Barça survives Laporta, by Manel Pérez

Joan Laporta knew in August, from the day he signed the contracts of Dani Olmo and Pau Víctor, that to register them on December 31 he would have to sell the future income of the approximately 200 seats in the most VIP boxes of the future Camp Nou Spotify. And that step involved a scrupulous process of presenting documents to LaLiga: the signed contracts for the operation, an audit that confirmed the valuations and the corresponding income of money as proof that it had been executed.

The rules say so, and with even more reason in the case of a supervisor who already felt cheated by a board using the ghost sale of Barça Studios to expand its margin of registrations. The financial advisors with whom he negotiated, in those same days, a new bridge loan of 100 million to secure the club’s cash had also told him. It is obvious that despite knowing all that, he has not done it.

A new example that the management practices at Barça are not correct, not only because of the error itself; also due to the lack of explanations and the assumption of responsibilities by those involved. And the details are still to be known. Will the cost of the operation be as painful as could be assumed based on the conditions of the negotiation, quickly and quickly, in a bid in which the entire advantage was on the buyer’s side? Will the company that owns the rights, distributed between the club and the new investor, be located in some fiscally exotic place and with anonymous partners, as is also the case with Barça Studios? Will unjustified commissions be paid to regular collectors?

This new episode of chaos, improvisation and opacity has led many to wonder if Laporta’s management will be able to melt the bond, the power of attraction – which includes the brand, in the language of business, but which incorporates many more elements – overall of Barça, its true treasure, thanks to which it generates the lion’s share of its income in the wealthy football market in which it operates, to the point of posing an existential threat to its future. It seems that the answer is no. Agreements with companies like Spotyfy and Nike indicate that, despite everything, it resists and is in good health. But you shouldn’t play too much.

Barça is going through a desert journey that should end when the Camp Nou reopens – it is most reasonable to think that not before next September – and the progressive reduction in the wage bill becomes palpable, to an amount around 350 million euros next season.

But it is evident that this critical phase is unspeakably aggravated by Laporta’s practices. The president has turned the current transition, from the hardship brought on by the pandemic to the splendor expected with the future Camp Nou, into a cruel ordeal for the fans and an economic roller coaster that discredits the entity in the eyes of the entire world.

Even the improvements, such as the increase in the contribution of Nike, recently closed, or the substantial reduction in the wage bill, are dwarfed and counterbalanced by issues such as the failed registration of Olmo or the conversion of some levers into losses.

The rocky firmness of the centuries-old sports entity, so often highlighted, explains its survival to this tough test. The image, the brand, is the protective shield, the source of resources, although at this point it is already dotted with bruises.

Almost four years of mandate outline a personalist, opaque management model with practices of nepotism. To which is added an unrecognized amateurism, at the opposite end of the transparency and professionalism that an institution like Barça requires, both due to its complexity and economic dimension as well as its social significance.

The economic policy, like casino roulette, discredits the club in the eyes of the world

And the silent witnesses to these accusations are the many executives who have left the club, protesting with their feet against the methods of the president and his entourage. Starting with its short-lived first general director, Ferran Reverter.

The payments of multimillion-dollar commissions deserve special mention. Inexplicable in general, but especially when it comes to renewing with a historical sponsor like Nike, with which agreements have been signed for 25 consecutive years.

If the failure in Olmo’s registration is consummated, the player is free and opts, against his own feelings, to sign for another club, the economic cost could reach 100 million, the sum of his signing plus the salary until the end of the year. contract. A figure that would enter the year’s accounts like a red missile, direct losses, on the waterline of an already very affected ship.

In the best scenario, the one promised until now by Laporta and until yesterday denied again by reality, in the unlikely event that LaLiga reversed course, amended itself and registered the player, the negative reputational impact would continue to be enormous.

In economic terms, there are still other black holes to clear. Firstly, the stormy soap opera of Barça Studios lasts three years, the company that was going to be worth 1,000 million and that the auditor believes does not even reach the 208 in which the club accounts for its 54%.

An adventure that has had all the spice of bad financial practices, from the use of investors who were not investors to the most discredited stock market scam. If everything goes wrong as before and that company had to be accounted for at a value close to zero (it had a turnover of only 74,000 euros), the loss would be another 208 million.

Finally, there is the file of Locksley Invest, owner of 25% of the club’s television rights in LaLiga sold to a fund, from which Barça will not receive anything for 25 years, but which in its books has a value of 157 million. In these last two cases, these are operations that the board has called levers, sales of assets that despite their dubious viability have allowed the partner to hide the real losses.

These levers, to which is added the sale of the VIP boxes, have served to point to income of around 1,200 million during Laporta’s mandate and present a photograph that hides operating losses that have far exceeded 400 million and are summarized in a negative net worth of almost 100 million, a situation that the president has never managed to reverse.

This make-up has allowed us to maintain a wild transfer rush, more than thirty, some at an unjustified cost, as if there were not a situation of emergency and forced austerity. Argument that was used to not renew Leo Messi, the current mandate having just begun.

The stormy soap opera of Barça Studios lasts three years; The Olmo case could end in ruin

Barça will fortunately survive his management, but with a dented, lackluster reputation, forgotten the discourses on ethics, transparency, social responsibility; a casino roulette management. With a very fragile economy and an infantilized member, alienated from the reality of the club, to whom few and broken explanations are given. In keeping with a very peculiar football democracy.

And this within the framework of a society that considers itself advanced and adapted to its time. In the end, a very discreet sporting balance, a league and a cup and without standing out in Europe, with accounts that do not add up and in which one can no longer appeal to being an example of excellence and a reference in the world.