Le Mans | Ferrari: the masterpiece is born from cunning and precise estimates

Winning the 24 Hours of Le Mans is never an easy task. Being able to do it for two consecutive years, among other things in one of the most unpredictable editions of recent times, is something that adds another touch to the legend. Twelve months later, Le Mans is still red, with the 499P giving an encore with an emotional race, with hearts in our throats until that checkered flag that turned the dream into reality for the crew of the #50.

In an event made extremely treacherous by changeable weather, with rain which on several occasions forced the teams to constantly vary their strategy between slick and wet tyres, tactical management was fundamental. In the same way, so was the ability to understand what was happening, making projections even in a very short time on what the subsequent scenarios could be.

Ferrari knows this well, having to deal with an unexpected situation in the final part of the race which forced them, once again, to change plans on the fly, responding in a very short time to a situation that could have compromised the race .

Given the problem with the right door, with the lock remaining stuck making it virtually impossible for the driver to close it without returning to the pits, the Maranello team had to think in a short time how to adapt the racing tactics to get to the end but without sacrificing victory. Strategic reactivity was the real key to Ferrari’s success at Le Mans, not only throughout the entire race, but above all in the last two stints, where circumstances placed the Ferrari faced with complex scenarios in which making a mistake was extremely simple.

The main theme was energy and fuel management, so much so that the #50 took the checkered flag with 2% of the “virtual energy tank”, leaving enthusiasts in suspense. However, although the tension was clearly palpable not only in the stands and at home, on the other side in the Ferrari pits the engineers were certain that they would be able to get to the end of the race without any difficulties in terms of consumption.

It all started from that problem at the door, which came after the driver change, which forced the team to return to the pits again after just a few minutes and rethink the strategy. From the outside, the real fear was that the #50 would be forced to make another “splash” pit stop at the end, thus losing several seconds to return to the pit lane and carry out a brief top-up of fuel useful to get to the end of the race.

On the contrary, however, the engineers were able to react quickly, making predictions on the consumption values ​​necessary to get to the checkered flag with just two stints instead of three. In the space of a few minutes, the technicians varied the tactics and parameters, finding that, from their calculations, with an additional refueling when the car would have had to return to the pits anyway to fix the car problem, the #50 would have had to be able to get ahead of everyone under the checkered flag without having to make a splash pit stop at the end.

#50 Ferrari AF Corse Ferrari 499P: Antonio Fuoco, Miguel Molina, Nicklas Nielsen

Photo by: Alexander Trienitz

Predictions and calculations which later proved to be correct, among other things without having to carry out particular energy or fuel saving tactics, demonstrating the good work done by the engineers in red on the forecasts. However, the most interesting aspects lie not only in the accuracy of the upstream calculations, but also in the reasoning applied behind the change in strategy.

Looking at the weather forecast, Ferrari was expecting variable conditions with the possible arrival of rain and, in wet conditions, we tend to maintain a slower pace, also reducing consumption. If the track had remained wet for both stints, the Cavallino team was certain that the amount of fuel on board would have been sufficient to get to the end without difficulty. Precisely for this reason the two final stints were divided into two sections, not only from a purely practical point of view given that it would naturally have been necessary to make another reference to reach the checkered flag, but also from the point of view of the approach. By the time the #50 returned to the pits to repair the door, the red’s strategists had calculated that realistically another 27 laps would be covered with time still available before the 24 hours were up.

At a tactical level it was therefore decided to divide the two final sections into two stints, the first of which lasts 14 laps, while the final one lasts 13. A practical but also well-reasoned choice because it was decided to carry out the longest stint at the moment in which the track was certainly still wet, which allowed us to reduce consumption and go further while still maintaining a good pace.

“When we fixed the door, we calculated that there were 27 laps left. We knew that if the conditions were wet, we would be able to get to the end without any problems. So, we started by telling ourselves to start doing 14 laps in the meantime [nel primo dei due stint finali]as we knew that in wet conditions we would be able to do them”, explained Ferdinando Cannizzo, head of Maranello’s Endurance cars.

