News of yet another round of Russian-Ukraine peace talks may be encouraging, but unfortunately, it doesn’t have much reason to be. Delegations from the two countries, in addition to the talks held in Belarus, will meet in Turkey, currently the regional power with the greatest capacity to mediate in the conflict. It will be the second meeting mediated by the Turkish government. The first was held on the 10th of March and did not produce results, and there is not much reason to believe that this future meeting will be that different, and a dose of skepticism is important.
The reason for Turkey’s interest in mediating these meetings has already been briefly explained here in our space. In short, this is a war in your region, which affects the important Black Sea. The conflict involves two of its most important partners, with Ukraine having a free trade agreement with Turkey, while Russia has several infrastructure projects in Turkey. Turkey also has historical ties to Crimea, where part of the population is Tatar, a Turkic people. Finally, the question of prestige. Coming out of this crisis as the government responsible for peace could bear fruit for Turkey, a country currently under some US sanctions.
It is for these interests that Turkey has returned to play the role of mediator. At the last NATO summit in Brussels last week, Turkish President Recep Erdogan said he would call Vladimir Putin over the weekend. “I will look for ways to end this problem by telling him to become an architect for peace and make an honorable exit.” From that telephone conversation, last Sunday, came the proposal for a new meeting between the two delegations, on March 29 and 30.
In addition to inviting the two delegations, Erdogan, last Thursday, may have committed some indiscretion. According to the Turkish leader, Ukraine and Russia have already agreed on four of the six Russian demands. The Ukrainian abandonment of any future NATO membership, the return to the official language status of the Russian language in Ukraine, disarmament and mutual security guarantees. There would remain, as pending, the territorial questions: the recognition of Crimea as Russian and the eventual independence of the regions to the east.
Ukrainian counterattacks
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba quickly denied that there was any agreement, saying that “the negotiation process is very difficult” and that “we insist, first of all, on a ceasefire, guarantees of security and territorial integrity.” of Ukraine”. Of course, the action was motivated even to avoid a weakening of the Ukrainian international position. Countries may review arms shipment plans, for example, thinking that Ukraine would be close to accepting the conditions demanded by Russia. There could also be a drop in Ukrainian domestic morale.
In recent days, Ukrainian forces have also carried out counter-offensives, retaking part of territories previously controlled by Russian forces. It is not known exactly the Ukrainian ability to keep the breath of counterattacks. The country’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, continues his international calls for more weapons. The most recent recipient has been the government of Israel, which seeks to remain neutral. Not only because of its relations with Russia, but because of the fact that there is a large community originating from the former USSR in Israel, both from Russia and Ukraine.
Zelensky has also made contradictory statements about Ukraine’s territorial integrity. At times, he remains adamant and claims that his government will not accept any territorial concession. In other circumstances, however, he claims that an agreement that is approved by referendum could be accepted. What sounds democratic and healthy at first needs to go through a question: who is the electorate in this referendum? For example, a referendum on the status of Crimea in which the electorate is only the inhabitants of the peninsula would mean maintaining the existing Russian rule.
The defense of a possible referendum can be, then, a way to “keep up appearances” in an eventual territorial concession. It wouldn’t be the first time this has been done. Historically, perhaps the prime example is the plebiscite for Italy’s annexation of Venice in 1866 after a war against imperial Austria. In parallel with Zelensky’s statements, the Russian armed forces held a speech last Friday, led by General Sergei Rudskoy.
Russian offensive
He stated that “the main tasks of the first stage of the operation have been completed” and that “the combat potential of Ukraine’s armed forces has been significantly reduced, allowing us to focus major efforts on achieving the main objective, the liberation of Donbass”. According to the same statement, the actions near Ukraine’s “bigger cities” would only be to distract Ukraine’s main forces and keep them away from the east of the country, the supposed “main objective”.
The statement is part of a Russian effort to “rewrite” recent events, disguising the initial setback. The first days of the Russian invasion made it clear that the objective of the offensive was a decapitation attack on the Ukrainian capital. And that offensive failed, both on Russian failures and on Ukrainian merits. To say now that the main objective was the east of the country is an attempt to make up for these mistakes. At the same time, if the Russian military authorities speak of a “second stage”, we can expect a renewed offensive, to the east and to the north.
Along with these statements comes news that Russia is sending more of its first-line forces to Ukraine, including professional mercenaries from the Wagner Group. Russia has also stepped up attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure such as fuel depots and the power distribution system, something it had avoided in the early days. Along with this possible renewed Russian offensive, Putin got a “gift” for his internal speech, directly from Joe Biden.
The US president said last Saturday that “Putin cannot remain in power”. The White House tried to “clarify” it, saying it was a reference to Putin abusing his power. The statement found both detractors and supporters. One of the critics was French President Emmanuel Macron, who called the declaration “non-productive”. And it will certainly be used a lot by Putin for his internal speech, that the US is the real enemy, that it uses the Ukrainians as puppets, and that Washington wants to interfere in Russia and overthrow the government.
In short, we have contradictory statements about the demands for an end to the conflict, with two sides catching their breath to renew the fighting, asking for more weapons or concentrating more forces. Both political leaders feel encouraged by their internal audiences. Are there reasons for a possible end to the war? Yes. Is it proving to be much more costly than anticipated or tolerable? Also. The scenario, however, is much more like two sides trying to buy time, to further strengthen their positions, as the development of a few days of combat can change the tone of conversations.
Does this necessarily mean that conversations are a smokescreen? Maybe not so much, just the idea of keeping a line of communication open for a future opportunity. Not in the present, with chips still staked on the battlefields. Whether it’s an even bigger stalemate, beneficial for Ukraine, or a clearer victory, a Russian goal. Finally, there is another development of interest to the Turkish government that could form part of Russia’s future calculations.
Caucasus and skepticism
On March 26, the Azerbaijani government asked the Russian government to withdraw the Armenian army and “illegal Armenian armed groups” from “internationally recognized territories” such as Azerbaijan. What Armenians call Nagorno Karabakh, a region where the majority of the population is Armenian. Azerbaijan’s request to the Russians is due to the fact that Russia is the guarantor of the peace agreement between the two rival neighbors in the Caucasus. Russia also accused Azerbaijani forces of violating the unarmed zone that was created as a buffer between the countries.
Russia is, historically, Armenia’s greatest ally. Azerbaijan relies on its alliance with Turkey. With Russia embroiled in a much more grueling war than they imagined in Ukraine, even using much of its forces based in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan may be betting that Russia will not be strong enough to protect its allies. You can also consider that the recent election victory of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in June 2021, a pro-Western and somewhat pacifist ruler, means that Armenians will not be interested in another war.
Or even that Russia would no longer be willing to bail out the Armenian government, let alone now. Pashinyan even suffered a military “ultimatum” before the elections, but he resisted. Last week, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu spoke with his Armenian counterpart Suren Papikyan. Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister, Zakir Hasanov, reportedly “raised the alert level” of his country’s forces. A potential new war in the Caucasus, less than two years after the last one and during the war in Ukraine, is certainly a scenario Russia does not want. Turkish intentions are more difficult to classify.
As much as peace is desirable and as satisfying as it is to see a high-level meeting between delegations from countries in conflict, skepticism, always necessary, is quite justified in this case. The general actions of those involved do not allow for optimism, but encourage a realistic approach to conversations. On top of that, carried out under the specter of a possible new war in their vicinity. Let us keep an eye on the conversations and any results, especially on humanitarian issues such as the evacuation of civilians, but without any great illusions of an imminent end to the conflict.
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