Julius Ruiz: “The fear of Franco’s fifth column explains the massacre of Paracuellos”

The historian and Hispanist Julius Ruiz, professor at the University of Edinburgh, delves into The dirty war (Espasa) in the fight of the republican secret police against the fascist fifth column during the civil war, although the Trotskyists were also considered another internal enemy.

British Hispanist, but son of Spaniards.

My mother is from Ourense and my father is from Madrid, although of Andalusian origin. They both went to England to work and met there. I have relatives who fought on the Republican side and a great-grandfather who was shot by the rebels in Seville in August 1936, but also grandparents who fought on the Francoist side.

Hence his interest in the history of Spain.

It’s a way to understand my past. Without the war I would not have existed, because in the fifties Spain was still suffering its consequences, which motivated them to emigrate to England in search of work. My father told me many stories about the civil war and post-war Madrid that fascinated me.. Now, unlike other British historians, I was never interested in the histories of the International Brigades. Those stories had a lot of impact, however they did not attract me.

Instead, it addresses the figure of George Orwell and his persecutors.

Of course, because his story is tremendous and impressive. Tribute to Catalonia It is the best book written by a British person during the civil war and its reading is essential to understand the conflict.

Are you not interested in the International Brigades because they were mythologized or because you think their role was not so relevant?

For both reasons. Their importance lies in the fact that they were the symbol of international solidarity with the republican cause, more than in their military performance. Abroad, the myth still survives that they saved Madrid in November 1936. However, some historians maintain that The military performance of the International Brigades was disappointing—and, in some cases, disastrous— and that has always been overestimated. I insist: its importance lies in the field of propaganda and not on the battlefield.

A fifth column awaits in Madrid. How much truth did that phrase have, attributed to several senior Franco officials and popularized by Pasionaria in ‘Mundo Obrero’?

It first appears in a report by the German Hans-Hermann Völckers, who reported to Berlin on September 30, 1936 about the resistance of right-wing supporters in the capital and wrote: “Bad tongues say that, when Franco was asked Which of his columns would take Madrid first, he answered: The fifth, which awaits in the capital“.

The phrase was also attributed to Mola, but I have not found the supposed original statement, although you do quote the general. Like that of Passiflora, in Working Worldon October 3, 1936: “Four columns, the traitor Mola said that he would launch on Madrid, but that the ‘fifth’ would be the one that would begin the offensive. The ‘fifth’ is the one that is inside Madrid; the one that despite the measures taken moves in the dark”.

And was that internal “enemy” that had to be “crushed immediately,” according to Dolores Ibárruri, so dangerous?

We must differentiate between the real fifth column, which existed in the streets of Madrid, and the imaginary fifth column, which existed in the heads of the anti-fascists. That is, compared to the vision that Pasionaria presented in Working Worldthe royal fifth column were autonomous groups dedicated to self-defense in the context of unprecedented revolutionary terror.

Setting up a rebellious organization at that time was not only difficult, but also suicidal. And there was also at that time the firm belief that Franco was going to enter Madrid at Christmas. Why risk your life organizing clandestine activities if Franco is going to free all the, in quotes, good Spaniards?

However, the capture of Madrid failed and that winter we began to see autonomous and clandestine groups trying to connect with national commanders behind the lines. It was a very hard and difficult job, so it was only from 1938 that they were well organized and directed by José Ungría, head of the Francoist SIPM (Information Service and Military Police).

The fifth column was never a monolithic organization, organized from the top down, but rather they were autonomous groups. That is why the SIM (Military Investigation Service) and the DEDIDE (Special Department of State Information), that is, the republican secret police, were never able to completely dismantle it, since some network always survived.

The diplomatic delegations—and their suitcases—played a fundamental role and, furthermore, their presence in Madrid determined that it was the capital of the fifth column.

Of course, because the embassies and consulates were safe spaces and, although the Republican police knew their importance and knew that some members of the fifth column were hiding there, they did not act for fear of international reactions, with exceptions, such as the assault on the Turkish legation.

In his book, the repression exercised by the Government of the Republic weighs more than the fifth column itself.

What I want to demonstrate with the book is that the secret police were much more successful against the fifth column than some historians maintain. And the main reason for these successes was the systematic use of torture, that is, they were able to quickly extract information from the prisoners and then completely or partially dismantle the clandestine networks. Perhaps the best example is the dismantling in 1937 of the Fernández Golfín-Corujo Organization.

He also wanted to know the nature of SIM and DEDIDE, shrouded in mystery. Who exactly controlled them? I intend to demonstrate in a definitive way that it was a Negrinist police, where the communists did have an important role, but ultimately secondary.

