In 2006, an analysis was made of how in the democratic political scene of Mexico There was an exchange of partisan fields of legislators. At the end of this six-year term, here is that note and a conclusion for 2021:
“A friend who works in the corporate sector wonders, what happens to the politicians when they are no longer on the pages of newspapers? When they are not in the places of the public administration? These are questions that lead to that reference attributed to an old man Mexican politician: “is An unemployed politician is more dangerous that a guerrilla armed”, at least as an exercise in warning and blackmail in those years of authoritarianism Mexican.
Now, plurality has made this sentence lose some of its appeal, since the most that can happen is that some unemployed politicians decide to change party acronyms, and given the possibility of alternation at different levels of government, their political action, given the disuse in one party, can find accommodation in another without any major problem. Suddenly, with the democratic regime in Mexico, there was a migration of politicians between party ranks. This is a reality of plurality, the possibility of alternation and therefore of democracy in our country” (Lecturas, EL DEBATE, 26/Feb/2006). Eleven years later, in 2021, this text was concluded by quoting this text with the following comment: “The consolidation of democracy in Mexico has shown that this transition of actors between different parties occurred and will continue to occur” (Lecturas, EL DEBATE, 5/Sep/2021).
Lobbying in the legislature
Today, we are facing a national debate on Morena’s efforts to add senators from opposition parties to achieve a qualified majority in the vote on the constitutional reform of the Judicial Branch of the Federation, presented to the Congress of the Union by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Just as Roque Villanueva’s signal has been recalled, and the accusations of the opposition, precisely from the parties preceding Morena, for having voted for constitutional reforms during six-year terms governed by the PRI or the PAN.
The reality is that Mexican democracy, like any democracy, has, in its legislative sphere, the intermediation of interests in which each interest group seeks representation, via legislators from one party or another. Of course, before and after the elections. It is a lobbying action that arises precisely from the democratic transition.
Here are some examples of this lobbying: During the six-year term of President Felipe Calderón in 2009, the following was published here: “On the other hand, in defining the process of selecting the PAN candidate in Sinaloa, one element to be analyzed will be the balance obtained by President Calderón in his negotiations with the PRI legislators: On the one hand, in the lobbying of his economic package; and on the other, in the appointments of autonomous bodies and the judicial power: two Ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, the Presidents of INEGI, the Bank of Mexico and the National Commission of Human Rights. In addition, there is the designation of three IFE Counselors for October of next year, just after the elections are held on July 4 in 11 federal entities, including the case of 10 governors…” (Lecturas, EL DEBATE, 4/Oct/2009).
Paragraphs: On politics and cannon shots
Before the 2011 presidential election, the same topic was analyzed here: “Returning to Sinaloa, in a scenario where the governor does not have a majority in the local Congress, there will always be a task of political intermediation… given the high expectations of a return of the PRI to the Presidency of the Republic. This leads to questions about the work and lines of government and intermediation of interests that Governor Mario López Valdez and his cabinet will design and apply in the coming months. On the other hand, the scenario of an eventual consolidation of the PRI’s preferences in the electorate to give it victory in July 2012 cannot be left aside… In this sense, the possibilities to move forward with reforms, appointments and designations in Congress must have a strong component of political intermediation. Beyond classic techniques of co-optation, which even when they tend to be effective, in a scenario of high expectations for some parliamentary factions in 2012, they could fail. Even with the artillery techniques that General Alvaro Obregon boasted about: “Nobody can withstand a 50 thousand peso cannon shot…” (Readings, EL DEBATE, 20/Mar/2011). Let’s continue analyzing.
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