F1 | McLaren: The Behind the Scenes That Cost The Triumph at Silverstone

In the last six events, McLaren has been one of the main protagonists in the fight at the top, thanks to the great work done behind the scenes by the technical group that has led the MCL38 to compete for victory regularly. However, to climb the mountain and reach the summit, the car alone is not enough, but also everything that surrounds it, such as the driver and the team, an aspect that emerged well in Spain and that has allowed Red Bull to achieve successes even in potentially complex situations.

An aspect that the Woking team is dealing with right in this period of its ascent because, after having reached the top areas, another step forward is needed to put together all the various pieces of the puzzle and start to materialize. Although McLaren has a long and glorious history behind it, on the other hand it is also true that only now is it reappearing in the upper areas of the rankings, accentuating the difference with those teams that have now been at the top for years with a consolidated structure, such as Red Bull.

On the other hand, however, it is also true that the missed opportunity at Silverstone probably has a different aftertaste than others, more bitter, because the missed chance in front of the home crowd exposed not one, but several critical points in the decision-making process. Elements that, certainly, will be the basis for further growth in the future, but that, at the moment, when added together, are not allowing us to collect what the car deserves from a purely technical point of view. Let’s analyze what are the reasons that pushed McLaren to make certain decisions at Silverstone.

The failed double stack with Piastri

After a dry start in which Mercedes had managed to dictate the pace, with the arrival of the first drops of rain the situation quickly reversed, giving space to the MCL38 to show off. On an asphalt that in a few minutes dropped by about 5°C, falling below 18°C, the Woking car was the one able to manage the tyres best. This allowed both Lando Norris and Oscar Piastri to have a pace well above their rivals, taking the lead of the race at the start of the twentieth lap.

At that moment almost no one stopped to fit wet tyres, except those who found themselves in a situation where they had to try an almost desperate joker, because in reality the forecast indicated that, after a brief shower of rain, there would be a break, which would be followed by a more intense downpour that would have led to fitting intermediates. In fact, McLaren had estimated that the “calm” period would last about five laps, as in fact occurred. Only on lap 25 did something start to move on the wall, but the fact that the times were still relatively good and that the track was not yet completely wet pushed the Woking team to take a cautious approach.

Going to listen to the team radio, in fact, you can notice how in reality already on lap 25 Norris actually wanted to stop, but only if the intensity of the rain had increased. Since the team’s indications indicated a stable situation, the Englishman was then convinced to stay out. As it turned out, the ideal moment to switch to intermediates would have been precisely around lap 26, as done by Max Verstappen and Carlos Sainz: in reality, on that lap McLaren was also ready to call Piastri, but a change of plan at the last second shuffled the cards.

The initial plan, in fact, was that if Norris had not returned to the pits at the end of that 26th lap, it would have been the Australian who would stop to put on intermediates. A plan shared by the Australian himself, but which the driver then questioned just seconds before entering the pit lane, deciding instead to stay on the track given the uncertainty about the conditions and the weather. During that same lap, in fact, McLaren had communicated that that intensity would last another ten minutes, so they did not expect a sudden worsening of the conditions.

Lando Norris, McLaren MCL38, Oscar Piastri, McLaren MCL38

Photo by: Zak Mauger / Motorsport Images

This partly explains why the Woking team decided not to call both cars into the pits on the next lap, the one in which Norris stopped. Basically, McLaren’s idea was that, although the track was progressively becoming wetter, the stability of the weather conditions should have allowed Piastri to stay on slicks and still lose fewer seconds than he would have suffered with a double stack.

As Stella admitted at the end of the race, there was a sin of greed and impatience on the pit wall’s part, also caught by a not exactly perfect reading of the conditions. However, as underlined by the team manager, on the other side the Australian could have perhaps pushed his hand more in his choice, pushing the team to accept losing time with a double stop, as Mercedes probably should have done, given that the driver’s feedback in these conditions is central. A mistake that then pushed Piastri to have to rebuild his race, coming out with a gap of about twenty seconds from the top against a potential gap of about 4/5 seconds.

