Why the conventional wisdom that the Ukraine war was a stalemate in favor of Russia is wrong.
- Ukraine is at war significant progress has been made
- Ukraine needs many thingsin order to be able to break out of the current stalemate
- Kyiv has a real path to victory in the Ukrainian war
- This article is available for the first time in German – the magazine first published it on January 8, 2023 Foreign policy.
KIEV – Ukraine's daring attack on a large Russian warship in occupied Crimea in the early hours of December 26 was another episode in Kiev's strategy to wrest control of the Black Sea from Russia. With most of its ships expelled from its home port of Sevastopol, the Russian Black Sea Fleet can no longer find safe harbor anywhere on the Crimean Peninsula. All ports there are now vulnerable.
The Institute for the Study of War backs this up with data showing that the number of Russian naval vessels in the port of Sevastopol steadily declined between June and December 2023; In contrast, the number of ships in Novorossiysk, on the Russian mainland further east, steadily increased. While Russia is doing everything it can to attack Ukrainian infrastructure, the risky deployment of ships and submarines armed with Kalibr missiles in the Black Sea is exposing them to possible Ukrainian attack. This is a tacit admission that Russia can no longer rely on Crimea's ports and launch pads.
Ukraine's success is due to domestically manufactured missiles and drones, sometimes launched from Zodiac boats or jet skis. But the most effective attacks came from the air, where Ukraine used its Soviet-era fighter jets to shoot down both domestically manufactured and NATO-supplied missiles. These attacks occurred under the protection of modern Ukrainian air defenses – including newly delivered foreign air defenses – which regularly shoot down most Russian missiles and drones intended for Ukrainian targets.
Ukraine has made significant progress in the war
So Ukraine has made significant progress in denying Russia control of the sea and air space over and around its territory, thereby preventing the Russian navy and air force from operating with impunity. But is that enough for Kiev to win? To many Western observers, victory seems impossible as wave after wave of Russian troops crush the Ukrainian defenders. Ukraine's strategy of denying Russia free use of its sea and airspace may work, but as things stand, it cannot defeat the Russian army on the ground, nor can it stop every missile that hits civilian targets.
The current view in much of the West is that Ukraine is losing the ground war and that there is no path for the country to victory as Russia brings Ukrainian civilians to their knees. Kiev might as well call for a ceasefire and sue for peace.
The problem with this scenario is that it spells defeat not only for Ukraine, but also for the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. It would encourage both Russia and China to steadfastly pursue their political, economic and security goals – including the conquest of new territories in Eastern Europe and Taiwan.
But is conventional wisdom correct – or does Ukraine's adept success at sea and in the air suggest that a different outcome is possible? Perhaps the Russian army can be defeated by taking advantage of Ukraine's willingness to fight in new ways. If you ask any U.S. military expert, the key to the Russian withdrawal lies in relentless and precise airstrikes, well-coordinated with combined forces maneuvers on the ground. While the Ukrainians are admirably using the weapons at their disposal to attack Russian forces both strategically, such as in Crimea, and operationally, such as targeting command and logistics targets, it is a success at the tactical level not yet recognizable. To achieve a tactical breakthrough on the ground front that leads to operational and strategic success, they must become more effective from the air.
For air power to be decisive in 2024, Ukrainian armed forces must create temporary windows of local air superiority in which to concentrate their firepower and maneuver forces. Since the Ukrainians have successfully closed their airspace to Russia at points of their choosing, such time windows are possible with the means they already have at their disposal. More and better weapons tailored to this scenario would make them more successful on the entire front with Russia.
Ukraine needs many things to break out of the current stalemate
General Valery Zalushny, the commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, admits that the Ukrainian armed forces need air superiority, the ability to break through mine obstacles, better battery defense capabilities and more electronic warfare assets to break out of the current stalemate that favors Russia and return to maneuverable warfare in which Ukraine has an advantage. Specifically, he advocates three key components. First, armed UAVs capable of coordinating attacks with artillery using real-time reconnaissance (this could include appropriately armed Turkish-made TB2s, MQ-1C Gray Eagles, MQ-9 Reapers, or custom-made cheap and light UAVs capable of the to use the necessary weapons). Secondly, armed UAVs to suppress enemy air defenses and medium-range surface-to-air missile simulators to deter Russian pilots. And third: unmanned vehicles for breaking through and clearing mines.
Although they involve new technologies, this combination of capabilities is reminiscent of the method used by the U.S. and allied NATO forces in West Germany during the Cold War to counter the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior ground forces, protected by layered air defenses were to confront. The Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) is designed to synchronize attack helicopters, artillery and close air support from combat aircraft and to ensure a constant barrage of fire on the enemy in the event of an attack by ground forces. Pooling NATO resources in this way should give the alliance's forces the mass, maneuverability and flexibility they need to overcome numerical superiority, avoid a war of attrition and escape the kind of bloody carnage that is expected of the alliance the current stalemate in Ukraine is characteristic.
In the case of Ukraine, a modernized JAAT would include armed UAVs with Maverick and Hellfire missiles, loitering munitions, precision-guided artillery shells, and long-range aircraft-launched standoff missiles, among others. These systems would be coordinated in an electromagnetic environment designed by Ukrainian operators to dominate local airspace, saturate the battlefield with munitions and clear mines to pave the way for a ground attack. This updated JAAT – let's call it electronic or eJAAT – would create a bubble of local air superiority that would expand as the combined forces advance under the protection of that bubble.
Given Russia's willingness to accept significant losses, the eJAAT could be even more effective in defense: a massive use of firepower against advancing forces by an eJAAT could result in an overwhelming defeat of the attackers and open up the possibility for Ukraine to strategically use sudden twists of fate.
Kyiv has a real path to victory
Zalushny has publicly stated that “the decisive factor will not be a single new invention, but the combination of all existing technical solutions.” Like all good commanders, Saluzhny is painfully aware that the 2023 campaign did not work as well as he had imagined. Nevertheless, and to their advantage, the Ukrainians have clearly demonstrated their innovative talent, their willingness to use Western methods and their absolute will to win. Helping the US and Europe work with the Ukrainians to better manage operational complexity and more dynamically combine technology, information and tactics, coupled with security assistance tailored to the eJAAT approach, would bring movement back to the now static battlefield give Ukraine a fighting chance.
If Ukraine can achieve the momentum in the ground war that it lost during its failed summer offensive, Kiev has a real path to victory. This path will involve Ukraine's demonstrated naval and air capabilities, coupled with the application of a sophisticated combination of techniques on the ground. This will be a path to victory not only for Ukraine, but also for the United States and its allies.
To the authors
Rose Gottemoeller is a lecturer at Stanford University, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a former NATO Deputy Secretary General, and a former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State. Twitter: @Gottemoeller
Michael Ryan is a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy and a former career officer in the US Air Force.
We are currently testing machine translations. This article was automatically translated from English into German.
This article was first published in English on January 8, 2024 in the magazine “ForeignPolicy.com“ was published – as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to readers of the IPPEN.MEDIA portals.
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