With the return of Donald Trump to the White House, Morocco will have a powerful ally in Western Sahara, since the former president was the first Western leader to recognize the Moroccan identity of that territory in December 2020. Recently, the French president, Emmanuel Macron , supported Rabat’s autonomy plan. During his visit to the Alawite kingdom, he assured that “France will be on Morocco’s side in all its existential issues,” including, “of course,” the future of Western Sahara.
For the professor and honorary professor of Arab and Islamic Studies at the Autonomous University of Madrid, Bernabé López, “this is a real boost to the Moroccan vision.” The specialist in history and social movements of the Arab world and contemporary Maghreb speaks with elDiario.es about a possible solution to the conflict. In his opinion, the important thing is to find “a formula in which neither of the two parties agree to start from scratch.”
What implications could a new Trumo presidency have for the conflict in Western Sahara?
Donald Trump’s presidential letter of December 10, 2020, about to leave the White House, recognizing the Moroccan identity of the Sahara, paved the way for key countries in the dossier such as Spain, Germany and recently, above all, France to approach to the Moroccan theses. Donald Trump’s electoral victory allows Morocco to think that the now president-elect will complete the policy that he started, making a reality what was left in suspense during President Biden’s mandate: the opening of a consulate in the Saharan city of Dakhla, the ancient Villa Cisneros.
But the unpredictability of Trump’s personality, with other fronts in international politics much more urgent, and other risks that may arise in Morocco’s new partnerships with uncomfortable countries like China, force us to be cautious. After Trumop’s victory, Mohamed VI sent his congratulatory telegram saying what was obvious.
During your visit to MoroccoEmmanuel Macron recognized that Western Sahara “is within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” Is it a point of no return?
France, what it came to say verbatim is that “autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the framework in which this issue must be resolved” and that “the 2007 autonomy plan constitutes the only basis to reach a fair and negotiated political solution.” in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.”
This, evidently, leaves no doubt that it is a full endorsement of the Moroccan vision. It only leaves it understood that the issue is not resolved, but that it must be resolved as Morocco wants, without specifying what autonomy means. It is a point that is close to the recognition of the Moroccan identity of the Sahara that President Trump gave in 2020, a month before his departure from the presidency.
In that sense, if the United States and France act in unison, all is lost from the point of view of a resolution that can reconcile the interests of the two parties. Because that’s the problem. That is, you do not have to agree with one or the other, but rather find a formula in which neither of the two parties agree and which means entering into a discussion starting from scratch.
What also caught my attention is that on the page of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Morocco entry, the map appears without separation points with the Sahara and with 400,000 square kilometers of extension for the kingdom of Morocco. That is the effective recognition of the incorporation of the Sahara. That is, the complete map, with the Sahara included and the kilometers.
But, ultimately, France’s right to veto makes a Security Council resolution almost impossible and demonstrates, in that sense, the absolute ineffectiveness of this institution.
Pedro Sánchez called in a letter in 2022 As “realistic and credible” as the 2007 autonomy plan is, is this option still the only one on the table?
Morocco has managed to get numerous countries to consider its 2007 autonomy proposal as “realistic and credible” as a way to resolve the problem, but this would require that the other party, the Polisario, consider it acceptable in order to be endorsed by the inhabitants of the Sahara. , in the territory, in the camps and in the diaspora, something very difficult due to the lack of a census.
But if the Moroccan identity of the Sahara is recognized, there is no need for autonomy or anything. An autonomy plan would be needed, but without consensus, discussion, debate or negotiation. Simply apply autonomy when Morocco wants. And in that sense it is absolutely vague.
Morocco also plays with the card of control of the migrationIs that your greatest asset?
Morocco exploits its key role in controlling migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa or from its own country to Europe, as well as the anti-terrorist control exercised by its effective intelligence services. And he uses that paper as a bargaining chip to pressure for the recognition of his rights over Western Sahara.
The last setback that Morocco has suffered has been the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union which annuls fishing agreements in the waters of Western Sahara. Despite this, can the interest of the 27 in wanting to maintain strategic relations with Morocco encourage other EU countries to support their autonomy plan?
It could, but there are still no European countries that have positioned themselves in this direction. So far there has only been an advance party in Germany, France and Spain. And now France has clearly positioned itself. However, right now I do not see other countries on the horizon that are going to join the decision of the French Republic.
What is evident is that Morocco appeared to show little concern about the European court’s decision, saying that it would find “other markets.” Furthermore, Europe has one year to continue with these agreements. Nobody knows what can happen at this time.
