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In a moment of special weakness, after the elections in Castilla y León and the error of the labor reform, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez began the demolition of Casado and Egea with a ‘weapon of mass distraction’, the alleged espionage on Ayuso, who awarded him the role of victim
When Teodoro García Egea was appointed secretary general of the PP, it seemed paradoxical to me that the most disorganized politician I know, capable of meeting two people at the same time and in different places, and thinking that this would not be a problem, was chosen for such a position. The disorder was a reflection of frenetic activity, which he faced with a stubborn optimism that he did not lose until hours before his resignation. Full, he was always full, he said. In one of the times that I saw him after his appointment, I spoke to him about how difficult political activity can be in Madrid, where the navigating between like-minded people is a classic in the capital, especially at the heights of the PP. Being secretary general of a party confers a lot of power, but it also makes a lot of enemies willing to collaborate in a possible purge if the opportunity arises. It is clear that the ciezano entered very dangerous waters.
The defenestration of García Egea and Casado, in a lightning operation of a few days, to which they contributed with their gross errors, will end up being studied in the faculties of Political Science. For months, both required Isabel Díaz Ayuso to clarify compromising tax and banking information about her brother, without thinking that this Florentine dagger could become a boomerang in the hands of the leader’s chief of staff, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez. There is nothing more naive than exhibiting a dagger that is not going to be used, because it cannot be used or because it is not wanted to be stabbed. The adversary will feel threatened and will respond when he sees the right opportunity. That moment of vulnerable weakness came after the poor results of the elections that Casado and Egea forced, for strategic purposes, in Castilla y León and after the blunder in the vote on the labor reform. Miguel Ángel Rodríguez then began the demolition operation with a ‘weapon of mass distraction’, leaking the alleged espionage to Díaz Ayuso, who cast the president as the victim (in crisis communication, reality does not count, only perception is worth). García Egea’s overreaction at the subsequent press conference, where he announced the opening of a file on Díaz Ayuso, only contributed to putting the popular parish even more on the leader’s side. Then came the total mess of Casado’s interview with Carlos Herrera and the reverse gear hours later, announcing the closure of the file. From then on, the crisis acquired a dizzying speed, with an embarrassing escrache against Genoa that no one has repudiated, the slow trickle of defections from those who were faithful to the popular leadership, the editorials calling for the resignation of Casado and Egea in the media of conservative reference… With the PP opened up and bleeding to death, the nightly conclave of the barons was reached, where Núñez Feijóo was elevated and Pablo Casado, the leader boosted after Rajoy’s departure by the corruption of the ‘Gürtel’ and who now leaves the PP for denouncing the alleged corruption of a colleague. Everything has happened so quickly and in such an unedifying way that it is difficult to understand. An interesting book helps me, ‘The cannibal ceremony. About political performance’, where the French historian Christian Salmon reflects on the dramatization of politics, whose protagonists end up becoming actors, ‘performers’, who try to capture the attention of voters through the media and networks social. The problem in our hypermediatized society is that a minimum error in this political dramatization can lead to ruin. And there they are to prove it Albert Rivera, Pablo Iglesias and, now, Pablo Casado.
The crisis that decapitated the PP was broadcast live in the new spaces that have displaced the traditional deliberation forums. Now they are in the newspapers, the social networks and the television channels that bet on political information, scenarios where the ‘performers’ of politics are born and die. It is no coincidence that Egea chose La Sexta to disappear from the front line in the best way possible for its battered public image. In the end, he was not as fine a strategist as he believed after frustrating the motion of censure in the Region. Symbolically, he thus put an end to this war that was won by the one who best knew how to face the combat, was unpredictable in his response and managed to impose the truth that suited him. They are the rules of confrontation-era politics, according to Christian Salmon.
What happened is a warning to navigators. Organic power succumbs to electoral expectation. It would be of no use, for example, for López Miras to have the support of the regional PP apparatus if an internal rival appears that makes militants and voters think that with him or her they would have better results at the polls. That was Ayuso’s power against Casado, a magnetism among the conservative electorate that is now at its peak. We will see how Ayuso and Alberto Núñez Feijóo coexist.