HS Analysis | The next president no longer needs Niinistö's super skills

“General has spoken.”

This Sauli Niinistön comment to the Russian To Nikolai Makarov recalled a journalist specializing in security policy at Helsingin Sanomat Kari Huhta.

Niinistö didn't really say anything, but in the 2012 security policy debate, the message was clear. Makarov had warned Finland about too close NATO relations. Between the lines of Niinistö's laconic statement, you could read what was thought in Finland about Russian advice on national defense.

Niinistö was a master in such situations. He knew how to play the same game with the Russian leaders. Some of the cards always remained hidden. Niinistö had the poker face of tough international politics and a strategic mind.

Many people are used to expecting this kind of skill from the next president as well. But is it needed in the same way anymore?

Niinistön the way of working with the Russians can be described in terms of international politics as a so-called obfuscation strategy (strategic ambiguity), as intentional ambiguity or ambiguity.

This obfuscation is practiced in international politics especially by the great powers. For example, US foreign policy includes strategic ambiguity regardless of the president.

Strategic obfuscation is often done when the relationship with another country is vague or there are several approaches at the same time.

Finland had this kind of relationship with Russia for a long time. Although Finland's defense was actually built on the premise that Finland's central security challenge was Russia, the Finnish political leaders hardly spoke about it out loud. The importance of good relations and dialogue was publicly emphasized. NATO membership was an option.

The idea was that when the talks were unclear, Russia would also be a little on its toes in relation to Finland.

In terms of trade policy, Russia was seen as an opportunity.

On the line also had his critics.

One critic of this obfuscation strategy was a researcher at the Foreign Policy Institute Mika Aaltola. At the time of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, he wrote In Suomen Kuvalehti, how obfuscation could indeed be wise from an internal political point of view, because it facilitated the cooperation of those who disagreed.

President Urho Kekkonen was such a skilled obfuscation that he was admired by both peace researchers and colonels, Aaltola wrote.

But the strategy was
risky for a small country. In Aaltola's opinion, obfuscation was indeed succeeded by the great powers. For a small country like Finland, it could lead to uncontrollable situations.

Aaltola's danger was self-deception. Although the obscurity was a cunning gimmick, some could read it as Finland's right line. Maintaining the line would also be difficult in the long term.

No matter how much one imagines otherwise in Finland, the obscurity could not escape the fact that Finland had a long border with Russia. And Russia's perception of Finland could be completely different from Finland's own perception of itself.

President Urho Kekkonen and Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev were photographed during Kekkonen's visit to Moscow in December 1963. Picture: V. Yegorov

when Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, the time of strategic obfuscation in Finland is over. The masks were taken off.

Now almost everything is different in foreign policy. Ten years ago, even Mika Aaltlaka would hardly have believed, for example, that he would answer the phone in 2024 at his same workplace at the Foreign Policy Institute, but has just ended his presidential election campaign with a stinging defeat in the first round.

But what does Aaltola think about the qualities required of a president, both as a researcher and as someone who has experienced presidential elections?

Finland's foreign policy line before the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was classic obfuscation, says Aaltola. It also had a direct impact on what were previously considered the qualities of a skilled president.

In Aaltola's opinion, is it possible to think that the certain cryptic nature of Niinistö's speeches was a skill of his time?

Exactly like this, says Aaltola. He describes this skill as the president's “unreliability”.

Niinistö was just that, unreliable.

In the former world, being untrustworthy was one of the most important skills of a Finnish president. But now the new president no longer needs the same. Finland's next president does not necessarily have to be a cunning ring fox.

Finland is no longer sitting on the fence. Half is selected.

In this foreign policy situation, instead of obscurity, the president is expected strategic clarity.

When situations change, the great powers also give up strategic obfuscation. For example, dealing with international politics Foreign Policy -magazine wrote in January that the United States should abandon it
in relation to the Sino-Taiwan conflict.

Instead of enigmatic tricks, one should be more strategically clear.

President Sauli Niinistö and Prime Minister Sanna Marin (sd) held a press conference on February 24, 2022 shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine. Picture: Rio Gandara / HS

These the presidential elections are the first in Finland in a time when Finland's relationship with Russia is no longer characterized by obscurity.

In this sense, Sauli Niinistö's season already ended when Russia attacked Ukraine.

Now the president's line must be understandable to everyone. Both for the Russian leadership, allies and Finland's own citizens.

Of course, a certain lack of trust is still needed in international politics. When it comes to Russia, the era of distrust of the president is completely over. But, for example, the relationship with China is another matter. As part of the EU, Finland is thinking about whether we are China's partners, competitors or, in some cases, almost enemies. In that respect, there is still a need for the strategic obscurity of the foreign policy leadership.

Still, clarity is now the basic line of Finnish foreign policy.

At least the public debate is refreshed by strategic clarity. It is no longer necessary to talk about foreign policy in such a way that important issues have to be interpreted between the lines.