes of democratic breakdown have changed a lot around the world, they are no longer a military coup. Before it was very easy to know when a democratic system was broken, now there is a gradual process, a wide grey area in which it is not known precisely when a country crosses the Rubicon. I suggest a very basic rule: it is crossed when political change through the electoral route is no longer possible. In that sense, let’s say, Bolsonaro can be described as many things, but in Brazil it was possible to reverse the process of deterioration of democracy through the electoral route in a way that is not possible in Venezuela.

P. Do you see any way to rescue Venezuelan democracy?

R. Whoever says there is an easy solution is lying. We must start from a premise: the capacity of the international community to make a difference is very limited; if we are on the outside, there is little we can do. It is not zero, but it is little. Regimes like that of Nicolás Maduro have a support structure that allows them to sustain themselves even in conditions of great vulnerability, so I do not have great hopes that the situation will change soon. All the signs lead me to think that the decision of Maduro and the people around him is to tighten their grip on power, in a similar way to what has happened in Nicaragua. If t
hey are willing to turn Venezuela into North Korea, there is not much that can be done.

Now, the reaction to the fraud in Venezuela is as important as the event itself. If we are not able to say that the only legitimate way to access power is the legal way, that fraud is not acceptable, it reveals where we are in terms of commitment to democracy.

P. The vast majority of governments in the region have questioned what happened, with exceptions such as Honduras, Nicaragua and Cuba…

R. Saying that fraud is not acceptable is a very basic, elementary thing. We are all at that point. Some countries, like Colombia, have taken a cautious attitude. I fully understand that the Colombian situation is particular, that it has a very complex relationship with Venezuela, with a number of aspects that must be handled with great delicacy. In addition, I am pleased that, like Brazil, they have expressed their interest in playing a mediation role that could be important, and that President Petro, very consistently, has maintained the demand that the electoral records be displayed, another very basic thing. My concern is that there comes a point where you have to reach the conclusion that what happened was blatant fraud. I admit that that point can come at different times for different people, but when it comes you have to say it. If not, the commitment to democracy is in doubt. Or are we going to treat Venezuelans differently than Guatemalans? During the post-election crisis in Guatemala, when there was an attempt to subvert the majority will expressed at the polls, we saw a very powerful reaction from Presidents Petro, Lula, López Obrador, a response that honors them. I would hope that this will be repeated with Venezuela.

P. Will that be the moment when Edmundo González says he will assume the presidency?

R. Nobody wants to go back to the experience of Juan Guaidó, who ended up being recognized by more than 50 countries and did not achieve any change. We were left, as we say in my country, skeptical. Now, that does not mean that we have to accept a big lie. At some point we have to say ‘no, sirs.’ We can create the conditions for an orderly political transition, but on the basis of knowing what happened and treating the Government of Nicolás Maduro as a government. de facto.

P. To conclude, how do you see democracy in Colombia?

R. Without going into the details of the security situation, this country is on a very difficult journey, more so than others, of building democracy. These processes are never linear, two steps forward and one step back. In Colombia, democracy has deep roots and has taken several steps forward. One, huge, was the agreement with the FARC. And it is not something abstract. I was head of the OAS electoral monitoring mission in the 2018 election, and I saw how it was the first in half a century without a single transfer of ballot boxes due to violence. Another very important step forward, regardless of whether one agrees with President Petro or not, was taken in 2022, when the left came to power through institutional means. There is no doubt that now everyone is in the political system, as it should be.

In any case, there is still a long way to go. The two most important pending issues are at the root of the conflict. We need to ensure the effective presence of the State throughout the national territory and the access of the entire population to economic and social rights, without which any democracy lives dangerously. One front, shared with the rest of Latin America, is the strengthening of the rule of law. The case of Colombia seems fascinating to me because it has an extraordinarily sophisticated and extensive legal and judicial culture, and at the same time it is a country with a very long tradition of illegal economies and phenomena of violence outside the State. Closing the gap between legality and reality, which is particularly wide in Colombia, is very important.

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