Polarization. Left. Right. These are some of the political concepts that underpin the new book by Eduardo Bayon (Gijón, 1986). The Communication consultant, political analyst and collaborator of several media outlets has recently published Tribal Fight: myths and truths of the political battle and identity radicalization between the left and the right (The Sphere of Books, 2024). In it he takes a journey that goes from the Transition to the present day and along the way he analyzes some phenomena of interest to understand the keys to discursive and political action. In this interview with Public develops part of the ideas of the publication.
Why have you decided to write this book? How does it arise?
It is an essay that is a map that serves to guide the political and cultural battle in which we are immersed. It has three blocks. The first is an x-ray of the political scenario in Spain with very particular institutional characteristics. There is a chapter dedicated to consensus as the founding myth of the Transition, it is something that shapes the political contest. As does the electoral system itself.
The second part talks about the cultural battle itself, about that dispute and resignification of concepts in which we are immersed and see day by day. How the right has managed to redefine the concept of freedom or how the left has failed to relocate the notion of security linked to the welfare state, material issues and certainties. There is a third block that is focused on the mediatization of current politics and the other side of the same coin, which is hyper-leadership and how it has been promoted and increased in recent times.
One of the theories he points out is that despite attempts to change the axes and frames, the left-right axis still remains.
“The left-right axis continues to operate”
Yes, the left and right axis that we inherited practically from the French Revolution is the one that really continues to operate in politics. It is true that there have been certain so-called “populist” moments after the 2008 crisis where there was a window where the bottom-up axis was introduced that served at that time to articulate political discourses. We are talking about 15M or the original Podemos. But now we see how even Podemos has been, one could say almost forced, to operate along the traditional left-right axis. Other parties do the same. I think of Vox, which sometimes makes some kind of nod to a different axis, but it is clearly a far-right party. And along these lines I maintain that the left-right axis continues to operate and that there is a transfer to the partisan contest that has been configured in quite immovable blocks beyond the fact that due to the characteristics of the Spanish State we have a third block of nationalist, independence or regionalists.
There is a chapter on consensus as the founding myth of the political system of ’78. Do you think it is now in question or is there still a long way to go? I think about the information that are coming out about Juan Carlos IFor example.
There would be two different things although they are part of the same thing, which is the story of the configuration and origin of the current political system. Regarding consensus, what I maintain in the book, something that some political actors also maintain when the story of the Transition begins to erode, is that consensus in Spain has been used as a parapet to stop any type of institutional reform. I have been listening to issues like the Senate for 20 years and there is still no real possibility of reform. Then it is also commonly used as a throwing weapon. I give some examples in the book, such as when the PP accuses Sánchez of breaking consensus. We also have issues that require agreements with many political forces.
“The consensus in Spain has been used as a parapet to stop any type of institutional reform”
On the other hand there is the culture part of the Transition. It evidently continues to operate and today it is no longer just historical ties but we see it in many pop cultural products. It is an official story in which the prominence of the characters is greatly exaggerated and they are given leadership and driving powers in that period that largely omits social aspects or conflicts. It is something that continues to operate. Regarding the founding myth, it is common in all political systems. What happens is that ours has its particular characteristics due to the Transition process and how the dictatorship ended. It is very different from the founding myth, for example, of Portugal with the Carnation Revolution.
In the book he talks about the 2018 motion of censure against Mariano Rajoy. And that there, accusations of “illegitimate government” or “Moncloa squatter” began to be heard. Was that motion key to understanding much of what is happening today?
“Not only is the political adversary attacked, but a tactic of institutional delegitimization is used”
Yes, it is key. In the book I make reference to the fact that we are immersed in an emotional polarization and that other authors have studied in greater depth than I have. But there are nuances, because in the case of Spain the right is immersed in a strategy of tension that comes from the motion of censure. It is accentuated not so much in the 2019 elections, because Sánchez’s victory was quite clear, but with the consequences and measures of the pandemic. Let’s remember those scenes in the Salamanca neighborhood or Ayuso’s own speeches. Not only is the political opponent attacked, but a tactic of institutional delegitimization is used. If you say that he is an illegitimate president or talk about coups d’état, Frankenstein governments, etc., you are not only eroding the Government, but also delegitimizing the institutions themselves. This strategy has been used at other times, for example when the PP lost the elections after 11M or in the last term of Felipe González until 1996.
