From the warnings from the State Meteorological Agency (Aemet) and the Department of National Security to the remembered and criticized phrase of the President of the Government last Saturday, before the reception amid mud and screams in Paiporta, the chronology of the crisis caused by the DANA moves from the understanding and coordination of the first hours of the tragedy (also promises) to the exchange of reproaches in the days after that dramatic October 29. The sequence of the first hours of that Tuesday, which generated so much controversy on the following dates due to the lack of forecast before DANA, it is not understood without prior warnings of heavy rains: Tuesday 29 07.31. The Aemet declares a red alert in the northern interior of Valencia and, a few minutes later (07:36), extends the warning also to the northern Valencian coast, which will last – it says – all of that day the 29th and Wednesday the 30th. That morning, The agency warns on its networks that “the danger is significant, and even extreme, in some regions.” 07:45 . The Emergency Coordination Center of the Generalitat establishes situation 1 due to rain in the Ribera Alta and warns of the red level alert on the southern coast of Valencia. In its 10:00 a.m. update, it extends the red level to the entire Valencian coast and the northern interior. 08.00. The Department of National Security, a department dependent on the Presidency Cabinet of the Government that advises the president on this matter, issues a last-minute note, after crossing the data from Aemet and Civil Protection, warning that “DANA will produce precipitation today that could be accompanied by storms and gusts of very strong winds, especially in the south and east of the peninsula.” Related News standard Yes National Security warned La Moncloa of DANA twelve hours before Ana I. Sánchez Montero presided a crisis committee on Tuesday night in Moncloa with Bolaños, Robles, Marlaska, Ribera and the Government delegate in Valencia That morning, both the central Government and the regional Executive knew of the maximum alert situation (the red level) that would leave their DANA passed in the south and southeast of the peninsula, especially in the province of Valencia. From that moment, and until the alert, a chain of events occurs prior to the tragedy. These are the most relevant: 12.45. The Minister of Justice and Interior, Salomé Pradas, goes to the Emergency Center to follow the storm and reports, as recorded by the Spanish Television cameras, of the offer from the Military Emergency Unit (UME) after speaking with the Government delegate, Pilar Bernabé. 15.21. The Generalitat formally requests the deployment of the UME in Utiel-Requena due to the rains, but is unaware of the risk of floods (it will find out later, after 6:30 p.m.). 17.00. The Valencian Executive calls a meeting of the Integrated Operational Coordination Center (Cecopi) in response to the storm. The president of the Generalitat, Carlos Mazón, arrives two hours late to the meeting, after 7:00 p.m., after meeting the journalist Maribel Vilaplana at the ‘El ventorro’ restaurant to offer her the direction of the regional television station À Punt. 18.43. The Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHJ), dependent on the Ministry for the Ecological Transition, sent an email alerting that the flow of the Poyo ravine had skyrocketed and already reached 1,683 m3/s. The Generalitat assures that during the Cecopi meeting “at no time did the CHJ alert of the sudden rise in flow.” The eyes were on the Forata dam. 7:30 p.m. The Emergency Coordination Center decrees the level of emergency due to the storm in situation 2 throughout the province of Valencia. 20.11. The Generalitat launches a geolocated Civil Protection alert to citizens due to the floods. In an interview in À Punt, Pradas acknowledges that he found out at 8 p.m. that the Generalitat had a mass alert system. Shortly before, he had received a call from the Secretary of State for the Environment, Hugo Morán. According to the Generalitat, they talked about Forata. According to the Government, the secretary only contacted her to offer her all the necessary means. After the late alert to mobile phones (at that time significant floods were already occurring) and aware of the severity of the storm, the coordination between the Government and Generalitat Valenciana operated during the DANA night, as demonstrated by the communications to which ABC has had access: Around 9:45 p.m. The first vice president, María Jesús Montero, calls the four regional presidents affected by the storm (Carlos Mazón, Emiliano García-Page, Juanma Moreno Bonilla and Fernando López Miras) from the crisis committee established in the National Security offices to get to know its disposition. About 10:45 p.m. Pedro Sánchez was informed by his cabinet about the seriousness of the situation and, when he was returning from his official trip to India, he sent WhatsApp messages from Oman to the affected regional leaders “reiterating that the Government was ready to assist them as soon as possible.” necessary”. 22.50. Second phone call from Montero to Mazón (in the first they were unable to contact due to the fall of Telefónica’s telecommunications poles). In that conversation, the leader asked Montero to deploy the Civil Guard and the Army. 23.00. Moncloa communicates the constitution of the crisis committee to “coordinate response and assistance work.” The understanding of these first hours after the tragedy breaks down in subsequent hours and days, when both administrations begin to minimize their degree of responsibility for what happened. and, in the case of the central Executive, the arrival of “everything that is necessary” was not fulfilled. Wednesday 30 10.00. Defense reports the deployment of 1,034 UME soldiers in the province of Valencia to work jointly with the emergency services. Around 9:00 p.m. First criticisms of the Government. The president of the Generalitat defends that all protocols were followed to notify the population and attributes responsibility for coordination to the “Civil Protection Directorate of the Government of Spain”. Thursday 31 07.00. The Government responds to Mazón. The Ministry of the Interior issues a statement in which it dissociates itself from sending the massive alert, which was the responsibility, as it recalls, of the Generalitat. At level 2, “it corresponds to the regional authorities,” he points out. 17.15. Message from Mazón in 18.00. The Government approves sending 500 Army troops after Mazón requested it: 300 from the Land, 100 from the Air and 100 from the Navy, which are added to those of the UME. The troops will join on Friday. Friday 1 Noon. The exchange of accusations continues. The head of Defense, Margarita Robles, after stating that “the 120,000 troops of the Army” would be there if necessary, states: “It was a frustration not to be able to work in more places because the Generalitat Valenciana limited its action to the UME and only in the Utiel-Requena area.” After the continuous exchange of reproaches in the three following days, Sánchez pronounced on Saturday one of the most remembered phrases, so far, of the tragedy: Saturday 2 1:30 p.m. Pedro Sánchez: «If he needs more resources (Carlos Mazón), he should ask for them. There is no need to prioritize some municipalities over others or prioritize tasks. It is prioritized when resources are lacking. And that, that’s not the case. It doesn’t have to happen. Therefore, if the Valencian Community requires more personnel, machinery, financing or technical advice, what it has to do is ask for it and it will be supplied.
#Chronology #crisis #understanding #confrontation #DANA
