“These are moments that have broken through the barrier of uncertainty and instability. The world today has a capacity for devastation unprecedented in the history of humanity”says Juan Gabriel Tokatliana sociologist specializing in global issues and international relations, with a PhD from Johns Hopkins University School and who lived in Colombia for 17 years, where he was a senior researcher at the Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (Iepri) of the National University and co-founded and directed the Center for International Studies at the University of the Andes.
According to the criteria of
Tokatlian refers to the absence of moderating factors in the international system, which today is combined with the nuclear threat, the existence of anachronistic institutions for new problems and different times and the influence of leaders who destroy institutions and subordinate their foreign policy to internal, personal and short-term interests. And for him, the scenario is highly disturbing.
What are the alarm bells? What could be the possible ways out of the catastrophic and dystopian situations that are already taking place? Tokatlian attempts some answers to these questions in a book he has just published, Unsolicited advice on international politics (Twenty-one Century Editors).
For several months, Tokatlian spoke with the journalist and writer Hinde Pomeraniec, a connoisseur and scholar of international issues. The result of this meeting is not an academic or theoretical book, but a broad tour of several of the most pressing issues of our time. The format could not be more attractive for those who wish to immerse themselves in international policy and also for those who seek to understand the conflicts of these times.
You maintain that today there is no country or coalition of States that has the capacity for full and universal hegemony. We are in a heterogeneous, fragmented and uncertain world, crossed by an earthquake that produces short and long movements, deeper or more superficial. Where do we stand?
Your question is significant because today we feel that the ground is moving around us, that there is no horizon, and because that is combined with a feeling of anxiety and frustration. I want to offer a point of view with a conceptual structure. What does this mean? I try to look at a historical pattern, a short cycle and a joint.
Let’s go by parts…
Historically, the essential thing is that, since the end of the 18th century, there has been an unquestionable predominance of the West: an attempt to universalize a set of values, premises, interests, preferences, institutions and rules established by the West. This very long process has different turning points, but one of the biggest turning points is the decade of the 70s and early 80s of the last century, when it begins to become evident that this predominance is eroded, questioned and another center of gravity gradually emerges in the world that is no longer the West, but is the East as a whole. Beyond China, China included, of course. In turn, there is a short cycle that refers to what is known as Post-Cold Warfrom 1991 onwards. In this short cycle, the United States has the disposition, the will and the possibility to shape the international order with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the communist world and a Europe that begins to lose weight comparatively in the international system. This short cycle full of promises and expectations begins to be hacked with a series of crises and a series of challenges.
As which?
One of the most important crises for international political purposes was that of Kosovo, where intervention was finally carried out outside the United Nations, through NATO. This shows a first break. That is to say, the institution that was destined to preserve international peace and security begins to follow the dictates of a group of actors much more than those of the international community. Another crisis It is the financial crisis of 2008, a basically Western crisis, centered in the United States and then expanded to Europe.
And what are the objections?
I would say that there is a challenge from the non-state side with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. That is, a non-state actor, a terrorist, a fundamentalist, says: “Not only are we not going to recognize your value system, preferences and objectives; we are going to beat them up and, if we can, we are going to overthrow them.” After Al Qaeda comes the Islamic State, which also dreams of recreating a caliphate from several centuries ago. And then, there is a challenge from the state, from the same perspective. State and at two different times: in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea by Russia – there are historical reasons to say that Crimea belonged to Russia–; and then in February 2022 with the invasion of Ukraine. With this, the short cycle of the post-Cold War period ended. And what is the current situation? It is a situation in which not only is there the war in Ukraine but we have a new devastating conflict, which is the Middle East, derived from the terrorist act of Hamas and the ferocious response of Israel as well. Two cases in which the lack of moderation factors in the system is evident. And the problem is that the United Nations is not only in a tremendous crisis, but its legitimacy is beginning to be questioned.
What other moderating factors have lost weight or disappeared?
