The Ukrainian offensive in the Russian Kursk region has been ongoing since August 6. A short-term success does not necessarily have long-term effects.
- The Kursk offensive may have brought benefits to Ukraine: Russian security gaps exposed and boosted Ukrainian morale
- Dangers of Ukrainian invasion: Kursk operation could result in more Ukrainian than Russian losses
- Key factors for ending the war in Ukraine: willingness to make sacrifices, aid to Ukraine and agreements
- The Ukrainian Kursk Offensive: Two Lessons from the Invasion of Russia
- This article is available in German for the first time – it was first published on August 28, 2024 by the magazine Foreign Policy.
Kursk – Is Ukraine’s surprise counter-offensive against Russia a decisive turning point in the war, a meaningless sideshow or a strategic misstep by Kiev? In the short term it was largely a success, but the medium to long term perspective is what matters. Does it have wider implications for Western policy towards Russia in general and the War in Ukraine in particular?
The fortunes of war have swung back and forth several times since Russia invaded in February 2022, and no outside observer has got it right. For this reason, a certain degree of modesty is in order. As with most wars, it is impossible to know exactly where the limits of either side’s capabilities or resolve lie. It is difficult to predict how third parties will react to new developments. That said, I see little reason to believe that Ukraine’s invasion of the Kursk region will have a significant positive impact on its fortunes.
Possible benefits for Ukraine from the Kursk offensive in Russia
To be sure, the offensive has already brought some obvious benefits to Kyiv. It has given a much-needed boost to Ukrainian morale and helped to allay fears that Kyiv is locked in a war of attrition against a larger adversary it can neither defeat nor survive. It has put the war back in the headlines and strengthened voices calling for greater Western support. It has exposed serious deficiencies in Russian intelligence and preparedness. The offensive could well put Russian President Vladimir Putin embarrassed, although there is no sign that the invasion has weakened its resolve or slowed the Russian advance in Donbass.
It is encouraging that Ukraine has had some success on the battlefield, but this operation is unlikely to affect the outcome of the war. On the positive side, the attack demonstrated admirable initiative by Ukraine and an impressive level of operational secrecy, which is why the attacking forces faced an insufficient number of poorly trained Russian defenders. In some ways, the attack was similar to the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv in the fall of 2022, which also came as a tactical surprise and encountered outnumbered and inexperienced Russian forces.
Dangers of the invasion of Kursk: Potentially high losses for Ukraine
Unfortunately, these events say very little about Ukraine’s ability to gain ground against well-prepared and adequately manned Russian defenses, such as those that thwarted the Ukrainian offensive a year ago. Moreover, the Kursk operation may result in more Ukrainian than Russian casualties, and that is not a trade-off Ukraine can afford. It would be a big mistake to conclude from recent successes on the Kursk front that additional Western aid will enable Ukraine to defend the Donbas or the Crimea to recapture.
This last point is crucial because the two states are in a very different situation. Both sides have lost a lot of troops and
equipment, but Ukraine has lost far more territory. According to published reports, Ukraine has now captured about 400 square kilometers of Russian territory and forced about 200,000 Russians to evacuate those areas. These figures represent 0.0064 percent of Russia’s total land area and 0.138 percent of Russia’s population. In contrast, Russia now controls about 20 percent of Ukraine, and the war has reportedly forced nearly 35 percent of Ukraine’s population to flee. Even if Kiev can hold onto the recently captured territory, it will not provide much leverage.
Key factors for Ukraine’s fate: willingness to make sacrifices, aid to Ukraine and agreements
It follows that Ukraine’s fate will depend primarily on events in Ukraine, not on the Kursk operation. The key factors will be the willingness and ability of both sides to continue to make sacrifices on the battlefield, the level of support Ukraine receives from others, and whether an agreement can eventually be reached that leaves the unoccupied parts of Ukraine intact and secure.
To that end, the United States and Europe should continue to support Ukraine, but that support should be coupled with serious and unsentimental efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and eventual settlement. Unfortunately, U.S. officials seem to have forgotten how to get even close allies to agree to a ceasefire, even when those states depend on U.S. support and a ceasefire is clearly in America’s interest.
Russia at war with Ukraine: Lessons from the Kursk Offensive
The Kursk offensive raises at least two more questions, but it is important to draw the right lessons from it. The first and most obvious lesson is a reminder of Russia’s limited reach and inadequate military performance. Since 2022, warmongers have tried to convince us that Putin was hell-bent on restoring the Russian empire and perhaps even the Warsaw Pact, and that Ukraine was just the first step before he launched new attacks on the existing order.
Given Russia’s repeated missteps in this war, and given that even its successful advances have been slow to progress, can anyone still believe that Russia poses a serious military threat to the rest of Europe? Those raising the threat have used this specter to bolster support for Ukraine, but relying on fear-mongering usually leads to poor strategic decisions.
Second, several commentators – including the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky – suggested that Kyiv’s successful incursion into Russia shows that existing red lines and other restrictions on Ukrainian operations should be discarded. Likewise, the suggestion was that the West should allow Ukraine to fight Russia as it wishes. If Ukrainian troops can enter Russian territory without triggering a Russian escalation, the argument goes, it proves that Putin is a paper tiger and that his previous threats of escalation (including some not-so-veiled references to nuclear weapons) were bluffs that have now been blown.
Such arguments are used to provide Ukraine with more and better weapons and to remove restrictions on their use, and I do not blame the Ukrainian leadership for pushing this idea. But the claim that there is no danger of escalation, no matter what Ukraine does, should be firmly rejected.
States are most likely to escalate when they are losing a war; Ukraine’s decision to invade Russian territory can indeed be seen as a risky attempt to reverse a trend against it. In contrast, Putin has no incentive to escalate when his forces are still victorious in Donbas. The danger of Russia escalating only exists when
Moscow faces a catastrophic defeat, but that is not the case today.
Negotiations to end the war in Ukraine – the West has missed its chance
It is not just the ongoing risk of escalation in an ongoing war. We should ask ourselves whether it is morally acceptable to support a war whose stated goals are likely to be unattainable while neglecting to make serious diplomatic efforts to end the fighting. The likely outcome of our current policies is that more people will die, with no political goal in sight.
Pushing for a negotiated solution to the war between Russia and Ukraine is one of those cases where self-interest and morality are aligned. The West and Ukrainians have missed the chance to prevent or end this war through negotiations, and Ukraine’s recent military success should be seen as an opportunity to begin serious ceasefire talks. The success should not be used as an excuse to prolong a costly war that Ukraine can survive but is unlikely to win.
About the author
Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University. X: @stephenwalt
We are currently testing machine translations. This article has been automatically translated from English into German.
This article was first published in English on August 28, 2024 in the magazine “ForeignPolicy.com“ was published – as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to readers of the IPPEN.MEDIA portals.
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