Tomorrow it will be 80 years since the armistice of the Continuation War. When thinking about Ukraine, reference has been made to our visit in 1944. Is there a basis for comparison?
Finland was a side stage of the Great War, Ukraine is the focal point, so the situations are completely different. I don’t usually believe that history repeats itself, not even by Karl Marx with the addition that first as a tragedy, then as a farce. It must have been a clarification made on the flap.
One big unifying factor is: the counterpart. And there is persistent repetition in the foreign policy of the great powers, meaning that Moscow’s way of acting in 1944 and 2024 can be compared.
In November 1943 Stalin received intelligence through Stockholm that the peace opposition was getting stronger in Finland and that the Sdp’s direction could change. And not the marshal Mannerheim had been a Nazi, but he would make peace as long as independence was preserved.
The Soviet Union had just proposed to the Western powers that Finland should be demanded unconditional surrender, because it was Hitler’s “the most dangerous ally”. Now Stalin made a sudden U-turn, told the leaders of the West his conditions for Finland (border after the Winter War, Petsamo and war reparations), signaled Stockholm’s willingness to negotiate and promised not to interfere with Mannerheim if he made peace.
Not either Vladimir Putin you just need to ask others. He trusts the information he received from the past like his idol.
When the contact was made, Moscow persuaded Finland to cut ties with Germany and agree to the terms. It was not mentioned that at the same time harsh additional conditions were being prepared, bases in Suomenlinna and Åland, a new eastern border even at Kymijoki and other things. If Finland had been left at the mercy of Moscow, these would have been put on the table. The negotiation tactics have hardly changed.
Finnish did not budge, so Stalin transferred the matter to the soldiers. Now we didn’t go to war like in the winter war and Ukraine. The big offensive in June brought the Red Army to Vyborg. It cost 87,000 men, but Moscow’s resilience was high even then. The Akkas are making new soldiers, they boasted.
After the loss of Vyborg, Finland inquired about peace terms. On June 23, Moscow responded greedily by demanding surrender. In general, Sweden was irreplaceable support for Finland, but now Stockholm diplomats exaggerated the chaos in Helsinki to the Russians and believed that Finland was asking for peace “on any terms”.
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Stalin realized his mistake.
Finland did not surrender, but made an agreement with Germany, received help and steeled herself with the fury of despair. The Red Army’s offensive stopped and no reinforcements were received, because the race towards Berlin had begun in the west, landing in Normandy.
The Swedish lords were dismayed by Finland’s solution. They hoped for the Red Army’s “rapid advance to Helsingfors” and saw the Finns’ affliction as “an incurable disease, namely stupidity”. It was believed that the occupation of Finland would be short.
I will lose under threat, it is risky to rely on well-intentioned supporters who themselves neither have to nor want to have to go to war. Let those who have their country and their lives at stake have the last word.
Stalin realized his mistake. Moscow returned to the position of conditional peace and even took into account the British wish for paper and lumber. Finland had an opportunity to earn foreign exchange even during war reparations.
As a surprise, the Porkkala rental area near the capital remained in the conditions. “Lord Jesus! Even this!” got from Mannerheim when he saw the message from the negotiators.
However, Finland could start reconstruction nine months before the end of the war in Europe and make decisions while the Allies were still in the allian
ce. Once again, timing weighed on the fate of a small operator. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill saw that Europe would only be left with the waste of broken states, but these did not include Finland.
Of course, we cannot offer the year 1944 as a model for Ukraine, but the experience provides a backbone for discussion.
The author is a professor emeritus of political history at the University of Helsinki.
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