The Russian political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann sees Vladimir Putin’s system in distress: repression is increasing, the loyalty of the security organs is bought with weapons and a lot of money.
This interview lies IPPEN.MEDIA as part of a cooperation with Security. Table Professional Briefing before – first published it Security.Table on July 17, 2023.
Yekaterina Schulmann is a Russian political scientist who researches authoritarian state models, in particular the Putin system, at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. Before the Ukraine war she worked at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences (Shaninka). She left Russia with her family in April 2022 and was able to settle in Berlin thanks to a scholarship from the Robert Bosch Foundation.
Ms Schulman, you recently asked politicians in Brussels to set up a contact point for Russians living in exile in the EU. So you don’t expect to be able to return to Russia anytime soon?
There are always individual considerations as to whether someone wants and can return. In Brussels I pointed out that such a post is necessary because there are hundreds of thousands of people from Russia living in the EU who are officially branded as traitors by the Russian side. This means that they are excluded from Russian state services, Russian missions do not protect them, and it may even be dangerous for them to use the services of the missions. And the number of these exiles is growing. At the moment it is unclear when and if at all these people can return. That’s why it would be good if someone took care of their concerns.
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How stable do you think the Putin system is, especially against the background of the attempted putsch by the head of the Wagner mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in June?
As for the attempted coup: Contrary to the usual practice in failed military uprisings, this coup was not suppressed or crushed, but negotiated with those responsible. Apparently there is a deal with Prigozhin. We don’t know what he looks like, and as time goes by, everything becomes more and more opaque. But we see that the system is buying loyalty again. The National Guard (Rosgwardiya) is not only promised tanks and other heavy weapons, but from October all employees in all law enforcement and security bodies will also receive a 10.5 percent salary increase. So far, the system has relied on carrots and not sticks.
What about the military who are said to have been interrogated and never showed up?
Apart from the vague rumors about the resignation of this or that general, there were no signs of major personnel changes in the power system. No one was held publicly accountable, either for the mutiny itself or for failing to prevent and end it.
“By mobilizing, Putin broke an unspoken agreement with the people”
How do you interpret that?
Well, the stability of a system is characterized by its ability to maintain the status quo without exceeding the usual level of violence. But if you have to put in significantly more effort to suppress dissatisfaction, then that is a sign of destabilization. It can be accompanied by more repression if power shifts in the internal structures, for example more to the repressive authorities. This then affects the entire structure. This also increases the dependency of the state on these repressive authorities: The system may then have to set up an even more powerful authority, such as the NKVD secret service under Stalin or the SS during the Nazi era.
On the other hand, the political system might feel too threatened right now to launch a major campaign of repression. The resignations of generals mentioned above triggered public protests from the military. The Kremlin cannot afford to further antagonize the elites, who already have many reasons for dissatisfaction.
Do you already see signs of a new, more powerful organ of repression?
Not yet. We see that the system is trying with all its might to stay the way it is. This is also supported by the many honors and trips that Putin received after the Wagner uprising, during which he even pretended to be close to the people. But even before that, the problematic mobilization, for example, showed that the regime had difficulties. With the mobilization, Vladimir Putin broke the unspoken agreement with the people that the people should remain apolitical and in return be left alone.
You have been living in exile in Germany for more than a year, travel a lot in Europe and speak to many politicians. How do you rate the knowledge about Russia here?
I have a hard time with reviews like this. I can only say that the Russia expertise in Germany, for example, was always very high…
… the Baltic states or Poland would contradict you. You say Germany was very naive and didn’t see the danger posed by Russia.
This is not a contradiction: Germany acted in its own interest. It did so not because it did not consider Russia aggressive, but because it did not consider itself dangerous.
“Talks with Putin are pointless”
How would you describe the current state of the Putin system?
The system falls apart. Slow or fast – that’s unclear, only the way is clear: It’s going downhill. Putin can secure another term in government in the next elections in 2024, all critics are locked up, the elections are held electronically, over several days and even in the Ukrainian areas now integrated by the Russian constitution. But who is to recognize these elections and Putin’s victory? Belarus? Syria? The EU will have to face this question. Because that has very big consequences in international politics. So far I have not heard anything from Brussels about this.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently did not rule out calling Vladimir Putin again. Do you think Putin can still be persuaded to reconsider his war course?
No. Talking to Putin is pointless. It’s his war. Putin is war. As deeply as he is emotionally involved in it, no one else is. Its surroundings are different. When I talk to German political representatives, I often hear the question: who could be our partner? That’s the wrong question at this point. Now it would be necessary to talk to people who have reason to be dissatisfied with Putin’s course. And there is.
For example?
You only have to look at the biographies or family backgrounds of people like Defense Minister Shoigu or Security Council chief Patrushev to see that they, too, have reasons to be dissatisfied. Sergei Shoigu, for example, has no interest in taking responsibility for the war’s failure. At the same time, he has a lot of power in the Moscow region through his connection to the governor, who is the son of one of his closest associates. Nikolai Patrushev, who stood above the current president in the earlier stages of his career, may well see his son, the Minister of Agriculture, as a suitable candidate for the next presidential post, in contrast to the president who has no sons. The same applies to every permanent member of the Security Council and to all members of the political elite.
But is there access for Western representatives to these people?
You know, it’s not my job to seek that access.
To person
Yekaterina Schulmann is a Russian political scientist who researches authoritarian state models, in particular the Putin system, at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. Before the Ukraine war she worked at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences (Shaninka). She left Russia with her family in April 2022 and was able to settle in Berlin thanks to a scholarship from the Robert Bosch Foundation. Schulmann comments on current developments in Russia on her own Telegram channel and via YouTube. Her videos and comments reach hundreds of thousands of interested people.
(Interview: Viktor Funk)
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