Israel, Iran… and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries

Over the past few weeks, the geographical neighborhood of the Arab region has gone through a difficult period of tension and instability. In this context, the United Arab Emirates called for calm and reason, expressed its deep concern about the continued tension, and called for not taking further steps that would exacerbate the escalation. This came as a result of the exchange of military responses between Iran and Israel deep within both countries that border the Arab region, and what happens between them, and without a doubt, has a direct impact on all Arab countries. Despite what is said that the two warring countries have achieved political, military and strategic goals, specific to each of them at the regional and internal levels, and far from the conspiracy theories and statements that have spread like wildfire at the regional level, the impact of what happened at the level of all countries of the region indicates danger. It directly threatens the security of the Arab world.

Beyond the fact that all Arab countries are concerned about what is happening in the future, and that they have no direct means of influencing Iranian and Israeli policy, there lie other structural factors that shape the assumptions and processes of foreign policy decision-making of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in particular, and with regard to Iran in particular. It is imperative to recognize that the GCC countries and Israel view the relationship with Iran in very different ways. For the Israelis, their apparent political, economic and cultural ties with Iran are very weak, and they are viewed as a difficult security threat. For Israeli media figures, political analysts, and policymakers, the Iranian threat remains present, material, and measurable, and is controlled by factors such as extensive armament, the desire to possess weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that carry them, and support for terrorism.

This Israeli view towards Iran is the direct result of decades of apparent and persistent hostility, tensions, and exchange of accusations between Iran and Israel, which reduced relations and brought them to the zero point. The absence of business interests, cultural exchange, and personal experiences, and the presence of Iranian pressure groups within Israel, play a role in how preconceived assumptions toward the other are formulated, and policies are drawn, shaped, and taken at the highest levels of the two governments without any influence from one side on the other, or taking it into consideration. Due to the lack of tools, methods, or even the information necessary for this. Israeli-Iranian relations remain at their lowest levels since the fall of the former Shah’s regime in 1979.

For the Israelis, Iranian practices towards them are the reason for this. Iran’s presence in Lebanon and Syria through the Lebanese “Hezbollah”, the violent Iranian propaganda and slogans against Israel, and Israel’s claim that Iran supports extremist and terrorist organizations hostile to it, such as “Hezbollah” in Lebanon, and “ Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, Iran’s nuclear file, and Iran’s role in supporting instability in Israel’s geographical neighborhood in a number of Arab countries, starting with Lebanon and Syria, passing through Iraq, and ending with Yemen, are all factors that make Israel fearful and cautious. Of Iranian intentions towards it. Therefore, a significant number of internal psychological obstacles and objective regional and global factors are constantly reinforcing the Israeli inability to formulate patterns of new foreign policy towards Iran, and constantly viewing it on the surface of the unfolding events as an existing enemy and a continuing threat, and certainly not a potential friend at all. Short-term. This matter is very dangerous for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and requires them to work constantly to calm the situation between the two parties as much as possible.

*Emirati writer