Ferrari AF Corse Ferrari 499P #50: Antonio Fuoco, Miguel Molina, Nicklas Nielsen win the 24H of Le Mans 2024

Photo credit: Rainier Ehrhardt

“Why did we think we could do it? Because the forecast told us that it would rain. Even if the rain had decreased in intensity, the track would still have remained wet. So, based on this estimate we said we could stop and repair the door.”

Beyond the changing conditions, as confirmed by Cannizzo, Ferrari did not have to implement particular saving tactics or change the strategy to manage fuel and energy in the last two stints compared to the initial forecasts, effectively validating the validity of the estimates of the Cavallino. In fact, to manage consumption, there are generally two different methods: an automated one, i.e. the one linked to a specific control unit, and the manual approach.

As regards the first, there are algorithms developed by engineers in the factory and adapted to the characteristics of each track which allow the “brain” of the car to make automatic estimates in order to manage consumption in a completely autonomous manner. This is one of the key elements to which great attention is given in the development phase, because well-written algorithms allow both fuel and energy to be managed in an increasingly efficient manner, based on the number of MJ that can be spent in each single stint, with a value set in advance by the FIA ​​with the BoP.

On the other hand, however, there is also a manual approach, in which the driver himself intervenes directly on consumption. In fact, on the screen on the steering wheel, whoever is in the cockpit is given a reference target on the energy that can be spent in each single lap, to which is added a projection of consumption towards the end of the stint based on the driving style used . In this way, the pilot can react independently to the estimates, adapting his style to exploit more energy or reduce consumption.

#50 Ferrari AF Corse Ferrari 499P: Antonio Fuoco, Miguel Molina, Nicklas Nielsen

Photo by: Shameem Fahath

“In terms of stint management, these are things that are pretty much quite structured. The guys with the drivers work a lot on it. We also have these strategies, let’s say automatic, which allow us to distribute energy in a stint based on how many laps we want to do. Sometimes this automatic approach is used, sometimes it is the pilot himself who has the energy quantity target to aim for on the screen,” said Cannizzo.

“The driver can see how much the energy is growing and adjusts himself, a number comes out that gives him a projection of how much energy he will use if he continues to drive that way. In this case clearly Nicklas in particular, but also the others, was good at managing on the one hand the energy to get to the end, but on the other also the gap from Toyota”. Based on the BoP drawn up before Le Mans, Ferrari had 889 MJ available for each stint, with an average estimate of around 68 MJ per lap. Clearly the Cavallino tried to give itself a small margin, suggesting to Nielsen to save a couple of MJ for each lap, so as to be able to count on a little treasure in case of any eventuality.

The double approach was fundamental especially in the last stint, which was in turn divided into two sections: the first part was aimed at maintaining the gap on the Toyota #7 driven by Jose Maria Lopez, so as not to let it get closer, while in the second it was decided to manage consumption with the sole objective of containing consumption and reaching the checkered flag, as confirmed by the history of the times. It was precisely in this first phase that the Argentine made some small errors which even allowed the gap between the two cars to widen, making it impossible for the Toyota to close the gap, although it was then able to get closer.

“At the beginning we had a good margin, we told him not to take risks and to go calmly, but he said that he would take care of it and that he had the performance, in fact he even did some very fast laps. I think it was a bit of the key to the race, because there Toyota understood that we still had some performance aside in case we wanted to push and, at that moment, Lopez who was chasing made some mistakes.”

“The first part of the stint was to keep the gap on the Toyota, then we managed it. It’s what I was saying before, which is not trivial: when we have someone behind who gets in our slipstream, they have the advantage of the slipstream and we don’t have enough power to stay in front”, added Cannizzo, recalling how Ferrari had a deficit of expendable energy compared to the Japanese manufacturer, so much so that it had to run with a weaker wing.

“So, then we couldn’t get back in the slipstream to make a counter-overtaking, so our objective was to maintain the gap so as not to let the Toyota get closer, and then manage it in the final laps, so much so that the advantage gradually decreased.”

The second consecutive success on French soil, therefore, is not only the result of the good performance of the 499P, particularly in the dry, but also of excellent management with accurate estimates and perfect reading of the last stints, knowing how to respond quickly to the problems that have arisen.