09/07/2024 – 18:42
Right-wing and left-wing populist parties that have emerged as the most prominent in the elections in eastern Germany are against arms shipments, posing challenges to the federal government that has promised to defend Kiev “for as long as necessary.” “We support Ukraine in its resistance to Russia’s war of aggression. Of course, we will continue to do so,” a German government spokesman said after the results of recent elections in the states of Thuringia and Saxony, where both right-wing and left-wing populist parties received significant votes.
But is this so “obvious” after the electoral success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) in the east of the country? These are two parties that advocate ending military support for Ukraine and improving relations with Russia.
Although foreign policy decisions are not made at the state level, German support for Ukraine has become one of the themes of the election campaign in the eastern states.
Leftist Sahra Wagenknecht has made the vote a choice between war and peace. AfD leader in Thuringia Björn Höcke even said that “these elections in the east will also decide whether this country leaves the path of war or continues towards escalation.”
Some statistics reflect the dimensions of the problem that the German federal government is facing, especially in the east of the country, despite the Federal Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, assuring that Berlin will support Kiev “for as long as necessary”.
Fear of an expansion of the war
According to the 2024 edition of the Allensbach Security Report, 76 percent of respondents in the east of the country fear that Germany will eventually be drawn into a military conflict. In contrast, only 44 percent of people in the west of Germany express this sentiment.
A survey released in July by the Infratest Dimap institute found that 36% of respondents across the country believed that Germany’s arms shipments to Ukraine had gone “too far”. In the east, 50% thought so.
“Many in the east fear an escalation of the war through arms shipments,” explains Katja Hoyer, a historian from Brandenburg, also in eastern Germany, who now lives in the UK.
“In recent weeks, I have heard time and again the argument that Russia cannot be defeated anyway, and that further support for Ukraine would only be an unnecessary provocation that would prolong the war.”
In an email to DW, Hoyer says he believes this perspective stems from the experiences of the former East Germany under Soviet rule. “The Soviet Union was one of the two world powers. The reverence that many in the east felt for the Soviet state was transferred to modern-day Russia – not so much to the West.” Furthermore, people in the east’s view of the Soviet Union was not entirely negative.
“The two branches of the Kremlin”
Saxony’s governor, Michael Kretschmer, echoed this sentiment during this year’s election campaign, calling for a “freeze” on the war in Ukraine. This stance has drawn criticism from within his own party, the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the largest opposition party in the Bundestag (parliament), where many see Kretschmer’s stance on the war as a betrayal of Ukraine.
Political analyst Roderich Kiesewetter assesses that the CDU has allowed itself to be pressured by what he called “the two branches of the Kremlin”, referring to the AfD and BSW.
In an email to DW, he said that “a ‘freeze’ in the conflict would result in massive war crimes in the occupied territories and the sending of soldiers from Western countries to reinforce the front lines. It would serve as a model for other aggressive countries and would result in millions more refugees and displaced people having to flee to Germany and Western Europe.” Kiesewetter attributes the outlook in eastern Germany to “the romanticization of Russia, distortion of history and anti-Americanism.”
Nevertheless, Kretschmer managed to find a resonance among voters in Saxony. Probably partly because of his criticism of support for Ukraine, the CDU narrowly outperformed the AfD, a party that has no qualms about openly rooting for a Russian triumph in the war.
“Stress test” for the CDU
In the upcoming coalition negotiations in Saxony and Thuringia, the question “What is your position on supporting Ukraine?” could have concrete consequences. In both states, there is a good chance that the CDU will lead the next government. The conservatives, however, will need coalition partners. So far, the CDU has said it has ruled out alliances with the AfD, although it has not done the same with the BSW.
Ahead of the election, Wagenknecht made it clear that his party’s membership in a coalition government would depend on the Ukraine issue. “We will only participate in a state government that takes a clear position in favor of diplomacy and against preparations for war at the federal level,” he said ahead of the vote.
Since the election, however, Wagenknecht has adopted a more moderate tone. She has said that a government that includes the BSW should publicly communicate its intention to see more “diplomatic initiatives” from the federal government aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, and that she does not support sending arms to Kiev “on the current scale.”
BSW as the “long arm of the Kremlin”
But is it possible for the BSW to get its way? “That shouldn’t be a major challenge in Saxony,” says Katja Hoyer. “Kretschmer has been clear from the start against arms shipments.”
The expert, however, believes that the situation is quite different in Thuringia. There, the AfD ended the elections as the strongest party, ahead of the CDU. “The BSW can and will put pressure on the CDU, which did not win the election,” predicts Hoyer.
“Almost half of the electorate voted for the AfD or the BSW, i.e. a pro-Russian party. Even if Wagenknecht ruled this out, a coalition between the two parties would have a majority in the state parliament.” This gives the BSW considerable negotiating room to demand concessions from the CDU.
Kiesewetter, for his part, strongly advises against making concessions to the leftist party. “The BSW is the Kremlin’s long arm and goes against all the values that the Union [a longeva aliança da CDU com a União Social Cristã (CSU) na Baviera] traditionally advocates: peace through freedom and self-determination, international laws, democracy and commitment to the West”. For him, collaborating with the BSW “would be tantamount to self-destruction”.
One way out would be for both sides to acknowledge that the states are not responsible for the situation in Ukraine, while committing themselves, albeit vaguely, to peace efforts. At the federal level, however, the issue is far from being resolved.
Public support for Ukraine is eroding, especially in eastern Germany. The longer the war drags on, the harder it will be for the government to maintain its policy of supporting Kiev. The issue will certainly come to the fore again in 2025, ahead of the country’s general election on September 28.
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