In the game of history’s “what if?” question, it is worth imagining what would have happened if Colin Powell, when in the early 1990s one of America’s most admired figures, had heeded the appeals of “conservatives” to seek The Republican Party’s nomination for the presidency in 1996, winning it, and then defeating Bill Clinton in November of the same year. Perhaps it was the “Republicans” who introduced America’s first black president.
The first president, since Andrew Jackson, would have been the children of immigrants and would have become a living proof that a country that opens its doors to poor strangers achieves tremendous wealth from their ambitions and efforts. A president reminiscent of Dwight Eisenhower in his moderation and his military and public stature might have played a role in reining in hard-line Republicans and the outgoing candidates of the angry populists who elected Donald Trump 20 years later.
The outcome of the 2000 elections, decided by the Supreme Court, would almost certainly not have been so controversial. Perhaps the country entered the twenty-first century surrounded by greater sobriety and less discord. And the battle against Islamic extremism that was likely to confront Powell in a possible second term, may have taken a different form at home and abroad. But Powell chose not to run. And the personality traits that made him an example of a military leader and presidential advisor were not suited to running in bitter election campaigns.
He did not have an ideology other than that he was solving problems with somewhat conservative tendencies. He did not have the religious self-belief that most candidates display. He considered himself a soldier and statesman like General George Marshall, the famous former US Secretary of Defense and Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He did not consider herself a politician whose career depended on opinion polls, and his relationship with the truth was flexible. No wonder, therefore, that Powell took advantage of the opportunity to be President Bush’s Secretary of State.
It was an opportunity to teach a novice in foreign policy at a time that seemed to present a unique promise to the United States. But the attacks of September 11th shattered a decade of America’s contentment with its place at the top of a world order in what is supposed to be the end of history. The administration’s response to the attacks blew any hopes Powell might have had of being a dominant figure in the Bush administration. Powell is sometimes remembered as the man who could have stopped the invasion of Iraq, but who lacked the audacity or political fighting skills to do so.
This is unfair and historically inaccurate. What is easily forgotten now is that the idea of portraying Saddam Hussein as a threat to global security was rooted in Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, Joe Biden, Chuck Schumer, and Adam Schiff, among many others.
And the file of weapons of mass destruction that Powell presented to the UN Security Council before the Iraq war had the full confidence of US intelligence. What is forgotten is that Powell had lengthy secret talks with Bush in which he discussed the real challenge of the invasion, which was that America would have to bear the burden of postwar reconstruction of Iraq. This was sound advice and required careful planning for the post-Saddam period.
But Bush entrusted the task of reconstruction to Donald Rumsfeld. Then came the greatest destruction at the hands of Paul Bremer, the self-confident American governor of Iraq who reported to Rumsfeld and who helped prepare the ground for the insurgency by demobilizing the Iraqi army. Powell almost deserves no blame for stating that he was never consulted on this decision. But Powell’s performance as minister also reflected the virtues and limitations of the system he promoted and in which Powell has come to embody its pros and cons. Powell came at a time when American systems were working. His parents came from Jamaica to America through legal doors.
He was educated, according to his account, in a good public school. The Army had given up its racism only a decade before Powell joined in, and Powell saw his hope and rose quickly. Powell won the Gulf War by expelling Saddam’s forces from Iraq in what was known as the “shock and awe” strategy. And the praise he received from the American public seemed to herald a long-awaited, post-racist future. But things worsened in the American regimes between the time that Powell was made and elevated to a high position, and the time that he had a hand in formulating these systems from above.
Migration processes have become inconsistent. and the deterioration of public education. And there was a stagnation in social mobility. At nearly every level of power the bureaucracy has stood for initiative, consensus for independent thought. The same mixture of gentleness, moderation, and vacillation that prevented Powell from running for president is the same mixture that prevented him from being the critic or reformer that a fractured system really needed. General Powell, you should have run for president in 1996.
* American journalist and writer.
Published by special arrangement with the New York Times Canonical URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/opinion/colin-powell.html
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