After a humiliating week in which European political players watched US and Russian Presidents Biden and Putin discuss the future and security of Europe over their heads, there is movement and conversation. Signs of life. However, it still looks form and directionless.
Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s new foreign minister, received a lot of attention with her visit to Kiev and Moscow. With her travel order, she gave the signal only after hearing the Ukrainians that she wanted to talk to the Russians – an attempt to allay the Eastern European primeval fear of a Prussian-Russian ‘about us without us’. In the Kremlin waited for her the Russian veteran Sergei Lavrov, faithful voice of his boss. Less than a year ago, in a press conference in Moscow, EU foreign chief Josep Borrell for protection; since then he no longer has a role in this play. For Baerbock, on an introductory visit, it was therefore especially important to win some respect from Lavrov – for the future.
Meanwhile, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz prefers to look the other way. His first trips abroad went to Paris, Brussels, Warsaw, Rome and (Tuesday) Madrid. Priority for the EU and its large member states, very nice. At the same time, he doesn’t have to lecture the Russia nostalgics in his party – with the most prominent former SPD chancellor Gerhard Schröder, well paid by Gazprom – yet. The loss of his predecessor is thus felt. During previous Russian-Ukrainian crisis moments, she was omnipresent behind the scenes. These weeks, Putin is also exploiting the political power vacuum left by Angela Merkel.
Unlike in Berlin, people in London are neither hesitant nor divided: the British are going hard at it. Defense Secretary Ben Wallace wrote a sharp piece this week pro NATO and against Putin. The British army is one of the few NATO members to supply light weapons to Kiev. There was a moment of excitement among defense watchers when the British flights in question circled German airspace in a wide arc; the Defense Ministry in Berlin denied having received a request for overflight. Authoritative Tory MP Tom Tugendhat Calls on European political and business elites, including those in the City of London, to make themselves less vulnerable to corruption, dirty money and influence by kleptocratic regimes. In this regard, he warns against ‘Schröderisation’ – another blow to the Federal Republic.
And the third Western European power, France? President Macron focuses on his domestic reelection. He apparently sees no advantage in the role of continental peacemaker.
However, there is talk of reviving the ‘Normandy format’, in which France and Germany consulted with Russia and Ukraine and concluded a ceasefire in February 2015. This ‘Minsk II agreement’ provided and lies the best chance of a peace agreement. But neither Moscow nor Kiev are complying with the provisions. So both parties can rightfully accuse each other of bad faith and the vicious circle is not broken. Another Franco-German initiative: Foreign Ministers Jean-Yves Le Drian and Annalena Baerbock announced at the end of last week that they would visit the contact line in Donbas together.
At the same time, last week’s humiliation showed that the bringing together of both EU powers – Germany’s economic weight and France’s authority as a nuclear power and permanent member of the UN Security Council – makes too little impression on the Kremlin, without America’s military clout and without political determination.
Dealing with Moscow, the adage goes, requires ‘deterrence and dialogue’. However, the deterrence has divided Europe into a military division (NATO: weapons) and an economic division (EU: sanctions). Deployment and calibration of both types of coercion require fine tuning, especially in the face of an accomplished strategist like Putin. Exactly what is missing now. Here is a task for a ‘European Security Council’, on which the Rutte IV cabinet also wants to contribute constructively. As a playmaker in times of crisis, such a body could bring together key European players (Berlin, Paris and London, Brussels-EU, Brussels-NATO) in crisis situations. This at least gives the beginning of a political shape.
Of course, that still requires substance, in other words an awareness of our goals and our relationship with Russia in the long term. Plus the political will to pay a price for those goals, to face painful choices. You don’t want Russian gas? So nuclear power stations, windmills, hydrogen investment – or a cold winter? Those conversations are still in their infancy.
Luke of Middelaar is a political philosopher and historian.
A version of this article also appeared in NRC on the morning of January 19, 2022
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