Belarus Belarus to hold “referendum” on constitutional changes on Sunday – Lukashenko gets more power and nuclear weapons from Russia again

In Belarus a “referendum” on constitutional changes will be held next Sunday. The amendments to the law confirm the leader of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko power, prosecute him and remove the current constitutional references to neutrality and nuclear non-proliferation.

The referendum is being held in a situation where Russia has sent up to 30,000 troops to Belarus military exercises. The drills ended on Sunday, but no troops have been withdrawn.

Meanwhile, Russia has stationed an exceptionally large number of troops and equipment on the Ukrainian border, and Western powers fear a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Troops staying in Belarus after the military exercises has raised the question of whether Sunday’s referendum is in any way linked to the deployment of Russian troops and Russia’s possible decision to launch an invasion of Ukraine.

It hardly is, says a senior researcher at the Foreign Policy Institute Ryhor Nizhnikau.

The amendment to the constitution will certainly go through an overwhelmingly clear reading, as Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime will not allow referendums that would end unfavorably for the administration, Nizhnikau recalls.

At the same time, Nizhnikau considers the referendum to be almost irrelevant to both the Lukashenko regime and the current situation in Belarus. Even if it were so unusual that an amendment to the Constitution would be rejected, it would only mean the continuation of current spending.

“The original intention was to quell public outrage and create the impression that there would be a clearer system of power-sharing in the country in the future.”

Belarus the constitution has been amended twice during Lukashenko’s reign, first in 1996 and a second time in 2004. Lukashenko has spoken about the third amendment since at least 2016, and he raised the issue again after the uprising in Belarus after the rigged presidential election in August 2020.

“Since then, Lukashenko has destroyed the domestic opposition and has no interest in sharing power. It’s just that he wants to keep his promise of a referendum and looks even a little unreliable in the eyes of the people, ”Nizhnikau says.

Belarus announced on Saturdaythat Russian forces will remain in the country after the initial major war exercises.

According to Nizhnikau, this has only a potentially psychological effect on voters. The greater fear is the repression seen after the presidential election, which went frighteningly well even without Russian troops.

According to Nizhnikau, keeping troops in the country is associated with threatening Ukraine and the West.

“They will stay in the country as long as [Vladimir] Putin believes that they have an important role to play in threatening Ukraine and the West. At the same time, welcoming Russian troops to Lukashenko costs little, as it can show loyalty to Moscow. ”

What about why is the constitution of Belarus being amended to remove the declared aspiration for neutrality and nuclear disarmament? Nuclear weapons were last deployed in Belarus in 1996. Are they concessions to Russian President Vladimir Putin?

Nizhnikau does not believe this. In the fall of 2020, Moscow was in favor of constitutional reform, but the Russian administration has lost interest in internal changes in Belarus since the uprising was suppressed. Lukashenko’s authoritarian status is clear for the future.

Instead, renouncing neutrality and nuclear disarmament is, in Nizhnikau’s view, a rebuke to the West, which has gradually imposed tougher sanctions on the Lukashenko regime and its neighbors: if you continue, you will face a much worse migration crisis and much worse security problems with Russia.

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“Moscow does not fully trust Lukashenko either.”

In November, Lukashenko told Russia propaganda channel Russia Todaythat he is ready to offer Putin the opportunity to deploy Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus.

This, too, was probably a message to the West, Nizhnikau estimates. Putin is unlikely to decide to invest in nuclear weapons in Belarus – at least not when Lukashenko is in power.

“First, the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus would be the last nail in the coffin for a number of international agreements signed by Moscow, and in addition, Moscow does not fully trust Lukashenko,” Nizhnikau says.

Lukashenko, for example, has never wanted to promote a state union between Russia and Belarus, even though its treaty was signed in 1999. Last September, however, he acceptedthat cooperation between the two countries be intensified on the basis of this agreement. At the same time, Belarus received financial assistance.

That union treaty is already a way to make Belarus a vassal state of Russia, if you really want to do that. It does not require constitutional changes or occupation forces, Nizhnikau says.

If If nuclear weapons were to be imported into Belarus, Lukashenko would certainly demand that the Belarussian authorities have at least partial responsibility for them. Nuclear weapons would give Lukashenko a huge piece of money.

“No one in Moscow wants to give nuclear weapons to Lukashenko because it would make the situation in Belarus unpredictable, which it is not now. Moscow wants to be there for the driver, ”says Nizhnikau.

While Putin has threatened a “military-technical” retaliation if Western countries do not accept Russia’s demands to stop NATO military expansion, for example, “military-technical” considerations are suspected to mean the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus.

According to Nizhnikau, the “military-technical” retaliation has always been just a twist on war or the acceleration of hostilities in Ukraine.

Beyond in the long run, however, the removal of nuclear disarmament from the Belarusian constitution may become relevant.

At some point, the regime in Belarus will also change. If, at the same time, relations between Russia and the West are still an order of magnitude colder than they are now, the Russian administration could potentially deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus, Nizhnikau believes.

Now Russia is stuck with Lukashenko, mostly happy but stuck. Changing Lukashenko’s status would be costly for Moscow.

“It would send a completely wrong signal to Moscow to other Russian-backed dictators that you cannot trust Moscow’s support. It would also send the wrong signal to the Russian elite, who have been instructed that leadership will not change with any agreements between the elites in the back rooms. Putin has consistently opposed such logic for 20 years. ”

What about could one dare to assume that Russia will not begin to occupy Ukraine, at least before the end of the ‘referendum’ on Belarus? That the Russian troops will remain in place and keep any protests at zero and only then move?

Can’t, says Nizhnikau.

“The referendum does not play any role in that. No one sees much importance in the referendum. It’s just something to do when it’s promised. ”

Instead, the interesting question for Nizhnikau is whether the Belarusian army will support Russian troops if they decide to attack Ukraine.

“This is not clear at all. The Belarusian army is obeying Lukashenko’s orders, ”says Nizhnikau.

“We need to remember that Lukashenko is still a fairly independent decision-maker. Russia’s full-scale war would put Lukashenko in a very difficult position and at least not strengthen his position. “