Press
Peace was possible – in April 2022. Apparently a document proves that both parties to the conflict had reached an agreement. Then Russia became stronger.
Kiev – “Mission Impossible,” claims Sabine Fischer; And even Germany's best-known military historian recently failed to see a silver lining on the second anniversary of the Ukraine war: “I don't see a chance for peace at the moment,” said Sönke Neitzel Free Press and supported the opinion of the political scientist Foundation Science and Politics, which she published in October 2022. Fischer was referring to peace negotiations between the two conflicting parties, which had been simmering on a low flame since the invasion in February 2022 and were broken off by Volodymyr Zelensky in October – the World is now reporting on a 17-page paper that could probably have ended the Ukraine war as early as mid-April 2022 – a draft treaty between the two opponents.
“Peace negotiations always depend on the military situation, i.e. the balance of power between the warring parties,” writes Sabine Fischer. And in fact, Vladimir Putin had made a huge miscalculation with his impetuous invasion – his troops were stuck, and Ukraine seemed to be able to drive the neighboring superpower straight out of the country. However, the academic consensus seems to be that Ukraine was still prepared to make “far-reaching compromises,” as Fischer writes.
Russia's dictate: Ukraine should commit to “permanent neutrality.”
However, that changed as the conflict progressed: Russia's atrocities against the Ukrainian civilian population as well as Ukrainian military successes caused trust in Russia to decline and Ukraine's self-confidence to grow. Basically, the driving force behind Russia's aggression appears to be its fear of NATO expanding eastward. According to the documents of the World Article 1 of the draft treaty is said to have stated that Ukraine is committed to “permanent neutrality”. This should mean permanently forgoing the possession or stationing of nuclear weapons, as well as ruling out NATO troops being stationed in Ukraine or having military infrastructure open to them, such as airfields.
“Negotiation results must be able to be sold domestically; So two conflicting parties can conclude an agreement, no matter how good it is – if this cannot be enforced domestically in one of the two countries or societies, then peace will not last.”
Joint exercises would also have been ruled out afterwards – Russia would have accepted Ukraine's accession to the European Union. However, she claims SWP-Scientist Fischer that since the annexation of Crimea ten years before Russia invaded the Ukrainian heartland, lasting reconciliation with Russia in Ukraine was seen as “unrealistic” and that political and military ties to the West were sought instead. For Vladimir Putin, Crimea is still considered renegotiable; for Volodymyr Zelensky, security guarantees from Russia are a top priority. An almost irreconcilable stalemate between the two heads of state – or both peoples.
In Article 5 of the supposed draft treaty from back then, Russia also assured Ukraine of security. Ultimately, this passage is similar to Article 5 of the NATO assistance obligation. Russia then suggested that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council should have guaranteed Ukraine's integrity. In addition to France, the USA, China and the United Kingdom, Russia would also have been a signatory state. The draft treaty thus contains Russia's recognition of a country's right to self-defense enshrined in the UN Charter – including with the help of other countries. However, this passage presupposed that the peace treaty would have had to be ratified in all countries on the Security Council – including Ukraine's commitment to neutrality.
Putin's idea: guarantees for Ukraine – with a veto right for Russia
In addition, Russia wanted to stipulate that “in the event of an attack, all guarantor states would have to give their consent to activate the assistance mechanism. This would have given Moscow veto power to override the defense mechanism. “In addition, Moscow rejected Ukraine’s demand that the guarantor states could establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine in the event of an attack,” as the World quoted from the document.
In return, Russia would have withdrawn its troops from Ukraine – but: According to Russian demands, Crimea and its port of Sevastopol were excluded from these security guarantees – which Russia made the base of its Black Sea Fleet in 2014. In doing so, Russia would have separated Crimea from the Ukrainian heartland and incorporated it into it with legal protection. The status of Donetsk and Luhansk, which Russia also took under control in violation of international law, remains similarly contentious to this day. The draft contract says, loudly Worldonly vaguely spoken of areas in eastern Ukraine that were to remain excluded from the security guarantees – ultimately it was probably intended that the two presidents Putin and Zelenskyj should have agreed together on a map about the binding borders.
Demilitarization of Ukraine – ideas were miles apart
The question of language is also said to have been non-negotiable because Russia demanded that Russian be made the second state language Ukrainska Pravda reported. Last but not least, Moscow insisted on extensive demilitarization of Ukraine – the draft treaty clearly states explicit figures. The number of troops should be massively reduced – from the estimated one million soldiers at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Ukrainian army should be reduced to 85,000 armed forces. Kyiv would have offered 250,000, writes the World. Russia would have accepted around 350 tanks, Kiev had probably insisted on 800; In terms of artillery pieces, Russia would have granted Ukraine a little more than 500; Kiev had them World According to the company, they insist on 1,900 pieces.
Overall, Die Welt summarizes, the conflicting parties moved towards each other in the first phase of the Ukraine war, but ultimately parted ways irreconcilably. “That was the best deal we could have had,” she quotes World on Sunday a member of the then Ukrainian negotiating delegation; At that time, the defenders were negotiating with the West for arms supplies and were probably already planning a counteroffensive; Russia had more to lose at that point. Overall, Russia as the aggressor made its demands, to which Ukraine responded – often with rejection. The dynamics of the negotiations followed the course of the fighting, as Sabine Fischer explained SWP clarifies.
Accordingly, after the failed coup on Kiev, Russia shifted its military strikes from the north of Ukraine to the Donbas and the south. Fischer: “While the Russian political leadership spoke of a 'gesture of goodwill', horror grew in Ukraine and at the international level about the crimes against the civilian population uncovered in the liberated areas. Kyiv is sticking with the negotiations for the time being. However, in view of the images from Bucha, Irpin and other places, support for a compromise with Russia has waned in Ukrainian society.”
“Mission Impossible”: Peace must also be able to be sold domestically
Nicole Deitelhoff also believes that these cuts in the integrity of the country and the ongoing terror will probably make peace at the negotiating table impossible for the time being, as she told the news channel Phoenix said – therefore, a peace agreement is at risk if one party leaves a negotiation as the winner and dictates its terms to the other party. But that's not enough, as the peace researcher says Frankfurt Goethe University says: “The second thing that many people often don’t consider is that negotiation results must be able to be sold domestically; So two conflicting parties can conclude an agreement, no matter how good it is – if this cannot be enforced domestically in one of the two countries or societies, then peace will not last.” (KaHin)
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