Italy in the escalation

Italy in the escalation

As is known, our ministers Tajani and Crosetto are against allowing Ukraine to use the weapons received from Italy outside its bordersthat is, on Russian territory, because Italy is not at war with Russia and does not want to provoke an escalation. This position did not please the EU representative for foreign policy Borrell, who commented as follows: “It is clear that these are decisions that are up to each individual state… The countries that send long-range missiles and other weapons to Ukraine will each decide how to use them. But I think it’s ridiculous to say that allowing targets inside Russian territory to be hit means being at war with Moscow.… Ukraine is attacked from Russian territory, and, according to international law, it can retaliate by attacking the places from which it is attacked… If some member states do so, we do not go to war with Moscow.”

Two observations can be made on this speech, clear and incisive, but perhaps not entirely satisfactory. If an attacked country merely attempts to push the invader back into its territory, its status as an attacked country is clear. Can it “retaliate by attacking the places from which it is attacked”? Can it launch counterattacks on enemy soil, as the Ukrainian army did with some success in the Kursk region? Well, it is not certain that a truly effective defense, with occupation of the invader’s soil, will not lead to losing its defensive character.

The limits that were drawn at the beginning of the invasion, as regards the use but also the nature of the weapons, had the purpose of underlining that the military assistance had an exclusively defensive purpose.. An obvious limit is the border. It is perhaps true that according to international law one can continue to defend oneself even by destroying the enemy’s missile bases and airports on its territory. But it is unlikely that the invader will suffer these actions without reacting so that they are in accordance with the law.

This is where Borrell is wrong in considering the Italian concern to contribute to an escalation as “ridiculous”. Furthermore, the position of a third country sending missiles or long-range drones to Ukraine so that it can strike targets on Russian soil becomes more embarrassing. This was once considered an “act of war” and exposes it to possible reprisals if not an extension of the war. Our two ministers understand both international law and the factual situation that is being created in Ukraine.

However, Annalisa Cuzzocrea in La Stampa on 03/09/24 does not consider the justification that Tajani and Crosetto give for their decision to be valid: “If the reasoning held, it would be the Ukrainian president who wanted the escalation – and not a more effective defense – and the governments of Great Britain, France, Spain, Denmark, Germany, the United States would have gone to war against Putin.” But it is this argument that “does not hold”.

Zelensky may well have considered that now he can only emerge victorious from an escalation that directly brings the US and NATO to war. The only “effective defense” may well be to provoke escalation. Nor is there an automatic mechanism for going to war with Russia. Clearly, countries that loosen or drop restrictions on the nature and use of weapons are taking a more offensive stance toward Russia, and are challenging it to react, counting on it not doing so. This is the gamble that our government rightly does not want Italy to participate in.

Also interesting is the position of Lorenzo Guerini, former Minister of Defense from 2019 to 2022 (in the Conte and Draghi governments) and currently president of Copasir (Parliamentary Committee for National Security). In the interview given to Francesca Schianchi of La Stampa and published on 5/09 he expresses his disapproval of the government’s line and his disappointment that Schlein, secretary of his party, has instead approved it. “Aren’t you also afraid that the use of weapons in Russia will open the way to an escalation?” the interviewer asks him.

Answer, in which I numbered the sentences: “1) The escalation is the Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities. 2) I find the discussion on defensive weapons quite hypocritical: Ukraine is an invaded country and is clearly making defensive use of weapons. 3) If the Russians attack from positions a few kilometers from the border, it is clear that responding to neutralize those bases means defending oneself.” It can be observed that 1) alone could be a decisive response that deprives 2) and 3) of relevance: there is no need to worry because the escalation is already there. It has been discharged and will be discharged only on Ukraine. The Russians cannot do more and worse than this: they are already doing it. Therefore we can authorize the Ukrainians to make the use of our weapons that seems most effective to them.

According to Guerini, all gleeful, Ukraine would pay for its full discretion on weapons obtained from friendly countries with its own self-destruction. 2) is exposed to the arguments opposed to BorrelI: to summarize them, what is at issue is not whether Ukraine is violating international law but whether Italy, by removing its restrictions on the nature and use of weapons, would violate it: by committing an act of war, which would justify a retaliation by Russia ON US; a retaliation that could happen simply because Russia could consider Italy’s step forward in the escalation intolerable 3) is strange, because it introduces an important limitation to the right to self-defense attributed to Ukraine by 2): it would be necessary for the Russian positions to be hit to be “a few kilometers from the border”. In front of Guerini, Crosetto seems a beacon of lucidity.