On the other hand, the SIM not only monitored internal enemies, but also left-wing critics, from the POUM to the caballeristas, including some soldiers of the Popular Army.

In other words, the SIM was more subject to the socialists of Indalecio Prieto and Juan Negrín than to the Soviet secret services of the NKVD, right?

In August 1937, Prieto created the SIM, an intelligence and counterintelligence service, as a police force independent of the communists. It was not an idea by Alexander Orlov, the head of the NKVD in Spain, but quite the opposite. Of course, the communists had an important role in areas such as Valencia – with Loreto Apellániz at the head – and they dominated the SIM in the International Brigades and in Juan Modesto’s Army of the Ebro, but not Madrid and the Central SIM, in hands of the negrinistas.

He also repressed the Trotskyists and the Marxists of the POUM, due to the impassiveness of Juan Negrín. Did it influence the evolution of the war and the defeat of the Second Republic?

Yes, but that repression was not directed by the SIM, but by the Catalan DEDIDE, which was communist. The problem is that there were many investigation brigades and many police forces, which leads to confusion. For example, the responsibility for the death of Andrés Nin [enmarcada en la guerra declarada por el comunismo a la “quinta columna trotskista”] It was not from the SIM, but from a Special Brigade that depended on the General Directorate of Security. And the Czech ones should not be generalized either.

Was it “the most sinister and fearsome political police” or does that adjective respond to Francoist propaganda?

There is a culture of widespread brutality that has nothing to do with a specific political party. Ángel Pedrero, head of the Madrid SIM, was a socialist and Loreto Apellániz, head of the Valencia SIM, was a communist, but both—or their agents—committed torture.

Few members of DEDIDE were professional police officers and only about forty did not have a party card. How did it influence that they were, above all, militants?

Hence the importance of the Soviets, because they teach them techniques to get information out of the prisoners quickly.

His youth also stood out, which could have influenced his, let’s say, warrior ardor.

The socialist Francisco Ordóñez Peña was 23 years old when he was appointed head of DEDIDE and Santiago Garcés Arroyo was only 22 when Negrín made him responsible for the SIM in May 1938. By the way, both were in the truck where the deputy José Calvo Sotelo was murdered on July 13, 1936.

And Santiago Carrillo, Public Order advisor in the Madrid Defense Board, was 21 during the Paracuellos massacres. They were very young.

Before the war they had had very short political experience, although they participated in the street fights of the October Revolution. They had a vision of zero-sum game politics, that is, “if we don’t win, we lose everything.” Politics for them is an existential issue and they have no democratic values ​​or commitments, they simply want to storm the skies.

They also reject their parents’ politics. Thus, Santiago Carrillo wrote an open letter to his father, Wenceslao, former director general of Security and socialist deputy who participated in Casado’s coup: “No, there can be no relations between you and me, because we no longer have anything in common.” , despite having the same last name.” It is a fight against the fifth column, but also a fight between generations, an important concept to understand political violence.

In the book he also alludes to the Paracuellos massacres, which still weigh on the republican imagination.

I had to make a reference to Paracuellos because in 1936 the fear of Franco’s fifth column explains for the most part the actions of the Republicans and the massacre of Paracuellos. That is, the anti-fascists’ fear that the prisoners would stab them in the back. Paracuellos is one more example of the problems that historians have had in understanding that war against the internal enemy and against the fifth column. An example, in short, of the power of myths.

His book ‘Red Terror’ was criticized from the left, but the title didn’t help either.

In the English version it was published in quotes: The ‘Red Terror’ and the Spanish Civil War. Perhaps today it would be more appropriate to use the term “revolutionary terror,” although there is always a tension between commercial and historical interests. The important thing is to tell it, because it is an essential part of the history of the civil war. It simply has to be done in a sensitive way and with an emphasis on objectivity and sources.

The fifth column did not carry out sabotage or assassinations because Franco was interested in limiting themselves to providing information, although the repression exercised by the anti-fascist secret police also had an influence.

The monolithic fifth column is a myth, powerful, well organized from above and that sent information across the lines without any problem, because in reality it was very difficult for the clandestine groups to relate to the Francoist forces. We could say that Republicans, even moderate ones, gave it too much importance.

Were the women of the Auxilio Azul network less repressed? Was inaction incurred due to machismo?

Exactly. It is evident that this sexist culture exists on both sides. The secret police did not give importance to the work of the women of the Blue Aid, although they should have. However, They were convinced that the most dangerous were hypersexualized women, like Mata Hari.. It is contradictory, because on the one hand they were afraid of them and, on the other, they believed that they could not be agents or carry out important espionage tasks.