The UN special envoy for Western Sahara, Steffan De Mistura, proposed in mid-October a “partition” of the territory to resolve the conflict, a proposal that is not new and that was already proposed by his predecessor, James Baker. Although they denied the partition proposal in front of the media, this plan consists of Morocco retaining control of the northern area and the south becoming considered an independent country. Is this a “realistic” and “pragmatic” measure, as the EU requests?
Partition is neither realistic nor pragmatic. It cannot be under current conditions, where the population in Western Sahara is six or seven times higher than in 1975, despite the fact that the majority are Moroccans from regions bordering or not bordering the Sahara.
The enormous economic and infrastructure investments that Morocco has made in the old River of Gold, together with the establishment of a population of several hundred thousand Moroccans in the southern part of the region, makes it unthinkable that Morocco would want to abandon it, much less to a Front Polisario that has demonized for half a century.
Can this hypothetical partition plan be interpreted as an abandonment by the United Nations of its mediation in the conflict?
non-acceptance [de la partición] by the parties [Marruecos y el Frente Polisario]would not have to imply the abandonment of UN mediation, which could be carried out if De Mistura abandons [el cargo] in six months, as you have suggested. Although it is increasingly difficult to find a mediator, given the failure of those who have taken on that task.
De Mistura’s failure adds to that of his predecessors, Baker, Van Walsum, Ross and others. And it is a result of the fact that the resolutions of the Security Council lack effectiveness due to the lack of a force that can impose them. The current composition of the Security Council, which includes vetoes from nations with strong conflicting interests, makes its operation for conflict resolution unviable.
De Mistrura also raised the possibility of the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
The withdrawal of MINURSO would be the recognition that what gives its name to the mission, the “R” for self-determination referendum, has lost its meaning, especially due to the material difficulties of carrying it out, with an incomplete and non-consensual census, apart obsolete, since it was made a long time ago. Furthermore, for years now, UN Security Council resolutions have insisted above all on the need to achieve a stable and lasting agreement between the parties. If achieved one day, that could be what would be voted on in a referendum.
Why has this mission not monitored human rights in the Sahara to this day? What weight has Morocco had in this?
Other United Nations missions have jurisdiction over the control of human rights in the corresponding area, but the MINURSO mission has not incorporated it into its tasks despite the failed proposal by the Administration of [Barack] Obama which Morocco, with the support of France’s veto, opposed.
Moroccan policy in Western Sahara has been intransigent and repressive with the demands of the Saharawi minority in favor of independence and has never wanted it to be controlled by MINURSO or other bodies.
What do you think the role of the international community should be (or should have been) in this situation?
Spain did not decolonize in its time. Therein lies his responsibility that he obviously cannot recover today. When he decided to decolonize, so untimely, so late (between 1973-74), he chose to follow in the abstract the UN guidelines of proceeding to a self-determination referendum without taking into account that there were historical claims raised by Morocco and territorial claims. most recent from Mauritania. And that Algeria, without expressing territorial claims, maintained strained relations with both neighboring countries and hid strategic interests of hegemony over the region.
Ten years earlier, everything would have been easier, if relations between Spain and Morocco had been more fluid and if Morocco’s proposal for an agreement with Spain to cede Western Sahara in 1963 had been carried out, since at that time There was still no nationalist sentiment in the Sahara. If so, they would have avoided problems and, probably even a war, the Sands War, which ended up poisoning relations between Algeria and Morocco.
However, it was decided to hold a referendum…
Yes. In order to avoid precipitating a referendum organized by Spain, from which it feared adverse results, Morocco decided, together with Mauritania, to submit the issue to the judgment of the Court of The Hague, believing in the strength of its dossier.
However, this court’s ruling was ambiguous: it recognized the rights of the parties and concluded – with the decolonizing logic in vogue – that a referendum of self-determination of the population was necessary, without taking into account the specificities of such an extensive and sparsely populated, with the risks of ending up allowing the establishment of a new failed State.
What role does Algeria play?
To the extent that Algeria gives its support to the Polisario Front, wielding the abstract principle of the right to self-determination of peoples, welcoming Sahrawi refugees into its land, helping the diplomatic maintenance of the SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), framing the leading leadership of the liberation movement, makes it hostage to its politics, closely controlling its action. The old rivalry with Morocco is behind the conflict and it seems impossible to achieve a solution without a change in Algeria’s attitude.
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