Two weeks after the scandal broke out over the intensive interception of communications, the shadows and the lights continue to mix in this case
Certainties
There was massive ‘hacking’ and the CNI had Pegasus
espionage existed
The ‘smartphones’ of 61 pro-independence politicians -59 Catalans and 2 Basques- were spied on through the Israeli ‘malware’ Pegasus. Between 2017 and 2020, attacks took place against secessionist leaders, including the last four Catalan presidents: Artur Mas, Carles Puigdemont, Quim Torra and Pere Aragonès. 97% of the interventions took place under the governments of Pedro Sánchez. The forensic analysis carried out by Citizen Lab in 2021 was the one that discovered the presence of the ‘malware’. The espionage campaign was especially intense during 2019 and 2020, coinciding with the operation against the CDR accused of terrorism, the sentence of the ‘procés’ and the subsequent incidents carried out by Tsunami Democràtic.
Previous sensitive data
Whoever spied on the pro-independence politicians with Pegasus had prior access to part of the communications of those concerned or to confidential data before the ‘malware’ took control of their terminals. All the victims of espionage received personalized messages (adapted to trips, purchases or subscriptions they had made or booked) to infect their terminals without even having to open those messages. These arrived in the form of SMS or through WhatsApp or other applications.
The license of the CNI
The National Intelligence Center (CNI) acquired the license to use Pegasus at the beginning of 2016 for more than 5 million euros, as different national security sources have confirmed to this newspaper. The secret services bought the right to use the company NSO against the clock, after months before Wikileaks revealed that the CNI used the services of an Italian company, Hacking Team, to spy on its targets. Spanish intelligence began using the system in the fall of 2016, making Spain the first European country to activate it.
There is a legal framework
Organic Law 2/2002 regulating the prior judicial control of the National Intelligence Center establishes that ‘La Casa’ can intervene in communications “for the fulfillment of the functions assigned” to the body and always with the prior authorization of a magistrate of the Supreme Court , appointed for this purpose by the General Council of the Judiciary. Since 2009, and after three renewals, this responsibility has been held by Pablo Lucas. The togado, within a maximum period of 72 hours, must approve or reject the request. The puncture will last a maximum period of three months, although it may be extended. The magistrate authorizes the interventions, but then does not receive the information collected by the spies. This is sent only to the Government.
Doubts
The authorship and the real scope of the plot are unknown
The responsability
Officially, the Government has neither confirmed nor denied that the CNI is behind this espionage campaign. So far, only the secret services environment, and always informally, has admitted that they did spy on Catalan independentists with Pegasus, but neither were the politicians pointed out by the Citizen Lab investigation nor were they in that volume. The environment of the CNI numbers around twenty mobile phones seized and circumscribes them to activists related to Tsunami Democràtic, the CDR and the Tactical Response Teams (ERT), whom the National Court accused of terrorism. The Executive insists that, be that as it may, any communications intervention by the CNI has obtained the mandatory authorization of the Supreme Court.
The reaching
The Canadian institute’s research is not exhaustive. In other words, the 61 cases revealed two weeks ago are only those located by Citizen Lab through a concentric sampling of infected terminals, after the MEP Jordi Solé (ERC) confirmed in July 2020 that his mobile had been intervened. . As a ‘tasting’, hundreds of mobiles related to the ‘procés’ or with people who had close contacts with the protagonists of the secessionist attempt have been analyzed until reaching the largest scandal known in Europe by volume of certifications of infected ‘smartphones’ with Pegasus. However, the real scope of the espionage with the Israeli ‘malware’ is impossible to calculate.
The spied content
Citizen Lab’s forensic analysis could only confirm that the terminals were hacked with Pegasus, but not the exact time that the program was active, much less specify what information from the ‘smartphone’ was leaked. There are no limits to Israeli ‘malware’: it can pass information contained in SMS, emails, agendas, notepads, messaging systems such as WhatsApp, photo files or social networks. In addition, you can remotely activate the phone’s microphone.
You hinder the truth
The Government wants to try to close this controversy with the explanations of the director of the CNI, Paz Esteban, in the recently constituted commission of reserved matters and expenses. However, there are significant doubts that this forum can come close to the truth. According to various members of that sensitive commission over the years, the appearing parties never deliver documents that can be contrasted and rarely show any paper, with which it is impossible to compare anything. The only time that public opinion had access to declassified CNI reports was during the parliamentary investigation commission for the 11-M attacks.
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