The keys to the crucial succession in Iran

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps is also an economic giant that controls the top levels of the country’s economy.

In addition to being inept, Raisi was known for his role in the summary executions of more than 4,000 political prisoners in 1988. A few years ago, when there was open discussion about this infamous episode in Iran, Raisi had the temerity to suggest that he deserved an award of human rights to cleanse the world of the corrupting influence of those he sentenced to death. And a prominent speaker at Raisi’s funeral “promised” that his “killer work of the 1980s” will continue unabated.

Less than three years ago, Raisi was nominally “elected” to the presidency in the most rigged election in the history of the Islamic Republic’s rigged elections. By eliminating all other remotely viable candidates, Khamenei practically appointed Raisi to the position.

The presidency of Iran is an empty position, except for its proximity to Khamenei’s throne. That’s important, because the specter of succession has been haunting Iranian politics since octogenarian Khamenei was diagnosed with cancer.

Guessing who is paving the way to succeed Khamenei in an election, and which problematic competitor is being eliminated, has become something of a parlor game in Iran.

In light of Raisi’s rise from a minor, albeit murderous, judge to head of the judiciary and then to the presidency, many assumed that he was being groomed to be the next supreme leader. Now that Raisi has died, some are talking about a succession crisis. In fact, his death has triggered aauthentic crisis of legitimacy for the regime.

Given Khamenei’s grandiose image of his own intellectual brilliance and his belief that he is the voice of God on Earth (he once even suggested that a sermon of his was actually from Allah), and given Raisi’s notoriously weak intellect , it is difficult to believe that Raisi was ever a contender, at least in Khamenei’s self-affirming vision.

Despite overwhelming evidence that Khamenei’s chosen successor is one of his sons – the mysterious Mojtaba, who has long lurked in the shadows – some experts in the West point to Khamenei’s aversion to hereditary rule as evidence of who does not want his son to succeed him.

But such an assumption goes against Khamenei’s behavior and Shiite dogma. Khamenei, who by decree or law offers views on virtually all facets of society, politics, culture and literature, and whose words are declared by his supporters to be Fasl-il-Khitab – “the end of the discussion” – could simply declare that his son is not a candidate to succeed him.

But he hasn’t done it. Additionally, Reuters reported, “sources familiar with the matter” said the Assembly of Experts, a deliberative body that oversees the supreme leader, removed Raisi’s name from a list with the pool of candidates six months ago.

Likewise, it is a central tenet of the Shia faith that the Prophet Muhammad had anointed his son-in-law, Ali, as his successor, and that the direct male descendants of Ali himself are, as imams, the only legitimate rulers of the Shia faithful. .
Khamenei’s rise to the position of supreme leader followed the same tradition.

Although he obviously lacked any of the constitutional qualifications for the office, he was declared successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the regime, following the flimsy claim of then-president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani – the second most powerful man, after the late Khomeini – that someone had heard Khomeini say that Khamenei was his worthy successor.

At the time, Iran’s Constitution stipulated that the supreme leader should be the chief ayatollah of the Shiite world. Khamenei was nothing more than a minor cleric. Finally, after he was appointed to office, the Constitution was amended to accommodate Khamenei’s poor qualifications. Gradually, Khamenei, to the dismay of some of the senior ayatollahs, assumed the mantle of ayatollah. But Khamenei is not a prophet nor is today’s Iran similar to the Arab society of 1,400 years ago, and therefore there is no guarantee that Khamenei will be able to carry out his plan, or, even if he does, that Mojtaba will be able to navigate the damaged ship of state towards stability.

The legitimacy crisis affects a large and growing segment of Iranian society. The Women, Life, Freedom protest movement is the latest manifestation of resistance to what many Iranians believe is a corrupt, anachronistic, incompetent, misogynistic and despotic regime. Reliable polls, some conducted by the regime and others by Gamaan, based in the Netherlands, indicate that less than 20% of the population wants it to remain the status quo. (Gamaan is an independent, nonprofit research foundation that studies Iranians’ attitudes toward different social and political issues.)

A clearer indicator of this crisis of legitimacy was that, despite the regime’s claims, few Iranians – inside and outside the country – were truly saddened by Raisi’s death. While large numbers of people in Iran, on social media and in the diaspora celebrated Raisi’s death, others lamented that he did not live long enough to be tried for his crimes.and others pointed to the regime’s inability to protect its key agents.

Another sign of the regime’s internal crisis is that none of Iran’s three living former presidents were allowed to participate in the funeral. Even more surprising and notable is that all previous presidents except Khamenei (who was president under Khomeini) have died in exile, been assassinated, or died under suspicious circumstances. Those who are still alive have been rejected as virtual enemies of the State.

Meanwhile, the country continues to suffer from double-digit inflation and high unemployment rates; the value of its currency is plummeting; and educated elites, capital and large numbers of skilled workers are leaving the country. Much of the international community, either uninformed about Iran or, more likely, betting on the short-term gains of pleasing the regime by adhering to diplomatic decorum, has offered its condolences over the passing of a man whom Ayatollah Montazeri, until 1988 Khomeini’s designated successor, called “criminal.”

The regime is doubling down on its despotism and issuing ominous warnings about its ability to produce a nuclear bomb. Once Khamenei leaves the scene, the IRGC will be the ultimate power broker, and Mojtaba will likely be its preferred supreme leader.

Ironically, some of Mojtaba’s defenders, evidently aware of the nature of the crisis, are suggesting that he will be a reformer along the lines of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, willing and able to pull the country back from the brink. While that is unlikely, the resilience of Iranian women in their fight for democracy is a ray of light. In the short term, however, instability seems inevitable and, as usual, whatever happens in Iran will not stay there.

After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s regional and international role changed. The regime that has governed since then has taken this nation on a path of confrontation with the West, bringing Tehran closer to China and to regions as geographically and culturally distant as Latin America.

The sale of oil to China, through a diplomatic pact with Saudi Arabia, has given it economic respite from the sanctions imposed by the US, after Iran’s refusal to renew nuclear agreements. Iran has responded by obstructing the work of nuclear inspectors and increasing uranium enrichment to try to create its own atomic weapons.

Iran has supplied Russia with drones for the war in Ukraine and weapons for its allies in the Middle East (Yemen, Lebanon, Hamas) in the Gaza war, avoiding a head-on clash with Israel and the US.

Although this limit was crossed in April after the first direct attack in its history on Israel with missiles and drones, in response to the Israeli aggression against the Iranian consulate in Damascus.

ABBAS MILANI

PROJECT SYNDICATE

STANFORD