Directing responsibility in one direction after a disaster can only lead to misunderstanding. Even more so in a tragedy like the floods caused by DANA in Valencia where the hoaxes that circulated from the beginning (accelerated by an almost total absence of official information), the political component is added.
Pointing towards Cecopi, the absence of Mazón or the delay in messages directly implicates the PP. On the other hand, offloading responsibility to the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHJ) involves the PSOE, not only because the organization depends on the Ministry for the Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (MITECO) headed by Teresa Ribera, but because its current president, Miguel Polo Cebellán -despite being a career civil servant and having been linked to the organization as an engineer for years- Nor can he hide his political affiliation, which led him to be Councilor for Culture for the PSOE. in his town, Titaguas (Valencia) during a term.
Since the crisis broke out, Polo has maintained a low profile and has refused to make statements to the media, despite the fact thatthe entity that directs It is key both in the prevention of this type of catastrophesas in monitoring and evolutionthrough the Automatic Hydrological Information System (SAIH), which has measurements through a network of rain gauges, reservoir capacity, river and ravine capacity and temperatures throughout the area covered by the basin.
The first information pointed to a delay in the communication of the “upward trend and very rapid flooding” of the Poyo ravine through an email sent at 6:43 p.m. that Tuesday. Others, on the other hand, exempted the CHJ from responsibility by pointing out that the ‘Special plan against flood risk’ They give it control over the “evolution of flows and situation of reservoirs in large rivers”, but not of the ravines, such as the Poyo, which has been the cause of most of the victims. A half-truth, because although the plan does specifically grant these functions, it also includes as competencies of the entire group, of which CHJ is a part, the «evaluate the risk situation and collect rainfall and hydrological data necessary to carry out monitoring, as well as “advise the Steering Committee on the measures to protect the population that are considered necessary.” In this way, to clarify this responsibility, it is advisable to make a chronology of the events of that day and the connection of the CHJ with them.
11:30 a.m. In just five minutes the flow of the Poyo ravine rises from 57.63 m3/s (at 11:25) to 208.20 m3/s. It is the first time that the threshold marked as an alert (150 m3/s) is exceeded and the CHJ – the only entity that has a flow meter in the channel, at the height of Ribarroja-, proceed to notify by email the Emergency Coordination Center of the CV, Government Delegation and AEMET following the protocol. After a verification period, the email is sent at 12:09.
Our environmental agents continue to tour the Demarcation to find out if there are more serious conditions in channels and ravines.
More information about rainfall and river flows in https://t.co/46wfm51HiR
— Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (@CHJucar) October 29, 2024
11:55 a.m. Although the CHJ has always denied that in emergency situations it is not their responsibility to monitor the ravines, from their X account they publish a post in which they point out that “our environmental agents continue to tour the demarcation to find out if there are any more serious conditions in channels and ravines».
5:00 p.m. The Cecopi meeting begins, which CHJ representatives attend electronically. Then, The flow of the Poyo is no longer worrying and has dropped to 71.65 m3/s.
5:25 p.m. The Poyo ravine once again exceeds the alert threshold and stands at 151.60 m3/s. However, this time the warning email will not arrive until more than an hour and a quarter later, at 6:43 p.m. The CHJ attributes this delay to the fact that They were “at the Cecopi meeting” and they could only perceive the magnitude by checking the data in one of the breaks.
5:35 p.m. Approximately at that time, the Minister of Justice and Interior, Salomé Pradas, requests a half-hour break to “think about what to do,” according to sources from the CHJ explained to ABC. By then the flow had already increased to 280.54 m3/s.
6:00 p.m. The meeting resumes. The concern is focused entirely on the Forata reservoir possibly collapsing, although by that time the Poyo ravine already doubles the flow of the Ebro River, with 809.59 m3/s, according to the only existing flow meter, which the CHJ controls. In addition, their rain gauges, which can be consulted on their website, also record that In the last hour it has rained 109.8 liters per square meter in Chivaupstream of the ravine, so that water will contribute in less than an hour to increasing the flow.
6:43 p.m. Second email alerting of the very rapid growth and “with an upward trend” of Poyo. The measurement offered by the mail is 1696 m3/s corresponding to 18:25, after verification, although at that time, data verifiable live through the web, it is already 1941.05 m3/s, four times the flow of the Ebro and well above 1412m3/s at the height of Torrent which, in a return period of 500 years, indicates the maximum expected flooding according to the National Mapping System for flood-prone areas prepared by MITECO, collected on the MITECO website. Júcar Hydrographic Confederation.
6:55 p.m. Last flowmeter measurement before the flood disables it: 2282.90m3/s. Until that moment, the meeting had only discussed the danger of the Forata dam breaking. “At no time was data collected from us about the Poyo,” the CHJ explained to ABC, focusing on the delay in sending an alert message due to the danger of flooding. “With the situation in the Magro River there were already enough reasons to notify the population,” they tell this newspaper, although they acknowledge that “then we realized the unfortunate increase in the Rambla del Poyo.” They point out again that “the safety of the population cannot be attributed to this sensor alone,” even though it is the only one that exists.
7:00 p.m. The president of the Generalitat arrives at the meeting, two hours after its start. Some media report his arrival half an hour later. The need to update data delays the decision again. By that time, there was no longer a flow meter in the Poyo.
7:30 p.m. Around that time the president of the CHJ, Miguel Polo, speaks with the Secretary of State for the Environment, Hugo Morán to take “an assessment of the situation of the meeting” and show their concern about “the slowness” in decision-making at Cecopi, as CHJ sources have confirmed to ABC. Specifically, the problem focuses on the delay in sending the mass alert through the Es-alert system and the discussion on its wording. CHJ sources who confirm the rest of the conversation say they do not know if the danger of the Poyo ravine was discussed. It seems unlikely, since if the Ministry had been alerted at that time, its reaction would have had to be immediate.
8:12 p.m. The alert is sent, which speaks of the danger of flooding but does not specify the area. At all times the meeting had focused on the Forata dam and there is no specific warning to the towns of L’Horta Sud in Valencia that cross the Poyo ravine and which have been the most affected. By that time, according to CHJ’s own estimates the flow must “exceed 3500 m3/s” in that areabecause at the height of Torrent there are other ravines that have no measurement.
The situation continues to be very complicated in the areas affected by the overflow of the Barranco del Poyo.
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— Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (@CHJucar) October 30, 2024
1:48 a.m. In the X profile of the CHJ the first explicit reference to the most affected area appears: «The situation remains very complicated in the areas affected by the overflow of the Poyo ravine” in the last post of a thread more focused on the situation of the dams.
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