The secessionist Moldovan region of Transnistria, bordering Ukraine and with a significant pro-Russian population, could be part of the plans of the New Russia devised by Vladimir Putin
Putin’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine has put the secessionist region of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova in the spotlight. This territorial strip beyond the Dniester occupies around 12% of the Moldovan territory and 10% of its population, around 350,000 inhabitants divided into three thirds (Moldovan-Romanians, Ukrainians and Russians).
In the month of September 1990, in the context of nationalist demands in the different federated republics of the Soviet Union, some groups led by the Russian minority residing in the Moldovan region between the left bank of the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border, linked to the local Soviet nomenklatura, declared their independence from Moldova.
The argument put forward was the eventual reunification of this republic with Romania – claimed by the Popular Front of Moldova – to reverse the effects of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 on Bessarabia and its integration and ethno-linguistic differentiation within the USSR. A similar movement took place, in parallel, in the five districts of southern Moldova, with an ethnic Gagauze majority.
The war conflict of 1992 and its subsequent freezing
Between the months of March and July 1992, the war phase of the confrontation between the Moldovan authorities and the Transnistrians, supported by the XIV Russian Army, established in the region despite the independence of Moldova, took place.
Since the Istanbul Agreement of July 21, 1992, which ended the military phase, Transnistria has been transformed into a frozen conflict and a de facto state.
A whole succession of formats to attempt a political-diplomatic resolution of it have failed, fundamentally due to the obstructionism of Russia, which is interested in maintaining the current status quo geopolitically favorable to its interests.
The conversion of the Russian military contingent into peacekeeping forces in the enclave was intended to seek legal cover for a presence that violates the principle of non-interference and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent state such as Moldova.
However, Russia did not recognize the independence declared in 2006 by the secessionist authorities, after holding an illegal referendum in which the majority approved it (97%).
Until now, Moscow has been more in favor of a confederal solution, such as that contained in the Kozak Memorandum (proposed in 2003, not accepted by the Chisinau authorities due to the right of veto granted to Transnistria in the adoption of essential decisions of the Moldovan state.
The Ukrainian crisis of 2014
The paralysis for years of the 5+2 negotiating format (Russia, Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, OSCE, with the EU and the United States as observers) coincided with the departure from power of the Moldovan communists and the formation of pro-Western governments (EU and NATO), although Moldova is a neutralized State (art. 11, Constitution of 1994). The consequences of Euromaidan in Ukraine, with the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its military interventionism in the eastern districts of Donbas – maintained since with more than 11,000 fatalities by 2021 – led to Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU and the consequent deterioration of relations with Russia and, in parallel, with Transnistria. In addition to the collaboration with Ukraine in border control, which, through the assistance of the EU EUBAM Mission, intensified in a very notable way.
Statue of Lenin in front of the city hall in the capital of Transnistria, Tiraspol. /
New Russia: a tangible geopolitical project?
During 2014, this project, Novorossiya (New Russia), developed by the Russian military leadership with some representatives of the neo-imperialist ultranationalism closest to the Kremlin, gained some notoriety.
The independence movement in Donetsk and Lugansk was promoted by Putin, who explained in April 2014 that these regions – with Crimea and Odessa included – had belonged to the tsarist empire since the 18th century. However, with the signing of the Minsk I and II Agreements in 2014 and 2015, the recreation of Novorossiya ended up being diluted.
What has changed? In the framework of the ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine since February 24, the concentration of Russian military operations in the eastern districts and in the south of Ukraine would allow it to control the entire south of the republic – with Crimea already in its power – , access from the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and to short-circuit this outlet to Ukraine if Moscow’s intervention design extended to Odessa and, ultimately, connected territorially with Transnistria.
In addition to the geostrategic importance of the project, which would definitively submit Ukraine and Moldova to their potential claims of joining NATO and the EU, it would recreate the Russian imperialist imaginary with control of the founding Slavic core (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) and it would reinforce its western borders, turning the entire territorial strip into a sort of security buffer.
Options and feasibility of the project
The conversion of Transnistria into a second version of Crimea is feasible. An eventual international recognition of its independence by Moscow would unite the separatist enclave with other cases in the former Soviet space, such as South Ossetia or Abkhazia in Georgia and the aforementioned Crimea and the districts of Donetsk and Lugansk in Donbas, located on the margin. legal parameters in the international legal order.
However, the conversion of Transnistria into a de iure State would not bring additional benefits to Russia with respect to the situation maintained for three decades, although it would have significant costs.
The possibility of carrying out an attack from Transnistria towards Ukraine by Russian and Transnistrian contingents is unlikely, since we are talking about some 6,000 human troops in total and weapons that, in many cases, are from the Soviet period.
However, the false flag operations that could be behind the recent attacks in Maiak or Parcani could precipitate the plan that the Kremlin may have designed for this enclave.
Moldova’s extreme energy dependence on Russian natural gas and oil does not allow to think of any kind of military agitation action in Transnistria by President Maia Sandu. In addition, the area is in a very complex context due to the reception of a large contingent of Ukrainian refugees.
The option of taking Odessa militarily is very risky, but it would be the only possibility to territorially connect Russian positions with Transnistria and surround all borders with Russian military positions (including Belarus).
If the more than two months of military aggression against Ukraine show us anything, it is that we must be prepared for the unforeseeable, such as recreating Putin’s New Russia project.
This article has been published in ‘
The Conversation‘.
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