In a war that has already lasted half a year, time is not in Ukraine’s favor when it is facing a larger and more populous Russia.
Russian the attack in Ukraine has increasingly turned into a war of attrition due to strategic failures and Ukrainian resistance. It’s a slow process of destroying enemy soldiers and their equipment while minimizing your own losses.
The war of attrition is considered the last option, which is resorted to after the failure of strategies leading to faster profits. It is avoided because it is difficult to inflict disproportionate losses on the enemy and because the sides usually wear each other down evenly. In addition, time brings other than military factors with it. The continuation of the war no longer depends only on the strength of the military, but also on demographics and industrial strength. The support of the people also becomes vital for military operations.
In this respect, Russia has a clear advantage. Russia is a larger and more populous autocratic state than Ukraine, where strict control of the war narrative enables the war to be prolonged.
Ukrainian relative weaknesses can be compensated by foreign support and the justification of defensive war. The justification of war is key. The horror of a war of attrition without the prospect of an end to the war can lead to the depletion of the will to fight.
Foreign aid is the most important leveler of the balance of power for Ukraine. Simply arming and training the country’s armed forces is not enough. Military support must be based on a strategic idea of what the army can achieve with the support. However, the West does not have the weapons or strategic assistance to quickly liberate the occupied territories of Ukraine.
So what kind of peace can success on the battlefield lead to? Restoring Ukraine’s 1991 borders may seem like an obvious military goal. However, achieving such a comprehensive profit is unrealistic. Russia’s nuclear weapons are holding Ukraine hostage. Extending the US nuclear umbrella to Ukraine seems too risky.
Because a unilateral victory seems unlikely, one must prepare for a compromise. The compromise must combine the difficult balance between Ukraine’s incomplete territorial conquest, the country’s compromised political sovereignty and Russia’s international power political position.
The peace agreement must to some extent recognize Russia’s demands towards Ukraine but also Russia’s international position. The key question is to what extent the West will be able to accommodate Russia’s demands without leaving Ukraine in the same situation as in 2015.
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Russia’s nuclear weapons are holding Ukraine hostage.
Neither side seems to be able to resolve the war by fighting, so it is likely that the war will turn into a de facto or even a formal cease-fire in accordance with the Minsk agreements. However, such a situation would only lead to another war over time.
Positive ones of course surprises can happen. A more moderate administration may replace Vladimir Putin, or the Russian army may revolt like in 1917. However, wishful thinking is not a substitute for a good strategy: China can attack Taiwan and Western support for Ukraine run out. “Ukraine must win” or the call to endure and trust in the implementation of international law cannot be considered a strategy.
A just peace would make Russia a nuclear-armed loser – a permanent threat to international security. Evenly distributed dissatisfaction leads to a better outcome in the long run.
Ukraine’s military capabilities must be used to improve the negotiating position in an incomplete compromise peace. Ukraine must be able to liberate an area that it can accept as a basis for peace. In return, Ukraine also gets a safe peace approved by Russia.
This can be criticized as a concession policy rewarding Russian aggression. Compromise is still a better option than the war waged for the pursuit of absolute justice and victory that we are witnessing now. The West is not ready for it, and Ukraine is not capable of it on its own.
Ilmari Käihkö and Jan Willem Honig
Käihkö is a visiting researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute and Honig is a professor at the Netherlands National Defense Academy.
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