There are several. Today There are no visible political leadersclear, key and recognized with the capacity to forge agreements that are acceptable to the main protagonists of the global scene. Another moderating factor is the functioning of democracy, but what we have today is a democracy in decline, not only in the periphery, in the world, even in West. What is another moderating factor? A certain economic stability, one that would allow us to think that we are facing projects that will strengthen the old welfare state. That would help. But, since that is not happening either, today we have a lot of social unrest and it is very widespread. So, I think that we are in the most dangerous historical moment for humanity since the end of the Second World War. These moments are prone to friction, dispute, confrontation. And the great novelty is that now the competition is not intra-Western, now the gravitation of a new pole is in the East. We have the feeling that there is a threat there. And at the same time we have levels of militarization and defense spending that have surpassed in the last three years all the trends that we had previously and, in addition, we live this transition process with nuclear weapons. Today’s world – in which there is not one or several computers in the international system – has today a capacity for devastation unprecedented in the history of humanity. These are moments that have broken through the barrier of uncertainty and instability.
In the past there were dictatorships and democracies. Today there are autocracies and democracies that were liberal, which in some cases are transitioning to illiberal democracies. How do these internal state issues impact the international game?
Foreign policy It was always understood as that very delicate balance between the national imperative and international responsibility. One of the issues that has changed the most is the primacy of domestic politics: domestic politics is increasingly important and guides, to a large extent, many international behaviors. You have to win elections, so to win elections you have to mobilize public opinion based on something. Who is my enemy? Who is the threat? Then, I declare, I speak out, I decide on questions of international politics to guarantee my national victories And then there is another factor that is becoming more and more evident: the religious component of domestic politics. It has always existed. But today it is much more visible. So that balance that I mentioned at the beginning has been breaking down.
What weight does the personality of the leaders have in this?
It has a huge impact. And much more so in times of crisis than in times of routine. When there is a crisis, and there are repeated and recurring crises, the role of people does not determine foreign policy, but it does influence, it does have an impact. It is not the only reason for decisions, but it becomes much more important than before. So, when we look at the world today, we see the emergence of reactionary leaders in different contexts that seek to radically transform domestic politics and, consequently, in pursuing this goal, aspire to also modify international politics through this dynamic where the primacy of the internal displaces this subtle and complex balance between internal imperative and international responsibility.
In the book you define some interesting concepts: what exactly is diplomacy, how paradiplomacy plays out – with its informal channels – and what is antidiplomacy. How do you apply these ideas to the current government of Argentina?
The objective of the diplomacy is to expand and improve contacts and agreements at the State level. For its part, the anti-diplomacy seeks to foster ideological coalitions and alliances between peers. Milei is an active part of a network that is, in fact, a Reactionary International. One sees people of different origins who are united by a vision of a glorious past in each nation, who seek to refound a new national order and internationally and seek to turn back the clock on social rights. If diplomacy has a sense of moderation and balance, anti-diplomacy is based on emotion and excess. And in the case of Milei, the Foreign Ministry has not known or been able to moderate this (…). I think that what a country that is declining like Argentina needs are partners, friends, companions, counterparts that contribute to recovering power and influence. Therefore, the binary logic of settling into ‘one against the other’ is dysfunctional.
If the problems of democracy are solved with more democracy and the problems of integration are solved with more integration, in Latin America we are facing a big problem…
The problems of Latin Americaand South America in particular, are problems derived from the high level of disintegration. Here there is a very serious problem of disintegration, of lack of capacity to act jointly in this world. And we have been on this path of disintegration for years, it is before MileiNow, Milei is not interested in integration because I get the impression that behind his hyper-Westernism there is the subterranean idea that we can have a special relationship with the United States, something that we have never had and that the US only has with two countries: the United Kingdom and Israel. What do I mean? If he is not interested in integration and fantasizes about a special relationship, he will become a provocateur of further disintegration. He has the fantasy of a special relationship with the United States that many of our countries always proclaim, aspire to, dream about and never achieve, because USA has no special relations in this part of the world.
What do you see as a possible Trump victory?
If Trump wins, I think the region is going to suffer under Trump. We are going to see a Trump who, in addition, is going to be vindictive for everything he failed to achieve in the previous administration, he is going to be tremendous in terms of migration, the wall, protectionism for his products… And in the specific case of Argentina, I do not believe at this point – after the deplorable situation shown by the case of the expansion of credit to Macri – that the International Monetary Fund wants to become hyperpoliticized again due to pressure from Trump to give money to Argentina. So, it does not seem to me that the fantasy that Trump will arrive and embrace Milei to Make America Great Again and Make Argentina Great Again is going to happen.
ASTRID PIKIELNY
FOR THE NATION (ARGENTINA) – GDA
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