Giorgia Meloni and Italian democracy

The coming to power in Italy of Giorgia Meloni a little over a year ago caused great concern among European progressives and liberals, and also concern among some moderate conservatives. His political record justified the suspicion, but even then it was possible to detect signs that, even if not out of principle, at least out of interest, he would decide to govern with the necessary restraint to avoid reactions dangerous to his continuity in power.

No doubt taught by the political death of Berlusconi – who a decade ago fell amid economic turbulence and the hostility of important actors in Italy and Europe – Meloni knows that the main risk to his continuity in the short and medium term is the ghost of the agitation of the public debt without the support of the ECB and the rejection of key palaces in his country (the Quirinal and Viale dell’Astronomia, the presidency of the Republic and the headquarters of the industrial employers, respectively) and abroad (Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt and Washington). The risk is much more there than in an opposition that is divided and bloodless.

With that in mind, he has opted for a management that is highly criticizable in multiple aspects, but without clamorously radical initiatives, without frontal assaults on democracy or fundamental rights that could encourage indignation or dangerous rejections. In recent days, however, his government has promoted two measures with disturbing features that seem to represent an acceleration in his pace of travel until now rather lacking in facts.

On the one hand, an initiative to reform the country’s political structure in a way that strengthens the position of the President of the Government and thus reduces endemic instability. It is clear that there is a problem of lack of political continuity in Italy and that other leaders tried to correct it. To achieve this, the Meloni Executive presents a legitimate plan, which runs through the legal channels of reform, but which represents a monstrosity that, if approved, would weaken Italian democracy by recklessly strengthening the Executive, among other things by granting a crazy prize of majority to the winner’s party/coalition.

Secondly, an initiative has been presented to build two centers in Albania where immigrants rescued at sea would be deported and where, under Italian jurisdiction, their cases would be managed. The plan raises, at the very least, serious legal questions.

It remains to be seen how and to what extent Meloni will push these plans and whether he will propose others with equally or more controversial features from now on. It is reasonable to assume that the starting logic of prudence necessary for survival will continue to have an effect. In any case, it is interesting to take a look at the democracy in which these maneuvers take place.

The Italian democracy is a democracy with many fragilities. The main international studies do not give it good ratings. The latest study by The Economist Intelligence Unit, for example, placed it worse than other southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal or Greece. In times marked by a general trend of erosion of democracy, it would be reckless not to take these fragilities into account.

At the same time, Italy has elements of resilience. To begin with, with a president of the Republic who is, due to constitutional powers and political history, an effective democratic mediator. Furthermore, right now, the person who occupies the position enjoys very high credibility and personal esteem that gives him great room for maneuver as a republican guardian.

Secondly, it has a political system that, even in extreme moments such as the governments of Berlusconi and Meloni, maintains a capacity for interaction between the different poles, as evidenced by the governments of national unity formed in recent history (for example, the of Ciampi, Monti or Draghi). You can agree or disagree with its formation, and certainly with its management, but the ability to converge at critical moments is an asset. There is no insurmountable moat in the middle of the chamber.

Next, it should be noted that the judicial system does not operate under clouds of politicization as heavy as those that circulate in other places, casting the shadow of suspicions of partisanship over its decisions.

In addition, it has a Constitution that is in many ways neat and precise, which is an effective north star of collective life.

The Italian political system has not guaranteed the continuity of its Executives, but it has – along with cultural features foreign to the institutional architecture – a fabric that has maintained together with a country with a strong potential for tearing (with the strongest communist party in Europe Western during the Cold War, independence drives in the North, the most spectacular case of a tycoon with enormous media power as prime minister, among other vicissitudes). Even if the first problem – the instability of the Italian governments – could be definitively fixed, it would be a mistake to pursue it if this meant triggering another, perhaps greater problem – a brutal tearing of the political fabric.

The President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court are good guardians against possible excesses. The Constitution, a luminous and prudent reference. Among other things, it contains an element of reflection for the debate that is burning in Spain: the Italian anti-fascist constituent fathers did explicitly include the amnesty in the fundamental text. They considered it an instrument of such political and moral significance that it required a two-thirds majority in both Chambers for its approval. (article 79). But it is another country, and each country has its rules. And their problems.

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