Arab and foreign oil
(The foreigner or the non-Arab here, is what is not an Arabic tongue and has no connection with the land of Persia or modern Iran). Trade before oil was not a driver of all approaches towards the geography of the Arab Gulf with its strategic content from the perspective of the (strategic) national interests of the foreigners of yesterday and today, and the recent reaction of Ajam today (Washington) regarding the decision of “OPEC +” is nothing but an affirmation of a conviction that is not related to reality and is rooted in their conscience. Energy security is not an urgent challenge on the scene of major crises, but keeping oil the permanent engine of the borders of the Gulf-US relations is an equation that lacks the possibility of sustainability.
Oil represented the most important engine of American diplomacy in containing the Ukrainian crisis, to the point of dropping the rest of what it defined as priorities. The Iranian nuclear file is no longer a priority, and the Europeans have overcome their narrow differences, and succeeded in enforcing a centralized pricing and purchasing mechanism for energy. As for Tehran, it saw bias in favor of its ally, Moscow, in order to maintain existing bilateral interdependence (its nuclear file/regional interests), and perhaps it saw in the development of bilateral relations an effective security umbrella and backer in the event that Iranian events got out of control. On another track, Washington accomplished a historic maritime border demarcation agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which represented the consolidation of the vitality of energy diplomacy or economic diplomacy.
Unlike the security of Europe, energy and food were the most important external drivers of the Ukrainian crisis, but both of them declined in terms of influence after the success of Europe and its strategic partners in neutralizing “energy” politically. This is due to the impossibility of Moscow accepting to admit defeat in light of its existing political equation.
However, Washington’s failure to develop models for more realistic approaches and similar to its success in the Lebanese-Israeli agreement with its Gulf allies in relation to their national security, coupled with this, Europe’s failure to realize the risks of delaying the signing of free trade pacts with the same allies, may cost them a lot if it is decided to join them. BRICS group. Europe in particular remembers the position of the Gulf sovereign funds in the financial crisis of 2008 and how they were in support of the programs to rescue its financial and banking sector.
Restoring stability to the whole of the Middle East is the greatest common challenge for all of its countries, as well as the need to neutralize the region from the dangers of rough geostrategic rivalry between the United States and China. And what is the announcement by the Saudi Foreign Minister, His Highness Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, on the sidelines of the meeting of the Saudi-Chinese Supreme Committee, “that there is an upcoming visit of the Chinese president to Riyadh, and that it will witness three Saudi, Gulf and Arab summits.”
Strategic balance is what all the countries of the region aspire to. If the traditional allies fail to realize the reality of what the current transformations in the methodology of the Arab Gulf states represent as an expression of their new philosophy, they will need to create a new dictionary.
* Bahraini writer
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