When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, religious leaders around the world were quick to comment on what had happened. On the same day, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople, head of the Orthodox Catholic Church, telephoned the Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to express his “deep sadness at this blatant violation of any notion of international law and legality” as well as his support for the Ukrainian people, victim of an “unprovoked” attack.
Metropolitan Onufry himself, at the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church linked to the Patriarchate of Moscow, defended the country’s “sovereignty and integrity”, appealing to the Russian president to “stop the fratricidal war immediately”. “The war between these peoples is a repetition of the sin of Cain, who killed his own brother out of envy”, condemned the priest.
Pope Francis, for his part, personally appeared at the Russian embassy in the Vatican to propose peace talks, called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and announced that he would consecrate both countries to the Immaculate Heart of Mary, a very symbolic gesture that, for Catholics, dates back to the battle against communism in the 20th century.
The harsh reprimands to Putin were only unheard of by Cyril of Moscow himself, patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. On the contrary: as soon as the Russian president started the invasion, the Orthodox leader spoke out asking for peace, but without hiding his alignment with the religious speech of the head of state. First, he asked that “God forbid that a terrible bloodline of our brothers be drawn between Russia and Ukraine” and that “protect the Russian land against external enemies”.
Then he turned against the West, saying that “to join the club in those countries, you have to do a gay pride parade.” In a letter to the World Council of Churches, he blamed NATO for Ukraine’s situation: “This conflict has not started now. I am firmly convinced that its promoters are not the peoples of Russia and Ukraine, who are united in a common faith and share a common historic destiny”. According to him, the war is “part of the geopolitical strategy developed, in the first place, to weaken Russia”.
The patriarch’s speeches triggered a series of criticisms from the religious leaders – and even a beginning of a split in the Russian Orthodox Church itself, given the opposite reaction of the Ukrainian Church that is submissive to him (understand, here, the history of the two churches) . According to the portal Crux NowSince the beginning of the war, at least 15 Russian Orthodox dioceses have given permission for their parish priests to stop mentioning Cyril’s name in liturgical celebrations.
In the multiple analyzes that followed the controversy, the primate is pointed out as a loyal ally of Putin – some say he is capable of influencing the president. But who, after all, is Cyril of Moscow and what is his power in Russia?
From Leningrad to Luxury
Born in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) in 1946, Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev was elected patriarch in 2009 by the synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, receiving the title of “Cyril I, Patriarch of Moscow and of all Rus’” (that is, of the entire world). territory of ancient Rus’: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus).
He was the first patriarch to be elected after the fall of the Soviet Union, inheriting from his predecessor, Aleksei II (1990-2008), a church that regained its central role in the country after the end of state atheism in the Soviet Union.
“He has had his own weekly television program on religious topics, and he has a reputation as, in that sense, a more modern type of religious. Although he cannot be considered an ecumenist, he agreed to meet with Pope Francis, causing scandal in certain more conservative sectors of the Orthodox Church”, explains journalist and iconographer Daniel Sender, a specialist in Eastern religions.
Indeed, within Orthodox circles, Cyril is considered a man relatively open to dialogue: he met and kissed the hand of Pope Benedict XVI in 2007, and he does not share the common opinion among his audience that Roman Catholics are heretics – a classification that would only apply to Orthodox dissidents (as is the case with the Church of Ukraine, separated from Moscow and recognized in 2019). He met with Francis in Havana and, last Wednesday (16), spoke with the pontiff via video about the war in Ukraine.
In his lands, Cirilo has his own list of controversies: in the 1990s, his name appeared in a series of reports about companies allegedly linked to the Orthodox Church, but nothing was confirmed. Every now and then there are rumors about a mansion in Switzerland and a palace in Russia.
In 2012, a photo of the patriarch circulated the internet as he sported a Breguet watch – valued at more than $200,000 – on his left wrist. At the time, the primate even said that he “knew nothing” about the accessory and, suddenly, a version of the photo without the object began to appear in the press. In the reflection of the table, the clock was still visible.
Anti-communist, anti-capitalist and pro-Putin
When it comes to political-economic systems, Patriarch Cyril of Moscow condemns both communism and capitalism. In an interview with French Forbes published in October 2021, he stated that “the transformation of capitalism and Marxism into a kind of new quasi-religion is equally unacceptable”.
“We, who have passed the era of communism, are well aware that the idea of social justice, transformed into an aggressive ideology, destroys everything around us. Hundreds of thousands executed illegally for their faith, the creation of a social ghetto for hostile classes – this is the reality of the ‘communist paradise on earth’”, added the priest, then stressing that “no less dangerous is the ‘capitalist gospel’ , which regards the fall of communism as proof of its impeccability and without alternative”.
Regarding Vladimir Putin, Cyril declared, before the 2012 presidential elections, that the prosperity and stability that Russia has enjoyed since Putin took power in the 2000s was a “miracle from God”. Five years later, the former KGB agent would give a speech at the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church, discussing the role of the Orthodox Church from the baptism of St. and maintainer of “stability and unity”.
On the same day, however, Patriarch Cyril criticized the excessive influence of the state over the internal affairs of the Church during its history, thanking the government for not intervening in Church affairs.
“Although the terms of both speeches were friendly, it is possible to see that there is a kind of warning for the State not to intervene in ecclesiastical matters that do not concern it”, explains Sender. “In general, the Putin government sees, from a political point of view, the Orthodox Church as an important inspirational organ of national identity and patriotism, where the clergy must lead the Church and the Church must help and be a partner of the State” .
The primate, for his part, as demonstrated from the beginning of the war, shares Putin’s impressions of Ukraine’s “spiritual destiny”. What we see in the words of the patriarch Cyril is that he considers the division between the current countries of ancient Rus’ – Ukraine, Russia and Belarus – as a tragedy sown from outside, namely by Western countries that throughout history sought to remove these three fraternal peoples to weaken them”, adds the expert.
“It is likely that pragmatic issues prevent him from seriously considering the bringing together of the three countries into a single body, a single state – a new and reborn Rus’ – but without a doubt there is the idea that if there is a common and manifest destiny between the three nations, carried out spiritually by the Patriarchate of Moscow”.
Contrary to what some observers boast, however, Cyril’s influence on Putin is not that great: according to Harvard University analyst George Sokora, although the Orthodox Church has regained prestige and possessions since the fall of the Soviet Union, the institution “has surprisingly little success in pursuing its political goals when these do not coincide with the Kremlin’s interests.” In other words: in the end, it is Putin who calls the shots.
“It is therefore wrong to see the Orthodox Church as a kind of Russian state-owned; likewise, it is naive to assume that it has much power to achieve political goals in spite of the state”, explains Sender.
“In general terms, it can be said that the truth lies somewhere in the middle of these terms, since the Russian government relies on the Church as a founding and legitimizing element of Russian national identity, and the Church relies on the State to defend its preponderant position as the moral arbiter of Russian society”.
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