Under these conditions of structural weakness, the Cuban government tried more aggressively in 2021, an economic opening with European countries, limited by bureaucratic criteria; a monetary unification that caused an inflationary spiral and the expansion of self-employment activities (from 127 to more than 2,000) to increase the role of the private sector in the economy that has not ended.
Beyond the economic embargo against it, Cuba failed to transform itself due to 3 burdens: (1) the bureaucratization of its ruling civil and military caste linked to the army and the Cuban communist party; (2) the impossibility of this ruling caste to get rid of a model tattooed for 60 years with these characteristics: economic nationalization, strict control of prices and wages, censorship of freedom of expression, systematic surveillance and personalized social control, and selective repression and / or massive; and (3) the inability of said dominant caste to sacrifice the iron political control over Cubans to open the economy with democracy, through the free and full exercise of the human rights of its 11 million inhabitants.
Will the protests shake that bureaucratized bunker of the ruling caste in Cuba? Hardly.
Do these demonstrations due to the lack of freedom and well-being foresee the terminal illness of the Cuban regime? Yes, but nothing more.
Ironically, the death (with a wake and mariachi included) of the Cuban regime does not depend, neither on its president Miguel Díaz-Canel or on the caste in power, and much less on the Cubans themselves, but on the multipolar game between the United States. Japan, China, Russia and the European Community.
Therefore, the day the Cuban regime falls, in which country will Cuba be transformed? What will be the quality of freedom to which Cubans aspire?
Would it be the same that prevails in Puerto Rico or the Dominican Republic? Or would Cubans migrate to Miami, to refound – once again – their definition of freedom – American way – there?