The delay in switching to slicks

Another key aspect of the race was the moment of switching to dry tyres which, beyond the time lost, shifted the balance by impacting certain decision-making processes. The one to break the ice was Mercedes who, observing the times now dropped below the ideal crossover time between the two types of tyres and listening to Hamilton’s feedback, called the British driver into the pits at the right time. On the other hand, McLaren was also more conservative in its choices on this occasion, also because at first it expected the rain to end around lap 40.

However, the rain actually stopped a few laps before the first, between laps 36 and 37, forcing the teams to think quickly, because this asphalt had proven to dry quickly all weekend. While Piastri prevailed by making the call to pit on lap 38, also agreeing that the medium was the best compound, Norris on the contrary gave no signs in this sense, only suggesting that the soft could be the ideal choice given that the track was still too wet in his opinion. In fact, the pit stop was delayed both because McLaren did not want to take the risk of being the first to stop, given that it was leading the race, and because at that stage it had remained involved with Norris in the decision-making process on which was the right compound to fit.

Lando Norris, McLaren MCL38

Photo by: Erik Junius

Added to this was a mistake by Norris in the pit lane, arriving long on the lay-by. However, even without that mistake, Hamilton would probably have been able to pass his compatriot after a few corners, having already had the tyres up to temperature.

Why the soft was the wrong compound

The timing of the pit stop certainly had an impact on the chances of victory, because it allowed Mercedes to take the lead of the Grand Prix, but what really made the difference was not that decision, but rather the decision-making process that led the Norris-McLaren duo to choose the soft. In fact, the Woking team was the best placed as far as alternatives were concerned, because having saved a second set of mediums it could play a wildcard that other rivals, such as Red Bull and Mercedes, did not have. Indeed, it was the team itself that suggested to Piastri before the pit stop that the yellow band compound was the best from there until the checkered flag, as later confirmed by the driver himself, who pushed for that type of tyre.

On the contrary, the decision-making process with Norris was much longer and more complex, so much so that it lasted three laps before the pit stop. The Englishman’s choice towards the softer compound was dictated by two different considerations: the first was the fact that the track was still wet in some places, as suggested by radio, while the second was the intention to copy Hamilton’s tactics, placing themselves on the same strategy. On the other hand, the team took the driver’s feedback into consideration, perhaps too much as admitted by Stella at the end of the race, also because the communications shared with Piastri show how McLaren was aware that the medium would be the most effective compound until the finish line.

But why was the soft the wrong tyre? With around 13 laps to go and a track that was gradually drying out, it is easy to understand why certain teams chose to focus on the softer compound, which offers more grip in uncertain conditions. While this may seem correct on paper, on the other hand, fitting the soft in these types of conditions tends to present difficult challenges to manage.

Lando Norris, McLaren MCL38

Photo by: Simon Galloway / Motorsport Images

With the sun breaking through the clouds, the track temperature gradually began to rise, but at the time of the stop it was still around 20°c, so rather low. These were ideal conditions to trigger graining, which had already been seen on Friday. Furthermore, some pit walls, especially that of Red Bull, had well assessed the behaviour of the soft in the first stint of the race on those drivers who had fitted it, in fact returning less than enthusiastic feedback. On a track full of fast corners that transmit a lot of energy to the tyre, the risk of triggering graining even with the C3 proved to be rather high: precisely for this reason the medium and hard, which offer greater resistance, proved to be the ideal choice over the long distance, even with a stint of less than 15 laps.

Added to this is another element, namely the way the tyres were managed. Being able to exploit that small margin gained at the pit stop, Hamilton was able to allow himself a more accurate management of the soft, unlike Norris, who in the first part of the stint, the most delicate for the tyre, pushed too hard in the fast sections, accentuating the degradation. Precisely for this reason the Englishman from McLaren had an almost vertical drop in times, almost opposite to his teammate who, with a compound that guaranteed greater flexibility, proved to be the fastest on the track in the final stages.