How would you define that polarization that you mention? Who are the main people responsible? Pedro Sánchez, for example, always talks about asymmetric polarization.
“There is a very emotional polarization. It cannot be explained without the 2008 crisis and its consequences”
It is asymmetrical in terms of that tension strategy that I mentioned in the previous question. It is a very emotional polarization. It cannot be explained without the crisis of 2008 and its consequences, without the austericide policies of those years. That crisis has left many voters with significant political disaffection. It is a polarization for which many political actors are responsible. Some to a greater extent and others to a lesser extent. But it also requires a media component. I also talk about it, about how the current affairs programs that arise due to this demand for interest starting in 2008 stage it very well. Two sides of social media always appear. And then there is another leg, that of social networks, which also lives off of that emotional leg.
He defends that polarization and tension must give way to a political dispute in which dialogue and the capacity for major agreements have their place. But the book does not end very optimistically in this sense…
I convey that idea because I think that in the short term, based on what we were commenting on the scenario itself and the factors that influence it, it seems quite difficult to me. As long as a polarized environment remains, the parties also have no incentive to leave it because what has an electoral impact on you is entering that game. There is another essential component, which is the historical one. Polarization is not exclusive to Spain but is part of current Western politics.
We are going to talk a little about the rebellion of the extreme right and what they believe it symbolizes, for example, the Vox party at the Barceló nightclub that he talks about in the book. ‘The rebellion changed sides’, he highlights in one chapter. He even quotes Ignatius Farray and the punk right.
All this does not mean that young people have become mostly right-wing, far from it. The leftist generation that became politicized in 2014-2015 did so with Podemos and the one that did so in 2018-2019 already had Sánchez in Moncloa as a reference. But beyond that, it is evident that in this context of polarization and anger there are some right-wing young people who have looked at political options and forms of the radical right and extreme right. In this scenario of delegitimization of the Government, these more radical forms in appearance and oratory are more attractive to young people because they are disruptive. We have gone from those years of 15M to a situation where what is rebellious for some young people are the speeches of Vox or Ayuso.
“We have gone from 15M to a situation where what is rebellious for some young people are the speeches of Vox or Ayuso”
In the Spanish case, the discourse of the libertarian right, except for some offshoots, does not have much impact. There are some studies about that, about how the libertarian right and the authoritarian left have little experience. But we are also witnessing a generation where the disruptive option is on the right. And because within this cultural battle we are witnessing a moment in which the left has been caricatured as prohibitionist. But the feminist wave has also emerged, and there are children from privileged sectors who, faced with this threat to their privileges, choose this disruptive path.
Has the extreme right seduced the working class? It is one of the questions in the book. And one of the concerns of recent times.
“In Spain the vote of the working class continues to be for leftist and progressive parties”
In the Spanish case, above all, it is very much an urban legend or an interested position. All this to say that the left is only concerned with cultural issues and not material ones. In Spain the data clearly show that it is an erroneous thesis. There are working class people who vote to the right for identity reasons, that has always existed and will exist. Here is the key to the issue, that there are sectors of those voters who have chosen – for an equal issue of prioritizing Spanish identity over Catalonia, or who consider that the PP was experiencing cases of corruption – to vote for Vox. But in Spain the vote of the working class continues to go to leftist and progressive parties. There is a key that explains why the PSOE survives the Zapatero legislatures, the emergence of 15M or Podemos. It is because their vote is supported by the working class. It is one of the factors that explains why the surprise of Podemos is not produced.
#Eduardo #Bayón #political #scientist #Spain #vote #working #class #continues #leftist #progressive #parties
